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This work is an attempt to develop a general ethical framework, the product of the synthesis 
of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, giving us a basic account of the dignity of persons and 
the structure of the moral community. There is a Kantian doctrine of human dignity, and 
an associated conception of the nature of morality, which together should be taken to 
provide the basic conceptual framework in ethical theory. However, the conception of 
morality implicated in the Kantian story recognises not only the dignity of human beings 
as moral subjects, but also the dignity (the special moral standing) of all sentient beings, 
who therefore count as persons for moral purposes. This is shown to be the case by means 
of an argument for Utilitarianism (taken as a technical view in philosophy) being consistent 
with the basic Kantian framework already in place, argument that involves disassociating 
Utilitarianism from both Consequentialism and Welfarism and construing it as an Agapist 
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1. The Core Project 
 
There is more than one thing that this work constitutes. If I am pressed to pick one as the 
main one, however, my answer has to be the following: this work is a restatement of 
Utilitarianism as an ethical theory. This work is also an extended argument to the effect that 
all animals – all sentient beings – are persons with dignity (persons with a specific type of 
moral standing and citizenship in our moral community under principles of equality), but 
as you might expect my defence of this claim is constitutive of my case for Utilitarianism as 
an ethical theory, a case that consists mostly in trying to state the view (which I submit has 
never been done sufficiently or even adequately).1  
 This work also argues for a Kantian conception of human dignity and for a distinctively 
Kantian conception of morality, but yet again this is also constitutive of my proposed 
formulation of Utilitarianism as an ethical theory. Which brings me straight to the nature 
of this work. My job here is mainly a creative or reconstructive one challenging certain 
aspects of dominant narrative in philosophy: to restate Utilitarianism as an ethical theory 
and its distinctive account of the moral standing of all sentient beings, i.e. to explain what 
these things actually amount to (which may not exactly correspond to what most people 
presently take them to amount to, and this including most self-identified Utilitarians), by 
bringing Kant’s moral philosophy to bear in positive and significant ways (which perhaps 
many people would regard as out of place given how much narrative we have received 
portraying Kantian ethics as the nemesis of Utilitarianism).  
 In relation to Utilitarianism in particular, this work aims to show that the view is 
perfectly consistent with Kant’s doctrine of human dignity (i.e. properly understood and 
so stripped from certain claims often though falsely attributed to it, most prominently those 
affirming the objectification and commodification of non-human animals)2 and even with 
                                               
1 Thus, again, the task of restating Utilitarianism as an ethical theory.  
2 I submit that claims affirming the objectification and commodification of non-human animals, for instance 
the claim that non-human animals are ‘things’ with no value beyond ‘price’ who are therefore to be treated 
 2 
his basic account of the nature of morality (a view depicting morality as irreducibly a matter 
of attitude on the part of human beings themselves, i.e. of things happening in the privacy 
of human wills and therefore quite independently of felicific consequences and 
tendencies). Now, this project of bringing Kantian philosophy to bear on the formulation 
of Utilitarianism – what is essentially a positive endeavour in ethical theory – goes together 
with a negative project, namely that of disassociating Utilitarianism from both 
Consequentialism and Welfarism. Openly challenging customary narrative in philosophy, I 
argue that Utilitarianism neither determines the morality of human activity on the basis of 
its consequences nor claims that happiness or well-being is ‘the only intrinsic good’; it 
certainly doesn’t make the morality (the moral value or moral worth) of actions depend on 
their felicific consequences (their impact on everyone’s well-being, be it in actuality or in 
expectation).3 Thus, again, the task of explaining what Utilitarianism actually amounts to, 
which may not correspond exactly to what most people (for some reason or other) presently 
take it to amount to. 
 In relation to my proposed defence of the moral standing of non-human animals 
in particular (which I am presenting as constitutive of my case for Utilitarianism as an 
ethical theory), the goal is to explain why this can and should be done in relation to ideas 
                                               
as ‘mere means’, are falsely attributed to the Kantian doctrine of human dignity even if Kant himself portrayed 
them as essential. Kant has frequently been criticised both for this mistaken attribution and for the claims 
themselves objectifying and commodifying non-human animals, and deservedly so. However, the punishment 
for Kant’s mistakes in this area (outrageous as they are, and damaging as they have been) cannot be to write 
Kantian ethics off, as Kant’s philosophy contains all manner of positive claims, arguments and conceptual 
frameworks that can be preserved under interpretations of them that don’t entail the objectification and 
commodification of non-human animals; claims, arguments and conceptual frameworks that can actually be 
put to work in the project of defending the dignity of non-human animals. Kant’s authority over ‘Kantian 
ethics’ (which is threatened by these claims) is discussed towards the end of this Introduction. 
3 The argument offered in this area is not only that Utilitarianism is falsely (although to some extent 
understandably) associated with so-called Consequentialism and Welfarism; the argument is also meant to 
show that these views are false, thus making dissociation from them not an option but a necessity for 
Utilitarians. The argument shows – on the basis of thoughts well expressed by Kant – that there is an intrinsic 
good of the relevant kind other than happiness and that, relatedly, the moral value of actions depends entirely 
on their relevant causes.  
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– such as those found in Kant and the larger scholastic tradition in philosophy – of human 
distinctness (human moral uniqueness in particular) and the special moral significance of 
our humanity (including ideas about the grounds of moral duty, but also about morality 
requiring us to relate to human beings in general in a special kind of way) under the rubric, 
once again, of human dignity.  
 And finally in relation to Kantian ethics, the main goal (which I have disclosed 
sufficiently already) is to disassociate the view from specific aspects of the story about the 
dignity of persons that is conventionally told on its behalf, a story that objectifies and 
commodifies non-human animals, and therefore, in truth, most persons, deeming them ‘things’ 
with no value beyond ‘price’ who are therefore rightly treated as ‘mere means’. Costumery 
narrative in relation to this issue has been damaging for all the parties involved, and this 
includes Kantian ethics itself as a view whose credibility has been hurt: how can people 
trust a view that under presentations of it widely regarded as standard (and for good reason 
if Kant is to be the ultimate standard in Kantian ethics) deems permissible acts that in truth 
constitute murder, theft and slavery?4 A view that in any case (as I have pointed out) 
                                               
4 My special phrasing here is meant to indicate that I don’t take Kant (or any of his faithful followers) to deem 
permissible acts of murder, theft and slavery under those rubrics. Rather, he gives us a view that deems 
permissible certain acts that in truth constitute murder, theft and slavery, excluding their victims from the 
relevant scope of reflection. To illustrate the kind of thing Kant is committed to saying: (i) murder is always 
the unlawful killing of someone (i.e. of a person); (ii) but a cow, for instance, is not ‘someone’ but instead only 
something, she (a word –  a personal pronoun – that Kant cannot use in consistency with his own principles) 
is a thing not a person; therefore (iii) no killing of a cow (not even an unlawful killing) can possibly count as 
murder. Now, this point alone doesn’t show that Kant’s philosophy deems permissible acts that in truth 
constitute murder, nor do similar points show that it allows for theft, slavery, etc. What has been shown 
(which goes deeper and is perhaps worse) is that non-human animals, i.e. in truth, most persons, do not even 
count (as ‘things’ that we can use as ‘mere means’) as potential victims of the relevant crimes in Kant’s 
philosophy. No act in relation to non-human animals as direct victims will ever count as an instance of the 
relevant crimes according to Kant, therefore, but it remains to be seen (what is a separate issue) whether any 
such action is in fact deemed permissible by Kant; after all, one could objectify and de-personify non-human 
animals, and exclude them from the scope of the relevant crimes, on the one hand, and nevertheless forbid 
anything being taken from them including their liberty and their lives, or forbid all actions that would 
otherwise – if done unto human beings, for instance – count as instances of the relevant crimes, or in any 
case – what is actually relevant here – forbid all actions that would in truth count as instances of the relevant 
 4 
objectifies and commodifies the vast majority of persons? Kantian ethics may be dominant 
in philosophy and enjoy a ‘good reputation’ even outside the profession, but until its 
principles be systematically revised (to do justice to the dignity of sentient beings in general) 
nobody can rightly hold it to be true or even a force for good in the world.5 
 Animal dignity is thus the concept under which the moral standing of sentient beings 
in general is developed (the standing of all sentient beings, human and non-human alike, 
as intended beneficiaries of morality), which together with the concept of specifically human 
dignity constitutes the moral general concept (which this work attempts to elucidate, both 
in its meaning and its moral significance, by means of the integration of Kantian and 
Utilitarian ethical theory) of the dignity of persons. 
 
2. Utilitarianism, the Dignity of Persons and Dominant Narrative in Philosophy  
 
From every Kantian it is expected that she will take the dignity of persons very seriously as a 
foundational concept in moral philosophy, but when it comes to Utilitarians the story is 
very different: here the expectation is that you should disregard dignity as piece of 
superstition and persons as of themselves morally insignificant. How come these 
expectations? I ask. How on Earth can it be generally seen as anomalous for a Utilitarian 
                                               
crimes, which one can do without recognising them as such). Now, since nowhere in his works did Kant 
oppose the everyday (by then also customary) consumption of non-human animals, indeed making statements 
entailing that he had no trouble whatsoever with such consumption (see, for instance, MM 6:409), and given 
that such consumption is in truth both murderous and theftuous (to mention only a couple of its evil 
qualities), then we do in fact have grounds to accuse Kant of giving us a view that deems permissible acts that 
in truth constitute murder, theft, etc. Kant is not alone in this, however, as most of our beloved ‘classics’ (just 
to speak of them) come out guilty when it comes to doing justice to non-human animals. Not even Bentham 
(the supposed father of Utilitarianism and according to some an animal liberationist) is off the hook in this 
area (see, for instance, Bentham 1823/1907, p.311).  
5 There are timeless truths in Kantian ethics even as Kant gave it to us originally, but these truths also suffer: 
they suffer from their association (which can of course be undone) with all the doctrine and rhetoric – all the 
evil doctrine and rhetoric supporting the objectification and commodification of the vast majority of persons 
– that we rightly blame on Kant’s folly. Happily, Kant is not the last word in ethics, not even in Kantian 
ethics. 
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to talk about the dignity of persons in relation to the foundations of her own ethical theory? 
There is a simple answer for this: dominant narrative in philosophy. 
 Thus, it is very often that we see people criticising Utilitarianism for failing to 
properly account for – and even for completely ignoring – the dignity of persons, but I argue 
that the truth is the reverse: without Utilitarianism (or in any case without a philosophy 
that is duly sentio-centric, i.e. sentio-centric about the relevant domain of moral significance) 
it is impossible to provide a credible account of the dignity of persons. Without a philosophy 
that deems the capacity for happiness sufficient for personhood, without a philosophy that 
accounts for the special moral standing of sentient beings in general and the basic moral 
equality that obtains between them (their equality as intended beneficiaries of morality, this 
being the domain of moral significance where a sentio-centric approach in moral 
philosophy is mandatory and essential),6 what we are likely left with is the objectification 
and commodification (in philosophy) of the vast majority of persons. The fact that 
Utilitarians haven’t for the most part been using the term ‘the dignity of persons’ is 
inconsequential and doesn’t in the least undermine the point I am making here, as (i) it is 
evident that they have been employing the concept under alternative headings (e.g. the moral 
standing of individuals), and (ii) their shunning specific terminology can be explained with 
reference to sociological factors that have no bearing on positive ethical theorising (e.g. by 
facts about how terminology has been monopolised in philosophy and related spheres of 
culture).7 
 We also very often see people criticising Utilitarianism for depicting human beings 
as nothing more than sensitive beings (for lowering human beings to the level of swine as 
                                               
6 By which I don’t mean to suggest that it is mandatory and essential that we adopt the perspective of our 
sentient (animal) self in our moral thinking, as if the perspective of the sentient self should somehow pass for 
a moral perspective. All I mean is that the extension of the relevant domain of moral significance (namely the 
domain of intended beneficiaries of morality in particular) is fixed by sentience (here as a shorthand for the 
capacity for happiness), meaning that all and only beings who are sentient (i.e. all and only beings who are capable of 
happiness) count as members of that domain.   
7 Which is not to excuse mistakes that Utilitarians have made in this area, including the very mistake of 
letting evil doctrine and rhetoric monopolise and define for us our basic everyday terms (the term person being 
perhaps the most important one).   
 6 
some people enjoyed putting it) and so for denying the rational moral nature (and therefore 
the very humanity) of human beings. Given that in the final account humanity equals moral 
nature (at least for the purposes of our present discussion), however, the accusation has to 
be that Utilitarianism denies the existence of human (morally rational) beings, which then 
raises the question why Utilitarians have been talking about things like moral duty. Whose 
are those moral duties that Utilitarians have been talking about? Human beings, of course, 
whose moral nature (and this is the moral fact that is likely obscured when Utilitarianism – 
or similarly sentio-centric philosophy – is depicted as denying the existence of moral natures 
themselves, and therefore as having nothing significant to say about the nature of such 
moral natures) puts them in relation to sentient beings in general as their intended beneficiaries, in 
what I argue deserves to be called an act of self-givingness.8  
 Sometimes criticism of Utilitarianism’s take on moral natures doesn’t get to such 
wild extremes: maybe the problem is not that Utilitarianism denies the existence of moral 
natures, of human (morally rational) beings, but rather that it fails to honour these natures 
in some way, be it by depicting them in poor light (e.g. by failing to emphasise their active 
side, or by denying their autonomy, or some such), by unduly instrumentalising their 
importance, or by failing to require action embodying proper recognition of them. The 
hope is that the argument of this work will give us the bases for addressing these and similar 
allegations, and the following reflection should suffice for the moment: if in all my moral 
thoughts I assume my moral nature as something that I cannot but take very seriously, 
because taking my moral nature seriously is taking my moral duties and my moral mission 
seriously, what it is that prevents me as a Utilitarian from properly recognising the moral 
nature of other human beings? What is it that prevents me from thinking that I ought to 
relate to my fellow human beings in recognition of their moral nature and so not merely 
as intended beneficiaries of my activity (e.g. also always at the same time as co-workers in 
the moral community)? Nothing, apart of course from dominant narrative in philosophy.  
                                               
8 The act of self-givingness that I refer to here is the success case of the more basic call of self-givingness that 
addresses all human beings: the call (the moral call) to be kind and to thereby act for the benefit of all sentient 
beings.  
 7 
 And then, of course, we have philosophers often telling the following story: that 
while Kantians are the guardians and protectors of absolute prohibitions in morality, and 
therefore of basic decency, Utilitarians are out to wreak havoc by arguing that ‘anything 
goes’ (including things like murder and theft) so long as the ‘felicific calculus’ (perhaps done 
by some public official, as some people have enjoyed portraying it) dictates. But then, of 
course, if you think about it for a second (and focusing only on one of the problematic 
elements in this common narrative), it is plainly incoherent for anyone to allow exceptions 
to prohibitions against the unjustifiable, against things like murder and theft that have moral 
unlawfulness (moral unjustifiability) written into their very definition; and what we end up 
with as a result of this, at least very often, is Kantians (and others who take themselves to 
be arguing on similar lines, and therefore against Utilitarians) self-aggrandising, and 
demonising Utilitarians, while being unable even to materially define things like murder 
and theft and letting most instances of those moral crimes go under the radar, e.g. in cases 
where non-human animals (i.e. in truth, most persons) are deemed ‘things’ with no value 
beyond ‘price’ whom we can do ‘as we wish’ or in any case ‘treat as mere means’, thus 
placing them beyond the scope of reflection as beings (‘things’) who don’t even get to be 
considered potential victims of the relevant crimes (of things like murder and theft, but we 
should also add slavery, rape and more).9  
                                               
9 It has to be acknowledged that criticism of Utilitarianism in this area is often (at least to some extent) well 
deserved. After all, we have seen self-identified Utilitarians often saying that specific moral prohibitions (such 
as those against murder and theft, although it has to be said that they have tended strongly to avoid such 
language when making claims in this area, instead talking about ‘killing’ and ‘stealing’) cannot be taken as 
absolute and that violation of them in general can in principle be justified. Even so-called Rule Utilitarians 
and Two-level Utilitarians are supposed to be committed to the thought that violation of specific moral 
prohibitions (such as the ones mentioned here) is permissible and even mandatory in ‘extreme 
circumstances’. I cannot afford engaging in discussion of these issues on the terms that customary narrative 
in philosophy has established, as I take such terms to be largely misconceived (especially in what relates to the 
alleged commitments that go with certain labels, and in particular the thought that Utilitarianism is by its 
nature, or at least by default, antithetical to the idea of absolute moral prohibitions). As I see it, it should be 
obvious to everyone (not only to Kantians and Utilitarians, but to everyone) that there is no room for thinking 
about consequences (even intended consequences) that could potentially justify things that have unlawfulness 
or wrongness written into their very definition, such as is the case with murder (unlawfully killing someone) 
 8 
3. Utilitarianism, Agapism and Christian Ethics  
 
The developments made in this work are meant to help us combating misleading narrative 
in philosophy of the kind that I have begun to address, but of course it’s the philosophical 
developments themselves that have to be the focus.  
 Thus, the reason I appear so confident in claiming that Utilitarianism is very often 
misunderstood and misportrayed in customary philosophical narrative and even in 
technical theorising, especially in the ways I already indicated (although in many other ways 
as well, and this sometimes even by self-identified Utilitarians themselves), is that I have a 
robust positive story to tell about what Utilitarianism amounts to, a story that has a lot to 
do with Kantian ethics (in ways that I will be explaining in detail) but which I would rather 
introduce as follows. In the final account, Utilitarianism is to be defined as an agapist 
doctrine, as a philosophy of practical love or rationally-based benevolence. Like Kant’s view, and 
like many other views in the history of philosophy, Utilitarianism depicts morality (the 
moral quality of human activity) as irreducibly a matter of attitude (of acting on good, 
distinctively moral, motives / principles / maxims) on the part of moral agents themselves 
                                               
and theft (which includes the thought of unlawfully taking something). Thus, it is an open question whether, 
and if so when and on what grounds, there is ever moral justification for killing someone, but there is no real 
question whether murder is ever morally permitted: the very act of declaring some instance of killing murder 
essentially involves the act of thinking of it as a morally wrong (and I should add, immoral) act. Such is why 
we use the term murder in moral condemnation, and the same goes for the term murderer. Murder and murderer 
(and also, of course, theft and thief) are not morally neutral, but instead morally charged, terms, i.e. these are 
terms that carry a certain – in this case negative – moral valence, and there are many other terms like that 
(e.g. lying and liar, cheating and cheater, etc.). Now, since giving a proper treatment of absolute prohibitions in 
morality should consist mainly in detailed moralisation of specific concepts (i.e. in detailed analysis of certain 
concepts as morally charged concepts), and given that there is no room in this work for taking these concepts 
one by one in systematic fashion, and given also that treatment of at least some of these concepts nevertheless 
appears scattered throughout this work, I have decided that there won’t be a separate section devoted to 
addressing the issue of absolute prohibitions in (Utilitarian) morality. You should therefore take this footnote 
(and the introductory passage in the main text) as my basic treatment of absolute prohibitions and expect the 
rest of this work to offer a very partial contribution to our understanding of them – which is all that could 
be afforded – through the moralisation of specific terms (murder being the one that receives the most 
attention).  
 9 
and therefore not as a matter of these agents producing (or even ‘promising to produce’ in 
the ‘expected value’ sense in relation to their conduct) good felicific outcomes.  
 There is of course an essential reference to felicific outcomes (or perhaps better to 
everyone’s happiness as a morally obligatory end of action) in Utilitarianism construed as an 
Agapist ethical doctrine, i.e. the very reference that justifies still using the label 
‘Utilitarianism’, which it is my job in this work to elucidate. Something should however be 
clear before even going into the details of that story: positing a certain reference to 
something (something having an essential reference to something else) is not the same as 
reducing the object that is said to contain the reference (morality in this case) to that other 
something (everyone’s happiness in this case, or even the conduciveness thereto – a.k.a. the 
utility – of human activity). The reference to universal happiness in Utilitarianism is not 
going to be that ‘morality equals everyone being happy’, and the same goes for utility or the 
conduciveness to everyone’s happiness of human activity: it is just not true that morality 
equals utility (however you take it) in Utilitarianism.  
 As I am describing it, Utilitarianism’s contribution to philosophy is its description 
of the fundamental principle of morality as a principle of practical love or rationally-based 
benevolence (agape) involving an essential element of self-givingness, of acting for the happiness 
of all sentient beings (this being morality’s essential refence to universal happiness as an end, 
which justifies still using the label ‘Utilitarianism’). Now, even though Utilitarianism puts 
especial emphasis on self-givingness thus understood, it makes no claims to the effect that 
self-givingness is the only constitutive element of morality: Utilitarianism (or in any case 
the view I am presenting here as one that is meant to deserve the label) offers a substantive 
and complicated picture of the ethical, which it is my job to describe in detail, and to the 
largest extent possible also defend, in this work. This description will be drawing heavily 
on Kant, and hence you will see me depicting morality (still under the label ‘Utilitarianism’, 
although also under other labels) as essentially involving acts of self-legislation and co-
legislation highlighting important aspects of the specifically human role in the moral 
community.  
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 A fact worth noting in relation to the historical background of this work (a work 
developing Agapist morality) is that the terms agapism and agape10 have been used in 
philosophy before, even in recent philosophy perhaps most famously in the works of 
William Frankena (1973; 1976) and Joseph Fletcher (1966). However, and this has to be 
on the record because it matters a great deal, it is in the context of Judeo-Christian philosophy 
(including the authors just mentioned)11 that ‘agape’ (often, although perhaps not entirely 
accurately, translated as ‘charity’ and understood as an unconditional, self-sacrificial and 
indiscriminate – impartially directed to everyone – kind of love, which in the tradition has 
often been described as first directed to God and then to his creatures as the beneficiaries 
of God’s love, but which in my story is only assumed to be directed at creatures as intended 
beneficiaries of moral activity, ‘God’ being understood as a metaphor for the moral law of 
human reason as the source of the relevant command and ‘love of God’ a metaphor for a 
commitment of obedience to the moral law, which I also construe as a commitment to 
truthfulness in living, thus dispelling the myth that practical love is potentially in tension with 
truthfulness) has been, and still is, more widely and thoroughly treated as a fundamental 
ethical notion denoting the attitude that is at the core of the morally good life, in something 
like the way that I am arguing it is. In honour to this particular association, I have decided 
to make treatment of the fundamental principles of ‘Christian ethics’12 one of the 
                                               
10 Terms that are largely neglected from the perspective of dominant ethical theory in our little corner of the 
world, except, of course, in theology departments and courses of ‘religious ethics’. 
11 The reason for singling out Frankena and Fletcher before introducing Judeo-Christian philosophy as a 
hotbed of agapist morality (i.e. of moral philosophy being done under that label), is that they are to my 
knowledge the two most famous cases of modern-day agapist ethicists who are recognised more as 
philosophers than they are as theologians or religion scholars. 
12 Kant’s peculiar take on Judaism, denying it not only the status of religion but also status of an ethical 
philosophy, instead depicting it as a political movement requiring only external action, and also his parallel 
exaltation of Christianity as ‘the only pure moral religion’ (Rel 6:125-127), all of which I regard as highly 
contestable (especially in what relates to the status of Judaism as an ethical philosophy, which I would contest 
myself), makes it odd for me to speak of Judeo-Christian ethics as belonging in the set of labels whose 
association this work aims to establish, i.e. it may seem odd for me to associate ‘Kantian ethics’ and ‘Judaism’ 
in particular. I will therefore (conceding to Kant distinctions that may be completely unfair, although also in 
part for ease of expression) keep using the terms ‘Christian ethics’ and ‘Christian Philosophy’. Again, this is 
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significant goals of this work, to be done mainly on the basis of reference to familiar biblical 
doctrines and principles especially through the works of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill.13  
 
4. Mill, Kant and The Fundamental Principle of Morality 
 
There are many reasons why Kant should be my main direct interlocutor in this work, and 
so he is. One of those reasons, which suffices on its own, is that I find Kant’s work most 
useful to discuss (both for good and for bad) when it comes to talking about foundational 
issues in moral philosophy.14 However, there is another historical figure whom I also have 
highlight in recognition of his importance from the perspective of this work, and that is 
John Stuart Mill. Which is mainly for the following reason: among the classic self-identified 
Utilitarians of the past, it was Mill who did more of an effort to relate Utilitarianism to 
other traditions in ethics in constructive ways, including both Kantian and Christian ethics 
but some others as well. Mill didn’t do the job quite exhaustively or even accurately in my 
                                               
not out of personal conviction, and you should feel free to read me as always speaking of Judeo-Christian 
philosophy.  
13 Acknowledging that the is a plethora of philosophers and theologians who are very much worth discussing 
– both for good and for bad – in the context doing Agapist ethics whom I won’t be discussing, including 
some of the authors I have mentioned. Now, the fact that agape (practical love) is – at least to my knowledge 
– most widely and thoroughly treated as a fundamental moral notion in the Christian tradition (especially if 
we include classic philosophers in this tradition, and not only the ‘premoderns’ but also people like Leibniz, 
Kierkegaard, and Kant, the latter being an example of someone who can be understood as ascribing an 
important agapist element to ‘Christian ethics’ while not necessarily deeming it an agapist doctrine) than it is 
in any other identifiable tradition (although I suspect there are very thorough treatments of equivalent 
notions in other ethical and religious traditions), if it is a fact, is not the same as it being the monopoly of 
(self-identified) ‘Christians’ or ‘theists’ of any kind. To speak of Utilitarians in particular (who may or may 
not identify as ‘Christians’ or even as ‘theists’ of any kind), although they haven’t been using the word agape 
very much if at all, there is no question that they have the concept in mind because they use it very often in 
ways that claim it as essential to their own philosophy. I see it being employed in many of the statements that 
Utilitarians past and present have made about the nature of morality, thinking mostly of those affirming 
universal or impartial benevolence (another valid name for agape) as the fundamental ethical attitude.  
14 I am a Kantian because I find Kant extremely useful in this way, no promise of faithful discipleship needed. 
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view, perhaps creating more problems than he managed to solve, but he left us with some 
relevant remarks that very much set the stage for the argument of this work: again, remarks 
to the effect that Utilitarianism must be understood in positive relation to other views (or perhaps 
better, to other labels) including the ones I have been referring to. Let me then give you some 
of those remarks and tell you what I make of them (this section focusing on comments 
referencing Kant, and the next section examining other references).  
 There are some significant remarks about the nature and significance of Kant’s 
moral philosophy in Mill’s work which I will be discussing in the body of this work. 
However, there is one aspect of Mill’s interaction with Kant that I won’t be revisiting 
because it has a purely introductory function for the purposes of my argument, and that is 
Mill’s general comments on Kant’s statement of the fundamental principle of morality. 
Hence, we see Mill saying things like the following (Mill, 1861/2003, p.225): “When Kant 
(as before remarked) propounds as the fundamental principle of morals, ‘So act, that thy 
rule of conduct might be adopted as a law by all rational beings,’ he virtually acknowledges 
that the interest of mankind collectively, or at least of mankind indiscriminately, must be 
in the mind of the agent when conscientiously deciding on the morality of the act. 
Otherwise he uses words without a meaning”. Which continues: “To give any meaning to 
Kant’s principle, the sense put upon it must be, that we ought to shape our conduct by a 
rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest.” What are we 
to make of these remarks? 
 Let me first ask. When Mill tells us that Kant “virtually acknowledges” his point 
about the nature of morality (namely that it contains an essential reference to that the 
benefit of human beings in general as an end), what is the purpose of the special phrasing 
in this sentence? One thought is that Mill is trying to read claims into Kant’s principles, claims 
that he takes Kant to have made in some vague way or at least gestured towards, or perhaps 
entailed in some of the claims that he did make (e.g. in the very claim that one’s rule of 
conduct must be fit to be adopted as a law by all rational beings), but which nevertheless 
he failed to emphasise sufficiently or made sufficiently clear: thus, I suggest, the thought 
that Kant “virtually acknowledges” the point. Kant “virtually acknowledges” the point in 
that he came very close to properly acknowledging it. 
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 Another thought (not necessarily inconsistent with the previous one) is that Mill’s 
special phrasing in this context reveals some textual insecurity on his part concerning 
Kant’s actual claims on the relevant subject; which is a shame because Mill had enough 
textual evidence available to back up his proposed reading of Kant’s principles. Expressions 
like “otherwise he uses words without a meaning”, or “to give any meaning to Kant’s 
principle”, or in fact “he virtually acknowledges”, would all have been needless had Mill 
been in a position to point to Kant’s manifest Utilitarian (or in any case Agapist) moments 
in, for instance, the Doctrine of Virtue. These moments in Kant play a central role in the 
argument of this work, and I submit they sufficiently establish the presence of an element 
of self-givingness (of acting for the happiness of subjects) in Kant’s moral philosophy. Hence, 
even though Mill didn’t bring the relevant textual pieces to bear in support of his proposed 
reading of Kant, we can still do the job in our own effort to get Kantian ethics right and 
make positive use of it in our own work (and, if we like, think that we are building on Mill’s 
efforts, engaging in a project that he inaugurated). What matters here is our own ability to 
bring Kant’s moral philosophy to bear in significant ways, saving all that is true and of 
lasting value in it, in the context of formulating Utilitarianism as an ethical theory.  
 Mill’s interaction with Kant (the part of it that we have seen so far) is not exactly 
the finest piece of Kantian scholarship, nor would I like to portray it as a good enough 
guide to for us to revise Kant’s philosophy. It certainly has some merit what Mill says in 
this context, but I find the deficiencies far more notorious. And one of those deficiencies 
actually comes very close to heart, namely the lack of mention of non-human animals as an 
important issue in relation to Kant’s philosophy, which gives a free pass to what is more 
deeply wrong in it. It is not so much conceptual poverty on Kant’s part that is problematic; 
it is not for instance that he lacks (because he doesn’t) the concept of intended beneficiaries 
of morality, of beings for whose benefit moral action (or at least part of it) is characteristically 
done, which is what Mill seems to be accusing him of lacking or perhaps failing to emphasise 
with sufficient force (which, if put this way, may in the end be a fair point). The main problem 
(at least from the perspective of this work, although I submit that this is indeed the single 
gravest mistake in Kant’s moral philosophy) is rather that Kant gets it wrong in terms of 
the scope of the relevant attitude (practical love), or what is the same in terms of the extension 
of the relevant domain (the domain of intended beneficiaries of practical love), unduly 
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excluding non-human animals from that picture. It is here that Kant’s philosophy warrants 
the strongest kind of criticism, and the fact that Mill plays blind is of course very 
disappointing.  
 However, again, we don’t have to rely on Mill’s personal attempt at revising Kant’s 
fundamental principles (as stated in passages that don’t necessarily reflect Mill’s complete 
view on the issues anyway, considering other statements that he makes) and are free to 
come up with our own version of things with the specific focus that we consider pertinent, 
which in my case has to be targeting the exclusion of non-human animals from the domain 
of direct moral considerability as the main aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy (as stated) 
which needs amending. I hope it is clear that the purpose in all of this is not to use Mill to 
correct Kant or the other way around, but rather to draw on both Kant and Mill at their 
reconstructed best (and on a few other philosophers as well) to help tell my own story about 
the nature of morality and the dignity of persons, a story that is fundamentally based on 
direct thought about the realities themselves (i.e. on my own personal thinking about the 
nature of morality) and that you should therefore expect to establish its own terms.15  
 
5. Mill, Kant and an Even Larger (Historically Engaging) Project in Moral 
Philosophy 
 
Another important thing that Mill does (which I already began to do here) is putting 
Utilitarianism in close connection with Christian ethics understood as an agapist philosophy 
(or in any case a philosophy with a strong agapist component), which he does in such a way 
as to suggest that Utilitarianism is – as I claim it is –  an agapist doctrine along the very 
same lines: “In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics 
of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute 
the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.”16 (Mill, 1861/2003, p.194) I thoroughly 
sympathise with this remark, and in that spirit, and also thinking that the association 
between Utilitarian and Christian ethics can go in both directions (because why not?), I 
                                               
15 I then abide by my basic professional conviction that we ought to do historically engaging, yet always 
fundamentally independent, moral philosophy.  
16 My own emphasis. 
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will invite you to read this work as giving a basic statement of the fundamental principles 
of ‘Christian ethics’ insofar as such is understood as an Agapist – and therefore in my sense 
as a Utilitarian – moral philosophy (which I leave for others to debate).17  
 There is still more to what Mill does by way of relating Utilitarianism to other 
philosophies (or perhaps more precisely to other labels in philosophy), and I need to 
examine some of that material here in order to give you a general sense of a larger project 
in moral philosophy that I suggest we should pursue. Thus, not only does Mill have things 
to say about Kantian and Christian ethics as we have seen already, going as far as to identify 
Utilitarianism with the fundamental principle of the latter (and make it consistent with 
that of the former) as expressed “in the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth” (Mill, 1861/2003, 
p.194); he also attributes Utilitarianism to (young) Socrates as represented by Plato in his 
dialogue Protagoras (Mill, 1861/2003, p.181): “[...] when the youth Socrates listened to the 
old Protagoras, and asserted (if Plato’s dialogue be grounded on a real conversation) the 
theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the so-called sophist.”18 Perhaps 
more important to the argument of this work (because here I cannot afford discussing 
                                               
17 The association between the two labels here (Utilitarianism and Christian ethics) is of crucial importance 
for us to sort out the nature of our ethical theories: and not only for the purpose of getting Utilitarianism 
right, but to do the same with ‘Christian ethics’ as well. However dominant certain quarters within the 
Christian tradition have been in the context of what is actually a very large (and of course very old) tradition 
that has many branches, some of which are often underappreciated and even ignored; no matter for how 
long they have been telling us, for instance, that in Christian ethics only human benefit is considered 
intrinsically and other animals are reduced to mere means to human ends, which admittedly goes back to 
antiquity (with an important trend starting in ancient Rome), or that Christian ethics is meant to be the 
nemesis (yet another archenemy) of Utilitarianism, which has been said over and over ever since the term 
‘Utilitarianism’ was introduced, with many people even using the latter as a term of abuse (calling someone 
‘utilitarian’ being intended as an insult), the truth is that Christian philosophy has the resources to tell a very 
different story. A philosophy that claims to take agape seriously (an attitude that in truth involves acting for 
the happiness of subjects quite independently of their moral credentials and nobility) is a philosophy that is 
by necessity committed to taking the happiness of non-human animals very seriously. 
18 The attribution here seems plausible because there is in fact a superficial Utilitarian flavour to Socrates’ 
position in Protagoras, although I wouldn’t fully commit given the intellectualist overtones of the dialogue 
and the ever present worry (when it comes many of the ancients, Plato included) of unwarranted 
eudemonism.  
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Socrates and Plato) is the fact that Mill also relates Utilitarianism to Stoicism and 
Epicureanism, and indeed in ways not unrelated to Kant’s interaction with those same 
traditions in relation to his own philosophy. I should therefore anticipate that the relation 
between the five labels mentioned in this paragraph (Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, 
Christian ethics, Stoicism and Epicureanism) is one of the central themes of this work.  
 And let’s not forget that in On Liberty Mill does even some more, here claiming 
Aristotle as a Utilitarian (Mill, 1859/2003, p.106), as in fact some people rightly or wrongly 
still do. Mill saw the essence of Utilitarianism everywhere he looked, he thought we need 
to understand the view in close connection with both antient and modern traditions in 
ethical theory, and I am someone who shares that attitude and happens to also think that 
the way forward for Utilitarians (and for everyone working in moral philosophy) involves 
giving a prominent place to Kant, by which I mean taking up Kant’s philosophy as a major 
(if not the major) historical philosophical resource for the purpose of formulating their 
views. Let’s do Utilitarian theory in historically engaging ways, let’s consider all the relevant 
sources and learn from them as much as we can, but let’s not miss a single opportunity to 
do some serious Kantian ethics.  
 
6. On the Use of Labels 
 
This is an openly ecumenical project in moral philosophy, although I also hope one that 
makes use of labels in meaningful and systematic ways, in ways that can actually help us 
sorting out the nature of ethics, doing justice both to existing theories and to the things 
themselves that moral theories in general are supposed to talk about. I therefore need to 
say more about the use of labels in this work.   
 It seems to me that the use of labels, and even more so the dialogue between 
different labels, is a very complicated affair, one reason being the following: while some 
labels are essentially historical in nature (e.g. ‘Kantian ethics’, which refers to Kant, and 
‘Christian ethics’, which refers to Christ) others are not. Take Agapism, for instance, and 
realise that this label refers directly to a certain attitude (namely agape or practical love) that 
is being identified by the theory in question as morally fundamental, without mention of 
any authoritative figures. And now take Utilitarianism, whose implied referent is one of the 
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most salient defining features of agape as an attitude, namely the act of self-givingness (of 
acting for the happiness of subjects, of determining oneself to be universally useful with respect 
to, and for the happiness of, all sentient beings) that it involves. Agapism and Utilitarianism 
are only assuming the moral realities themselves that they refer to and talk about, and hence 
place no special authority (let alone defining authority) on the hands of historical figures. 
They are as timeless as philosophical theories can get in that sense. Whether they are true 
theories is of course a separate issue, but just by their nature they are essentially non-historical 
and can be talked about freely without assuming any kind of reverence for (or even having 
necessarily to refer to) particular historical figures.  
 Hence, and this is the concern, how do we propose a conversation between Kantian 
ethics (what is essentially a historical label) and Utilitarianism (an essentially non-historical 
one), between a theory that relies heavily on a single historical authority and one that does 
not? Well, since Utilitarianism has a historical dimension, for there is in fact such a thing 
as a movement in philosophy that people identify by that name (although the details of the 
story as is often told are all highly disputable), then you can imagine someone suggesting 
that we historicise Utilitarianism, or in any case focus on what identifiable figures in the 
movement have had to offer, perhaps giving prominent voice to the ones who coined the 
term, and somehow compare that with the contributions of the other movement organised 
around Kant. But of course this project (this duel between sects) would oblige us to first 
identify the relevant movements themselves and demarcate between them, which appears 
like a difficult task in and of itself (especially in this case) given that the boundaries seem 
somewhat artificial and easy to cross. Is the work of R. M. Hare, someone who identified 
himself as both a Kantian and a Utilitarian, part of the Utilitarian or the Kantian 
movement? Is my work going to be considered part of the Kantian or the Utilitarian 
movement? Is Kant himself not part of the Utilitarian movement already given his 
manifestly Utilitarian moments and how often his work has been used constructively by 
Utilitarians (sometimes even more so than Bentham’s)? These questions are hardly of any 
relevance in the context of positive ethical theorising, and fall well beyond the scope of this 
work and others of the kind. I see the case for taking the history of philosophy as seriously 
as possible, but historical philosophical knowledge is altogether methodologically ancillary 
in the pursuit of positive philosophical truth, especially in this area. Others can indulge 
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talking about movements and sects in philosophy if they want to. In my case, all efforts are 
devoted to tackling the issues themselves, bringing labels to bear insofar as they are useful 
in positive theorising (for the sake of fixing certain ideas, for instance), to describe ethical 
reality as I see it.  
 In accordance with the above, I have to discard the strategy of historicising 
Utilitarianism (to look mostly at the history of the movement, if such there is) and then 
comparing that with the Kantian historical movement, which (I can now say) seems mostly 
like a distracting task: the kind of task we would be given by someone who doesn’t want to 
see serious philosophical progress (e.g. the dismantling of certain kinds of myths and taboos 
in ethical discourse) being made.19 My strategy is thus going to be the exact opposite: to ‘de-
historicise’ Kantian ethics, i.e. to take upon myself the job of defining its claims (with the 
aid of Kant, of course, but exercising the right to correct Kant as I see fit on behalf of the 
theory that deservedly honours his name), and then to put this view in dialogue with 
similarly ‘non-historical’ Utilitarianism. To illustrate: I can introduce the basic ‘Kantian 
doctrine of the moral worth of actions’, according to which actions have moral worth if and 
only if they are done from duty; now, surely we can think about the nature of this claim and 
how it relates to Utilitarian philosophy in abstraction from all given narratives about the 
comes and goes of the history of ethical theory and without even having to rely on the 
‘primary texts’ (which we read once, or twice, or a thousand times, but which can never 
come to replace our own thinking). Besides, if the Kantian thesis I just introduced for 
illustration is true, which I submit it is, then it belongs to humanity in general Utilitarians 
included, not to some sectarian movement in philosophy eager to claim it in exclusivity for 
itself.  
 Accordingly, then, I will be treating the main labels that are employed in this work 
(Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism in particular, but also of course Agapism as perhaps the 
central one, and all other labels that are introduced) as ones standing for particular 
philosophical theses, or perhaps for more complex views and conceptual frameworks, 
                                               
19 Not to deny that certain myths are to be addressed on the basis of careful historical work. Myths about the 
content of ethical theories as developed by particular philosophers (which abound) are a clear instance of 
this. Historical knowledge in general requires historical work.  
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which it is my job always to define in my own terms. In sum, neither am I treating Kantian 
ethics and Utilitarianism as ‘traditions’ in moral philosophy, at least not mainly, nor am I 
simply detaching the views from their existing historical sources. Actually, large portions of 
my argumentation will consist in meticulous discussion of specific claims and arguments 
as found in our classical sources, Kant being the central figure in this regard. 
 
7. The Plan of The Argument 
 
As to the structure of the argument, it goes as follows. Part I is devoted mainly to 
establishing a basic Kantian ethical framework that, I argue, is to be assumed in all moral 
theorising. A doctrine of human dignity is developed which emphasises the place of human 
beings in the moral universe as the sole moral actors, and then a basic conception of 
morality is also developed depicting it as irreducibly a matter of attitude (of acting from 
distinctively moral motives or maxims) on the part of the individual human subject. This is 
done in dialogue with Utilitarianism as a view that is typically perceived as calling into 
question ideas of human dignity (and distinctively human equality) and also as depicting 
morality in a very different way. Consequentialism and Welfarism are here shown to be 
false, and the promise is that Utilitarianism can be dissociated from them and rebuilt on 
more solid foundations (namely on the very foundations that are established in this first 
part of the work).  
 Part II is devoted mainly to argue for the dignity (special moral standing) of sentient 
beings in general, which I do in opposition to a negative story in this area that is often told 
on behalf of ‘Kantian ethics’. None of what is said in this section is meant to count against 
the credibility of Kantian ethics itself; instead, the upshot of the argument in this section is 
that Kantians are just as obliged as anyone else to acknowledge the citizenship (the 
beneficiary status) of all sentient beings, and therefore of non-human animals, in our moral 
community. Besides, the majority of my arguments in relation to the moral standing of 
non-human animals in this section are based on discussion of Kant’s works (i.e. to the 
extent that they are based on historical resources at all), and so the argument remains 
internal to Kantian ethics even in that sense. Even the formulation of Utilitarianism itself 
(as the theory that enjoins the protection of non-human animals in virtue of enjoining the 
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protection of sentient beings in general) is one where Kant’s philosophy is meant to play a 
major positive role. In the end, my conclusion (which should be understood in accordance 
with the rules of the game as have been established in this Introduction) is that there is no 
real conflict, but instead immense synergy, between Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism as 
technical views in moral philosophy trying to account for the dignity of persons, the 
structure of the moral community, the basic facts of human moral relationality. 
 Part III (which plays the role of Conclusion to this work) has a very specific 
purpose. It adds to the general argument concerning the consistency and complementarity 
between Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism as technical philosophical views, and therefore 
also to the ‘hybrid theory’ that is developed in this work, only now with a focus on more 
specific issues in ethical theory. The other goal of this section (intertwined with the previous 
one) is to explain how Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, and therefore also the synthesis 
of the two, are meant to relate to older philosophies (or perhaps better, to older labels in 
philosophy).  
 The work done in Part III is meant to do some more damage to the credibility of 
exaggerated narratives in philosophy portraying Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism as 
occupying opposite extremes of the ethical spectrum, this time by explaining how the two 
views (now as historical projects or movements in philosophy, demarcation between which 
remains a difficult task) have a very similar genesis in the way they were supposed to build on 
past philosophies. Perhaps the most basic fact in this regard (which I will be discussing in 
Parts I and III) is that Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism were both developed under the 
maxim of (i) trying to make good of Hellenistic (both Stoic and Epicurean) philosophy and 
(ii) secularising the basic ethical insights of Christian ethics. My hope is that by the end of 
the argument we will be able to see more clearly the possibility of a marriage between 
Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, the possibility of us being able to transcend a largely 






Part I: Human Dignity: A Defence of Kantian Ethics 
 
 
Moral philosophy, I submit, is always to be done under two related assumptions: (i) that 
there is such a thing as human dignity (human moral superiority), and (ii) that morality is all 
about the realisation of this dignity (or more precisely about the realisation of humanity itself  
– understood as a mental capacity – as the property which makes human beings morally 
superior to all other living and non-living beings).20 This is the central claim that I am 
making on behalf of what I am calling the Kantian doctrine of human dignity, a doctrine that 
is meant to provide the basic ethical framework for the view being developed in this work.  
 The starting point for the argument in this Part I is the apparent clash between two 
camps that we can initially distinguish, i.e. between those who find human dignity crucial 
for morality, and obviously so, on the one hand (the Kantians), and those who think 
morality better be divorced from ideas of human dignity on the other (the Utilitarians). In 
light of my general aims in this work as I have been laying them out, I have decided that 
                                               
20 Morality is in fact to be identified with the self-realisation (‘the good’) of human beings as human beings (as 
opposed to, say, their realisation as sentient beings, in which case what is at stake is happiness and not morality, 
the happy life as opposed to the morally good life). This simple remark helps to anticipate the crux of the 
argument ahead: the reason I can with such confidence declare my conviction in the moral centrality of 
human dignity, and therefore of human beings themselves, is that I identify ‘the human’ (the distinctively 
human dimension of things, if you will) with ‘the moral’ (the moral dimension of things), the terms ‘human’ 
and ‘moral’ thus being interchangeable for relevant purposes. Someone’s being a human being, for instance, 
is in this view the same as someone’s being a moral (i.e. morally responsive, although not necessarily morally 
good) being. The point, then, is that once the identity between ‘the moral’ and ‘the human’ has been 
stipulated, some notion of the moral centrality of the human becomes inescapable: human beings are exactly 
those beings who are called for morality, such that we can see morality itself as something distinctively human. 
Now, the main purpose of this work as a whole (my ‘agenda’ if you will, which relates to the main side theme 
of this work – namely ‘animal ethics’ – as well as with my project of restating Utilitarianism as an ethical 
theory, all of which I am stating upfront) is of course to argue that a proper conception of human dignity 
should lend no support to notions of human domination or mastery over non-human animals but must 
instead lead to as radical a view as we can have in this area: a view (a Utilitarian or Agapist view) involving 
the recognition of the fundamental equality – or in other words the equal dignity – of all animals (all sentient 
beings) as intended beneficiaries of morality (as beings for whose benefit moral activity is characteristically done).   
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the argument for Kantian human dignity in this Part I cannot be developed in isolation 
from relevant Utilitarian concerns, but must instead interact with them at every point.
 Let me then give you (what we could at this point designate) the Utilitarian critique 
of human dignity: the (initial) attempt on the part of self-identified Utilitarians (and other 
people endorsing relevantly similar sentio-centric commitments) to undermine the 
credibility of this notion. My version of ‘Kantian human dignity’ will emerge as a response 
to this alleged ‘Utilitarian critique’, and the central argument of this work will take off from 
there.  
 
1. The Starting Point: the ‘Utilitarian Critique’ of Human Dignity 
 
The first thing to note is that Utilitarians – in our present context at least – tend to see 
ideas of human dignity (human moral superiority) as assuming religious belief (belief in 
God) and therefore as suspect. This is a fact about our current state of the art (a sociological 
fact) which I cannot afford discussing in this work, and one that doesn’t matter a great deal 
for our purposes given that this work makes no assumptions about the exitance of God or 
his dignity-conferring power (which many people have pointed to as the ground of human 
dignity). The Kantian conception of human dignity to be developed in this work is a purely 
secular one that treats God as a regulative idea (as a metaphor mostly), one that can be used 
for presentation of ideas but which can be dispensed with because the ground of human 
dignity lies elsewhere (unless, of course, by God we mean the moral law as opposed to the 
moral author of the world, whom actually exists). Given this feature of the view being 
developed in this work, we can for the moment dismiss the worry that human dignity is a 
thing only for theists. Morality is not a thing for theists, but for human beings, therefore 
human dignity (the elevation of human beings in virtue of their capacity for morality) is 
not a thing for theists, but for human beings.21  
                                               
21 Of course theists will typically argue that human dignity is something that belongs to human beings in 
general and not just to theists. But the point here is a different one, namely that you don’t have to be a theist 
(you don’t need to believe in the existence of God) to coherently believe in human dignity, since to have that 
belief you need only believe in morality (which clearly you don’t have to be a theist to believe in). 
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1.1 Against Speciesism 
 
The real, substantive, critique that has been advanced by Utilitarians – the one that is of 
interest to us in this work – is based on the thought that raising human beings above the 
rest of creation (‘anthropocentrism’) betrays the kind of equality in moral standing that, as 
they see it, morality essentially involves. Peter Singer’s work on ‘animal ethics’ is one of the 
most prominent attempts at advancing a critique of this kind, and as far as I know the first 
systematic one to receive widespread attention in modern academia. I will take up Singer 
as my main interlocutor in this section, although what I will be discussing is actually a 
reconstructed version of Singer’s views as archetypal of a very common ‘Utilitarian’ (or in any 
case sentio-centric) take on questions of ‘moral standing’ (this with the purpose of adjusting 
the relevant thoughts to the needs of my argument). It is for this reason that I won’t be 
quoting Singer directly very much, but mainly explaining his (somewhat reconstructed) 
views on the issues and discussing what we should make of them. 
 The first significant idea that emerges in Singer’s critique of human dignity 
(anthropocentrism) is that advocates of this notion are guilty of promoting what he regards 
as a speciesist attitude discriminating between individuals on what appears to be a morally 
arbitrary basis: their membership or otherwise in the ‘human species’. To be clear, speciesism is not 
to be understood as a prejudice in favour of the members of the human species in 
particular, nor, therefore, against the members of other (non-human) species. Any kind of 
moral favouritism that discriminates between individuals – be it for or against them – on 
account of their species membership (whatever that is) is rightly deemed speciesist according 
to Singer. So, for example, the attitude behind the thought that X but not Y can be raised 
to be killed and eaten, because the former is a pig (a member of Sus domesticus) and the 
latter is a dog (a member of Canis familiaris), is meant to be a paradigmatically speciesist 
attitude.22  
                                               
22 It seems to me a problematic feature of Singer’s analysis of ‘speciesism’ that he portrays the speciesist as 
pointing to membership in biological categories as per se dignity-conferring; as if people who deny the moral 
standing of animals on grounds of anthropocentrism, for instance, were necessarily committed to 
membership or otherwise in ‘the human species’ being that which matters intrinsically about them. I agree 
that raising someone merely on the basis of species membership per se is wrong, and I don’t want to deny that 
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 Now, since we are talking about the credibility of human dignity and related ideas, 
the kind of (alleged) ‘speciesism’ we are concerned with is one that is supposed to be guilty 
of falsely elevating human life as such. Singer’s suggestion, then, is that belief in human dignity 
(human superiority) constitutes endorsement of an attitude that is rightly dismissed as 
speciesism, and that this is no different from the way in which belief in white supremacy 
constitutes (and is rightly dismisses as) racism, and belief in the inferiority of women 
constitutes (and is rightly dismissed as) sexism. Accordingly, he thinks that if we understand 
what is wrong with any of these attitudes, we thereby understand what is wrong with all of 
them.  
 Take racism, for instance, and the idea that what is wrong with this attitude is that 
it elevates some individuals above others on the basis of something that lacks moral 
significance: their membership or otherwise in one of the ‘human races’. We don’t regard the 
‘white-race’, for instance, as a morally significant category; its boundaries (to the extent that 
it even makes sense to talk about them) are not morally significant boundaries, and thus 
we understand that it is indefensible to raise people’s moral standing because they are ‘white’. 
There is nothing morally special about ‘someone’s being white’, is the idea here. Now, you 
can see how similar thoughts may arise in relation to sexism, and what Singer is suggesting 
is that the exact same goes for the kind of speciesism that, he thinks, comes with belief in 
‘human dignity’. For just like the racist arbitrarily raises the members of a certain race above 
the members of other races, declaring the former to matter more than the latter, so the 
speciesist (the ‘anthropocentric speciesist’) goes ahead and arbitrarily puts the members of 
the human species above the members of all others. And just like the sexist takes sex 
membership to be a morally significant category when in fact it isn’t, so the speciesist takes 
species membership to matter morally in a similar way when in fact it doesn’t. ‘Race’ and ‘sex’ 
membership, but also in the same manner ‘species’ membership, should all count for 
nothing in our estimation of the moral standing of individuals. It is as simple as that. We 
                                               
there are people who are guilty of that; however, I also think that very often people who would arguably count 
as holding speciesist beliefs typically have a reason in mind (which of course we assume is a morally arbitrary 
reason the second we call it speciesist) posited in connection to species membership X as that which does the 
real moral work (as that which is supposed to explain why X is a morally significant category in the first place). 
I come back to this point in subsequent footnote.  
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ought to see all attitudes raising individuals on any such basis as equally ungrounded, or, 
if you prefer, as equally grounded in morally arbitrary patterns of discrimination (Singer, 
2002; 2011a; 2011b). 
 What Singer is doing is quite straightforward and simple. He is pointing out that 
membership in the human species, no less than membership in a certain sex or race, is such 
that it is illegitimate to take it into account as a relevant factor when making judgements 
about the moral standing of individuals. This is a point worth emphasising, for that is what 
Singer takes most advocates of human dignity to be doing: he sees them as raising human 
beings above the rest of creation (including non-human animals) simply because they are 
human beings – which for him just means: because they belong in the human biological species. 
And thus we get the first argument that we can attribute to Singer in his critique of human 
dignity: (1) if human dignity being a respectable notion depends on ‘membership in the 
human species’ being of itself a morally significant category, and (2) if ‘membership in the 
human species’ is not of itself a morally significant category, then it follows that (3) human 
dignity is not a respectable notion. The reason why human dignity is not a respectable 
notion derives from the reason why ‘membership in the human species’ (someone’s being a 
human being) is not of itself a morally significant category. 23  
                                               
23 We have been talking about the speciesist as basing his ‘moral favouritism’ on the facts of species 
membership per se. Under this construal, the ‘anthropocentric speciesist’ would be him who regards human 
beings as more morally important than other animals simply because they belong in the human biological species. 
However, this kind of naked speciesism is by no means the only morally arbitrary way of raising the moral 
standing of ‘human beings’ above other creatures, nor should we see it as the only form that ‘anthropocentric 
speciesism’ can take. In fact, it seems to me that most views (most thoroughly ‘anthropocentric’ views) which 
we might be tempted to call ‘speciesists’ (which here amounts to deeming them unduly anthropocentric) don’t 
single out ‘membership in the human species’ as per se dignity-conferring; instead, they typically give us some 
reason posited in connection with ‘membership in the human species’ as the ground of its dignity-conferring 
power, e.g. that all and only human beings (all members of the human species) are image-bearers of God, or 
that God loves all human beings (all members of the human species) in a way that is different in kind from 
the way in which he loves, say, pigs and cows. If the reason posited in connection with membership in the 
human species is not an independently valid reason with some actual bearing in the relevant context of 
discussion, then the view is rendered morally arbitrary and, I would add, deserving of the label speciesist. Views 
don’t have to appeal to ‘species membership’ as such to be deemed ‘speciesist’, is the idea, then. One direct 
upshot of this reflection is that someone giving us some reason (on top of species membership per se) to raise 
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 But why exactly is ‘membership in the human species’ immaterial in this context? 
You may ask. Singer’s answer is a very simple one: ‘membership in the human species’ is 
immaterial to the moral standing of individuals because the only thing that can possibly 
underpin that moral standing is those capacities possession of which, on the part of 
individuals, would render them proper objects of direct moral concern, which is certainly 
not fixed by where they fall in a biological taxonomy (as least as we have biological 
taxonomies defined at present). If you think about it, (i) it is possible for an organism to 
belong in the ‘human species’ and yet lack any kind of moral standing in virtue of lacking 
those capacities that are required for it to count as a proper object of direct moral concern 
(whatever those capacities may be); and (ii) it is also possible for someone to have the 
required capacities (whatever those are) and yet not belong in the ‘human species’. An 
unviable ‘human embryo’ is a clear instance of the first case, since – despite being a member 
of the human species – it lacks all the capacities that philosophers typically single out as 
dignity-conferring, including sentience (the Utilitarian’s favourite) and ‘moral autonomy’ 
or ‘moral rationality’ (the Kantian’s favourite). ALF (the alien from Melmac) is a clear 
instance of the second case, having both sentience and moral agency (presumably) despite 
not being a member of the ‘human species’ (at least if we abide by the way ‘the human 
species’ is treated in current biological discourse). But if someone like ALF (a ‘non-human’ 
in the dominant biological sense of the word) has a serious claim to moral standing, and 
an unviable ‘human embryo’ (a member of the human species) has none, then surely 
                                               
the members of a certain biological species doesn’t get them off the hook of speciesism, since that depends 
on the moral arbitrariness or otherwise of the proposed reason: if the reason posited in connection with 
‘species membership’ is itself morally arbitrary, that arbitrariness renders the view ‘speciesist’. There might be 
other possible (better) ways of talking about these things, but I needed to make this point concerning the 
nature of ‘speciesism’ (as something we might talk about even if ‘species membership’ per se is not really the 
point of anything) because that is the way we treat similar prejudices: nobody would suggest that offering a 
morally arbitrary reason on top of ‘race membership’ per se to raise the moral standing of the members of a 
certain race (e.g. that they are typically taller than the members of other races, and that – to make the view 
complete, as is often done – those among them who aren’t actually taller in this way nevertheless deserve the 
same privilege because at least they belong to a race whose ‘normal members’ are taller than the ‘normal 
members’ of other races) gets someone off the hook of racism.  
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membership in the human species is – as Singer would have it – immaterial to the moral 
standing of individuals.  
 What of our commitment to human dignity, then? If the respectability of this 
commitment depends on the dignity-conferring power of membership in the human 
species being there, and the power is not there, then we have no option but to give it up: 
failing to account for the moral significance of someone’s being human (i.e. for Singer, 
someone’s being a member of the ‘human species’) means that we have to abandon our 
ideas of human dignity once and for all. Or so, again, the argument goes.  
 
1.2 Against Anthropocentric Ideas in General 
 
Something we could do at this point is take the idea of someone’s ‘being human’ and give 
it a more philosophical construal having nothing intrinsically to do with membership in 
biological categories, and this move would certainly get us some way (if not all the way) 
towards deflecting Singer’s critique. The thought could just be that some individuals count 
as ‘human beings’ (in some technical philosophical sense of the term) on account of a 
capacity of theirs that goes by the name of humanity, the clear candidate being the capacity 
for morality that we identify as distinctively human. Thus, advocates of human dignity need 
only believe that there is a capacity – called ‘humanity’ – that is dignity-conferring on those 
who have it on account of its moral significance, and no appeals to membership in the 
human biological species need be made.  
 But let us not forget that Singer is a self-proclaimed ‘Utilitarian’, and his critique is 
motivated by the thought – which seems to stand in opposition to anthropocentric ethical 
notions in general – that happiness (hedonic happiness) is the only thing capacity for which 
can underpin the ‘moral standing’ of individuals (the only ‘dignity-conferring capacity’ to 
use the language that I am proposing).24 The fact that Singer holds this substantive 
                                               
24 In line with common philosophical usage, Singer takes the term moral standing to mean moral considerability 
or moral patienthood. In his view, someone’s ‘having moral standing’ is the same as someone’s being ‘morally 
considerable’ in a direct kind of way – his being the ‘object of duties’ if you will – his being someone to whom 
we have moral duties. Accordingly, the thought that a certain property of individuals (e.g. sentience) 
underpins their moral standing is the thought that possession of the property in question renders individuals 
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Utilitarian (‘sentio-centric’ or ‘patho-centric’) belief means that he is committed to 
portraying ‘humanity’ (the property of ‘being human’, however it be construed) as immaterial 
to the moral standing of individuals: it is because he takes sentient beings in general to be 
morally considerable in a direct kind of way (‘to have moral standing’), and because he 
believes in the related idea of animal equality, that he adopts a principled stance against 
ideas of human superiority in general as they are commonly employed in human dignity 
discourse.25  
 Even if we point to distinctively human capacities and try to account for their dignity-
conferring power, Singer (as a Utilitarian) is committed to taking issue with our proposal: 
he will insist that no distinctions in ‘moral standing’ should be made between sentient beings 
with reference to the property (which only some of them have) of ‘being human’, even if 
construed as a capacity for morality. Let me raise a question to illustrate what Singer may have 
in mind (acknowledging that he wouldn’t put it exactly in these terms): Is it any more 
murderous to arbitrarily kill an adult human being than it is to take a baby’s life without 
proper justification? The Utilitarian (like myself in this case) proudly says no, and explains 
her answer with reference to the sentio-centric or patho-centric commitments of her view: both 
beings have a capacity for happiness (for pleasure and pain), which is all that matters in this 
                                               
directly morally considerable, which it can do only by making them proper objects (direct objects) of some 
distinctively moral attitude (e.g. ‘respect’ or ‘practical love’). Now, this way of putting things makes it natural 
to distinguish between ‘entities with moral standing’ (beings that are directly morally considerable) and 
‘entities without’ (beings that are not directly morally considerable). Very often I speak this way myself, but 
that is not to deny other, equally valid, ways of speaking. For instance, instead of ‘denying moral standing’ to 
entities that in our view count as ‘things’ (‘mere means’ or ‘tools’), we could say that that is their moral 
standing: they have the moral standing of ‘things’ (‘mere means’ or ‘tools’).  
25 In the final analysis, Singer’s rejection of the capacity for morality (‘humanity’) as dignity-conferring has to 
be understood as pertaining to discussions of moral considerability (moral patienthood) in particular; in the 
spirit of philosophical charity, it should in fact be read as saying something even more specific than that, 
namely that such a capacity in no way fixes – or contributes to fixing – the domain of intended beneficiaries of 
morality in particular. We certainly shouldn’t read Singer as trying to undermine the moral significance of the 
capacity for morality when it comes to the placing of moral burdens, for instance, or as saying that we ought 
to relate to human beings in exactly the same way we ought to relate to non-human animals (see Section 5. 
below). This is not to suggest that Singer does full justice to humanity in his own work, as here we are simply 
trying to locate the positive contributions of his general critique of anthropocentrism in ethics.  
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context. And similarly if the question were referring to an adult human being and a dog: it 
is no more murderous to kill (without proper moral justification, if any there is) the one 
than it is to kill the other. The question is not: can they reason? Nor: can they talk? But: 
can they suffer and enjoy their own lives?26 
 Nothing more needs to be said in order to capture the essence and the spirit of 
Singer’s ‘Utilitarian’ (or in any case sentio-centric) critique of human dignity. Before assessing 
the merits of this critique, however, and so as to make the ideas a bit easier to handle (and 
also taking the chance to start sketching a rout for the argument ahead), I need to say more 
about how this critique is divided into two parts, two separate and distinct claims that are 
meant to undermine the foundations of ‘human dignity’.  
 
1.3 Singer’s First Premise: The Principle of Individualism 
 
The moral standing of individuals depends on their own individual capacities.27 Such is the 
first premise in Singer’s argument, which we might call the principle of individualism. Again, 
this is the principle according to which we ought to look at each individual separately (in 
her own individual capacities) to adjudicate on her moral standing. We don’t look at the 
groups (social or biological) where she may belong, but consider only her own existence. 
For instance, we ask: is she a proper object of our benevolence? Which, again, has nothing 
to do with whether she has certain genes placing her somewhere in a biological taxonomy, 
or with whether she came from here or from there, or with whether she can reproduce with 
                                               
26 The point here is simply that for Utilitarians individuals don’t gain any ‘direct moral considerability’ (in 
the sense of having beneficiary status in the moral community) because they are capable of morality. All sentient 
beings are equals in their condition as intended beneficiaries of morality, is the idea. Is it any more murderous to 
kill someone who is a moral actor and not just a person with ‘beneficiary status’ than it is to kill a ‘mere 
intended beneficiary’? The Utilitarian (like myself in this case) says no. Some things may vary from one case 
to the other, but not the murderous quality of the act: a person is a person is a person, and also murder is murder 
is murder, is what the Utilitarian (like myself in this case) is meant to be saying here (see Part II). 
27 I am speaking of two premises here (‘two premises in an argument’), but actually I don’t mean to be talking 
about an argument in the proper sense, i.e. one with a few stated premises and a conclusion. What I mean is 
simply that there are two basic claims on the basis of which Singer builds his general case against (what he 
perceives as) unduly anthropocentric morality (here under the rubric of ‘human dignity’).  
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this or that other individual; instead, it is all about whether she is capable of happiness, so 
that we can be benevolent to her.   
 The ‘principle of individualism’ is crucial for Singer because it allows him to argue 
against the notion of ‘human dignity’ as follows: (1) if the moral standing of individuals 
depends on their own morally significant capacities, and (2) if there are human beings who 
entirely lack the relevant capacities (whatever those are), then (3) those human beings in 
particular who lack the relevant capacities (whatever those are) cannot be granted moral 
standing. Now, if there are human beings who lack moral standing (because they lack dignity-
conferring capacities), then ideas of human dignity or human superiority are straightforwardly 
false: it is not the case that human beings in general have a moral standing which all non-
humans lack.  
 And so we see how the first premise in Singer’s argument seems to sufficiently 
undermine human dignity if understood as the idea that all human beings (all members of 
the human species) have a moral standing which all non-humans (all members of other 
species) lack. As defined, this notion overlooks the fact that being a human being (someone’s 
being a member of the human species) doesn’t guarantee possession of the morally 
significant capacities, whatever those are: if it is the capacity for reasoning and acting morally 
that matters, then clearly some human beings (some members of the human species, e.g. 
foetuses and one-year-olds) lack that; and if it is the capacity for happiness (Singer’s 
‘favourite’) that matters, then some human beings (e.g. foetuses) lack that as well, etc. 
Someone’s being a human being doesn’t guarantee possession of those capacities that 
suitably underpin the moral standing of individuals by making them proper objects of 
direct moral concern (i.e. proper objects of distinctively moral attitudes such as, for 
instance, benevolence or practical love), and this alone should make us suspicious with 
respect to the notion ‘human dignity’ (at least as defined so far).   
 
1.4 Singer’s Second Premise: The Sentio-Centric Commitment 
 
Singer’s case against ‘human dignity’ has a second premise which derives from his positive 
moral views, and in particular from his Utilitarianism (or in any case from his ‘sentio-centric’ 
moral commitments). This second premise is the claim that the capacity for happiness (often 
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referred to as sentience) is the only property possession of which can suitably ground the 
dignity (moral standing) of individuals, the only thing that can make of individuals proper 
objects of direct moral concern. The first premise was a formal claim about the kind of thing 
that can ground an individual’s dignity or moral standing, viz. his own morally significant 
capacities as an individual; whereas the second premise – the one we are now examining – 
is a positive claim about that which actually underpins this dignity, viz. the individual’s own 
capacity for happiness.  
 I may start to sound too repetitive at this point, but we have to be clear about how 
the second premise adds to Singer’s case against human dignity. His first premise tells us 
that the moral standing of an individual depends entirely on his own morally significant 
capacities, whatever those are; and now we are filling in the gap in the previous sentence by 
adding the claim that the only dignity-conferring capacity of individuals (the only capacity 
that can give them some special moral standing) is their capacity for happiness. Only those 
individuals who have this capacity count as having the relevant moral standing; they and 
they alone are proper objects of direct moral concern. Thus, while Singer’s first premise 
seems to defeat human dignity (anthropocentrism) if understood in a certain narrow way 
(i.e. as depending on membership in the human species being of itself a morally significant 
category), his second goes beyond that by providing a positive reason to reject notions of 
human dignity more generally, even if construed in ways that are not easily dismissible as 
‘speciesist’, i.e. even if construed as basing ‘human dignity’ in the (alleged) moral 
significance of distinctively human capacities. 
 Something that follows from Singer’s substantive claims about the actual basis of 
moral standing (his second premise) is a certain understanding of what our notions of moral 
equality (in relation to the treatment of individuals) actually amount to. In particular, he 
think that this equality has to be founded in the capacity for happiness which some individual 
entities (who therefore count as subjects) have in common; and once he has emphasised this 
point, he can point out the fact that this ‘moral equality’ is one that obtains between 
individuals belonging to many different species, and therefore not only between human 
beings. Most members of the human species have a capacity for happiness and therefore 
participate in the ideas of moral standing and moral equality that Singer (as a Utilitarian) 
believes in, but obviously they share these features with members of other species insofar 
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as they too have a capacity for happiness. Hence, not only is it the case that not all human 
beings have moral standing or dignity (as entailed by the first premise in Singer’s argument); 
it is also the case that the moral standing that some human beings do have (on account of 
possessing the relevant capacity) is not one that all non-humans lack, but instead one that 
a vast number of non-humans have. After all – and here is the punchline – the capacity for 
happiness is not a characteristically human capacity but rather a characteristically animal 
capacity, one that constitutes the core of what we might call the animal condition.28 Now, if 
one agrees with Singer in thinking that this ‘characteristically animal capacity’ is the only 
one to consider when making decisions about the moral standing of individuals, then of 
course one’s suspicions against human dignity as a respectable notion will be nothing but 
amplified, for now one has the thought that moral standing is something that 
characteristically belongs to animals, not to human beings. Well, of course it belongs to 
human beings qua animals (or in any case qua capable of happiness), but that is a different, 
unproblematic claim for a Utilitarian like Singer: dignity (moral standing / moral 
patienthood / direct moral considerability / end-in-itselfhood) goes where the animal goes, 
and the human animal is only one among the many.  
 I began describing Singer’s views by considering his claim that advocates of human 
dignity are guilty of a moral mistake of a terrible kind: in their speciesism – Singer claims – 
they are the equivalent of the sexist who believes that men alone ought to rule, or the racist 
who believes that white people are to be treated as more important and deserving than the 
rest. As we have begun to see, however, this applies only to (i) those who make human 
dignity depend on ‘species membership’ as understood in biology being a dignity-conferring 
                                               
28 We don’t suffer or enjoy as human beings; we suffer and enjoy as animals (i.e. as sentient our experiential 
beings). In suffering and enjoyment we are the equals of cows and pigs, sheep and mice, turtles and lizards. 
Now, later in the argument (towards the end of Part II) I will be questioning the identity – which I am 
proposing here in the main text – between ‘animality’ and the ‘capacity for happiness’ (or sensibility more 
generally, also including concomitant agency), which I will do on the basis of the thought that ‘animal’ turns 
out to be a more general philosophical category, one that is actually equivalent to those of ‘person’ and 
‘subject’. To prevent misunderstandings, let me note that (at least for now) whenever I say ‘animal’ I simply 
mean ‘sentient being’, and when I say that something is ‘distinctively animal’ I mean ‘distinctive of sentient 
life’. 
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feature of individuals and (ii) those that posit morally arbitrary reasons in connection with 
species membership to justify their moral predilections; it shouldn’t concern those who in 
a more philosophical attitude think of humanity as a capacity (on the part of particular 
individuals) that is of itself morally significant in the right kind of way. If your view puts 
the ground of ‘human dignity’ in the direct moral significance of such a capacity as 
instantiated by particular individuals, there is no argument against you from Singer’s first 
premise. Now, your view could still be challenged on the basis of Singer’s second premise, 
which expresses what are normally regarded as distinctively Utilitarian (or in any case 
sentio-centric) commitments that are meant to stand in opposition to all views excluding 
non-human animals from the scope of dignity (direct moral considerability) or even 
portraying them as inferior to human beings in that regard.  
 And so what we get so far is an apparent clash between two different takes on the 
same issue, between two contending philosophical views on the actual basis of our ideas of 
‘dignity’ and ‘equality’: Singer’s Utilitarian (‘sentio-centric’ or ‘patho-centric’) view and the 
‘anthropocentric’ (‘Logo-centric’) view that we find in philosophers like Kant. This is the 
same clash we pointed out at the beginning, between those who take distinctively human 
dignity to be crucial (the Kantians) and those who supposedly think otherwise (the 
Utilitarians). By now, we have at least learned where Utilitarians are coming from in their 
critique of human dignity, which is not exactly a place of amoralism. The reason why 
Utilitarians oppose ideas of human superiority (human uniqueness and distinctively 
human equality) is simply that they care morally about animals (sentient beings) in general 
and consequentially see nothing special, nothing particularly morally significant, in human 
life as such that could render human beings more morally considerable than (superior in 
‘moral standing’ to) other animals. When it comes to deciding whether some individual is 
a proper object of direct moral concern, they simply think there is no merit to someone’s 
being a human being (however this notion be construed).  
 Singer’s Utilitarian critique of human dignity has now been stated in sufficient 
detail, and now we shift focus more towards assessing the merits of this critique. At this 
point we begin to introduce elements pointing in a Kantian direction.  
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1.5 Assessing Singer’s Critique  
 
My goal here is to offer a distinctively Kantian reply to Singer’s Utilitarian critique 
vindicating the notion of human dignity. However, it wouldn’t be fair for me to start pointing 
out the deficiencies, as I perceive them, of this alleged ‘Utilitarian’ critique (or talking about 
the riches of Kantianism in this area) without first saying more about the truth that it 
contains. 
 The first thing to be said in favour of Singer’s critique (which I have done in passing 
already) has to be that his first premise is on target: the moral standing of individuals – we 
have to agree – depends on the morally significant capacities they have as the individuals 
they are. Not all philosophers seem to agree on this basic point, but I think this is one of 
the places where Kantians and Utilitarians have most reason to agree: we have all the 
material to talk about the dignity of individuals in those capacities for morality and happiness 
that we care about, which are always capacities of particular individuals. We can on this 
basis agree on the imperative to oppose all attempts at raising the moral standing of 
individuals on account of things other than their own morally significant capacities: their 
possession of mental capacities that would render them proper objects of direct moral 
concern, i.e. proper objects of morally required attitudes such as, for instance, benevolence or 
practical love (or some other attitude that we manage to identify as morally necessary).  
 There is more to be said in favour of Singer’s critique, I think. Recall that his second 
premise includes the claim that sentient beings have a moral standing of their own in virtue 
of their capacity for happiness. I wholeheartedly agree with this claim, and so Part II below 
is meant to offer – among other things – a defence of what I call animal dignity: the idea of 
a certain kind of moral standing (the standing of intended beneficiaries of morality) that 
pertains distinctively to sentient beings. The problem, however, is that the premise itself 
(the second premise) can be challenged by a well-grounded theory of human dignity – like 
Kant’s – accounting for the special moral significance of humanity as a capacity for morality 
(often called ‘freedom’).29 Believing that all sentient beings have a certain dignity or moral 
                                               
29 Later it will become clear that Singer cannot coherently sustain commitment to his second premise as stated 
so far, since everything he says by way of moral claims addresses our human (moral) reason and so presupposes 
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standing (whose nature is yet to be explicated) is not the same as approving of Singer’s 
second premise, which asks us to believe that nothing more needs be said about the moral 
standing of individuals. Thus, the reason I reject this premise is that I don’t think the 
‘capacity for happiness’ is the only capacity capable of conferring dignity (moral standing) 
on individuals. If the ‘capacity for happiness’ is not the only dignity-conferring capacity, 
because there is another capacity that is also dignity-conferring (namely, as I will argue, the 
capacity for morality), then it follows that the moral standing that pertains to sentient beings 
as such and in general (the standing of intended beneficiaries of morality) cannot be the only 
kind of moral standing there is. Take the positive ‘Utilitarian’ story in this area (‘sentio-
centrism’ about the domain of intended beneficiaries) as seriously as it deserves, and you 
should still find plenty of space for a substantive conception of human dignity capturing the 
distinctive moral standing we ascribe to human beings (which, initially at least, seems to go 
unacknowledged in Singer’s expressed views on questions of moral standing).30  
 In sum, the argument for Kantian human dignity has to conform to Singer’s 
principle of individualism, i.e. it has to respect the claim that an individual’s moral standing 
depends entirely on his own morally significant capacities (on her having the capacities that 
would make her a proper object of morally required attitudes), and it also has to proceed 
                                               
our moral uniqueness and our consequent moral (strictly moral) superiority with respect to the other animals. 
In Section 5. below (the Interlude section), Utilitarians will get a fair chance to clarify their position and 
qualify the target of their alleged ‘critique of human dignity’. To anticipate, the critique is best understood 
(and under this construal I subscribe to it) as not necessarily targeting the idea of ‘human dignity’ (human 
moral superiority) itself but rather a certain (very common) misuse of it in ‘philosophy’ and elsewhere: the 
going from human moral superiority to either (i) the objectification of animal life (with an emphasis on non-
human animals) or (ii) the idea that human beings are in any case (radically) more important than other animals 
in their condition as intended beneficiaries of morality. It is in relation to the latter domain (the domain of 
intended beneficiaries of morality, of beings for whose benefit morality is characteristically done) that 
anthropocentrism has no rightful place in moral philosophy.  
30 It seems to me that Singer’s first premise may be accepted, and speciesism as such rejected, and ideas of 
‘distinctly animal equality’ defended (thus doing justice to the truth contained in Singer’s second premise), 
without in any way threatening distinctively philosophical conceptions of human dignity of the kind that we 
find in Kant (abstracted, as it should be, from its potentially speciesist moments and common misuses of it 
towards the objectification – or less than full moral appreciation – of non-human animals and even of animal 
or sentient life as such).  
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cautiously not to exclude non-human animals from having dignity (moral standing) 
altogether, for otherwise the whole point of Part II below would be undermined. What is 
more directly relevant to the argument: I need to explain what is meant by the term 
humanity if not ‘membership in the human biological species’, and so also what is meant 
by human dignity if not ‘the elevation of the members of the human species above the 
members of other biological species’. I have gestured towards a certain understanding of 
the term ‘humanity’ (humanity as a capacity for morality), and this already gives you a hint 
of where I am going with the argument. However, I cannot begin to make my case without 
first justifying the use of the term dignity.  
 Although we have a natural understanding of the term ‘dignity’ (which is why I 
have taken the liberty to employ it hoping that my reader will understand the meaning of 
my claims), the truth is that use of it in philosophy has become a problematic affair (due in 
large part, or so I would argue, to the grave misuses of it in philosophy and elsewhere that 
we have been witnessing). In light of this fact, we need to have a basic definition of the 
term ‘dignity’ before proceeding any further.  
 
2. The General Kantian Notion of Dignity 
 
The concept of human dignity that I am developing is an application of the general concept 
of dignity as I find it employed by Kant. Now, people say all sorts of things about what Kant 
means by ‘dignity’, but most of the time what they have in mind is human dignity, which 
(again) amounts to an application of the more general concept I am trying to clarify in this 
section. Thus, in its naked form, ‘dignity’ can be defined as the elevation of an object above 
another object along a particular dimension, or in some particular respect.31 This is a 
concept that applies to many things of many different kinds, not just to human beings as 
entities that occupy a special place in the moral universe (human dignity).  
                                               
31 This definition is found in Oliver Sensen’s Kant on Human Dignity (Sensen, 2011). Sensen identifies Kant’s 
general concept of dignity as described here (the concept of something being elevated above – or being higher 
in rank with respect to – something else) with the ‘Stoic’ concept of dignity (Sensen, 2011, p.143).  
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 You might be surprised to hear this, but the Kantian concept of ‘dignity’ (i.e. the 
concept of ‘dignity’ that Kant employs in his writings) applies to all things that can be said 
to be raised or elevated (normally in kind) above others in ways that are relevant in particular 
contexts of philosophical interest, and there can be many such relevant contexts. It applies 
to all things that occupy a higher station, or that are higher in rank, with respect to others along 
some philosophically relevant dimension, and there can be many such dimensions and as 
many relevant rankings and hierarchies. So, for example, Kant claims that mathematics has 
dignity with respect to the empirical sciences in virtue of some idea of its paramount 
theoretical importance (CPR A464 / B492). Likewise, I’d like to propose the thought that 
philosophy has dignity with respect to other disciplines in that it is responsible for addressing 
the most vital and important questions in human life (such that, for instance, it is 
philosophy and not biology or physics which tells us what it means to be a human being).  
 Please note how the general notion of dignity as defined above is being applied in 
these cases, taking my claim about the dignity of philosophy as an example: I suggested that 
a certain object (viz. philosophy) is raised or elevated above another object (viz. other 
disciplines) along a particular dimension (viz. centrality of the subject matter of various 
disciplines in human life), and that in that sense philosophy has a certain dignity. I don’t 
care whether or not you agree with this statement about the dignity of philosophy or with 
Kant’s claim about the dignity of mathematics, since we are just trying to see how the 
general concept of dignity is supposed to be applied.  
 Now think about the claim – which Kant also makes – that the moral law has dignity 
(MM 6:397). I make sense of this claim by saying that the moral law (first object) is more 
important than other practical principles (second object) in that the commands of the former 
are to be given absolute practical priority over the prescriptions of the latter, where the 
dimension of elevation is the pre-eminence of various practical principles in terms of their practical 
priority. The moral law is thus raised or elevated above other practical principles in a 
specifiable and seemingly relevant way, and hence we talk about it as having a certain 
‘dignity’. I take it that these claims about the ‘dignity’ of various objects are easy to 
understand and not at all mysterious (or superstitious), even if it is possible to disagree with 
them. In itself, therefore, the Kantian concept of dignity is completely unmysterious and very 
easy to apply: you just need two objects (or two classes of objects) and a certain dimension 
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along which one of these objects is, by virtue of some relevant feature of it, raised or elevated 
in rank above the other.  
  
3. Towards a Substantive Conception of Human Dignity 
 
Before examining the Kantian conception of human dignity, let us appreciate how 
Utilitarians like Bentham and Singer could make use of the general Kantian concept of 
dignity (as just characterised) in order to craft their own formulation of human dignity. They 
could argue – as in fact we have seen them doing already – that human beings (first object) 
have dignity in the sense that, as sentient creatures, they are raised above non-sentient entities 
(second object) in terms of moral standing (dimension of elevation). Surely all sentient 
human beings are (from the moral point of view as typically depicted in Utilitarian 
philosophy) radically more important than all those entities in the world who are incapable 
of suffering and enjoying their lives, and this, I think, should be enough to settle the issue 
whether there is room in Utilitarianism for notions of ‘human dignity’. There is a property 
to human beings (viz. their capacity for happiness, to the extent that they actually have it) 
that makes them radically more important than – radically higher in moral standing with 
respect to – all those beings in the world which lack that property. In the final analysis, the 
moral significance of this capacity that Utilitarians single out as paramount lies in the fact 
that possession of it can alone render individuals proper objects of the kind of benevolence 
that morality essentially involves (which following Kant I call ‘practical love’).  
 These ideas will be further developed in due course, and for now I’m just pointing 
to them as plausibly offering a ‘distinctively Utilitarian’ conception of human dignity – or, if 
you wish, to be more precise, the dignity of human beings. Human beings are among the 
creatures for whose benefit – as Utilitarians see it – moral action is done, and this sets them 
apart – in what looks to be a morally significant sense – from all entities that don’t belong 
in that domain.  
 Following this line of thought, it seems evident that Utilitarians can draw a sharp 
distinction between ‘persons’ and ‘things’, between ‘ends in themselves’ and ‘mere means’, 
or in any case between ‘intended beneficiaries’ (individuals for whose benefit things are 
morally to be done) and ‘resources’ (objects that are to be used for the benefit of individuals). 
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Should Utilitarians be precluded from using terms like dignity and persons in this context? 
Honestly, I don’t see why they should: having done the job of precisely defining the term 
dignity in particular (which in the relevant context in necessarily connected with the term 
person), it should be evident to everyone that it belongs to Utilitarians as much it belongs 
to anyone else.  
 We can of course expect ‘orthodox Kantians’ (if I may use this expression) and 
others who take themselves to be arguing on similar lines in this area, which very often goes 
with arguing against Utilitarianism (e.g. most ‘conservative Christians’, if I may also use 
this expression) to protest, as they have been monopolising over human dignity discourse 
and may want things to continue the same way. Nevertheless, I submit that they have no 
right to this monopoly. Utilitarians are entitled to make use of whatever terminology 
(‘Kantian’ or otherwise) allows them to make sense of their deepest ethical commitments, 
and I have begun to speak on their behalf by introducing a certain conception of human 
dignity (or, if you wish, to be more precise, ‘the dignity of human beings’) that is part and 
parcel of Utilitarian philosophy as we know it already: the idea that human beings have 
‘dignity’ (elevation in moral standing) as sentient creatures, on account of the capacity for 
happiness that makes them proper objects of the kind of benevolence that morality requires 
at a fundamental level. Surely human beings are not just ‘things’ or ‘tools’ or ‘resources’ in 
Utilitarian philosophy: they are intended beneficiaries of morality.  
 Now, it is true that in this Utilitarian picture the ‘dignity of human beings’ is not 
something that belongs to them in exclusivity, but rather something that they have in 
common with other sentient beings. However, it doesn’t follow from this fact that human 
dignity is thereby eliminated or denied, since one of the things the words ‘human dignity’ 
can mean is the dignity of human beings: the dignity that human beings have on account of 
the totality of their being, in virtue of whatever dignity-conferring capacities they may have 
as individuals. Is ‘the dignity of women’ (i.e. the dignity of women as persons) undermined 
by the fact that they have it in common with men, or maybe by the fact that it is not 
grounded in their ‘womanhood’? Of course not, and similarly in the case at hand: the 
dignity of human beings (as Utilitarians understand it) is no less of a dignity because they 
have it in common with other animals (other sentient beings) or because it is not grounded 
in their humanity. The human being’s ‘animality’ (his sentience or – what is the same here 
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– his capacity for happiness) is no less part of his being than his humanity is, and so it can 
in principle be true that his dignity (or a part of his dignity) attaches to him on account of 
his animality (his capacity for happiness in particular). Let me emphasise that in this view 
human beings are not the only creatures we have to dignify: if human beings have a certain 
dignity as sentient creatures (as beings capable of happiness), then we have to acknowledge 
that this dignity pertains to all sentient creatures (i.e. to all beings capable of happiness). 
 Now, if that which we have in mind when we speak of human dignity is something 
that human beings have in virtue of their humanity (on account of that which makes them 
human), which is supposed to raise them even above other animals in terms of moral 
standing, then it is not clear that the Utilitarian view can give us what we want. For even if 
Utilitarianism can make some sort of sense of the notion of ‘human dignity’ with reference 
to the capacity for happiness that defines the ‘animal condition’ in which human beings 
participate, we have grounds to complain that something crucial has been left out. 
Something crucial is missing in the picture when human dignity is reduced to the purported 
‘animal dignity of human beings’, which is what thinkers like Bentham and Singer seem (at 
least initially) to be doing. To their credit, animal dignity (and so the ‘animal dignity of the 
human being’) will prove to be a real and very important thing, but that is not the kind of 
dignity we are concerned with in this Part I.  
 My claim here is that we should endorse a substantive (non-reductive) conception of 
human dignity according to which human beings are morally more important than non-
human beings (and radically so, although in a way that has to be specified very clearly and 
that has nothing to do with their happiness counting for more for purposes of our being 
benevolent to subjects in general) on account of their humanity, i.e. on account of that 
which makes them human (their distinctively human capacities). This substantive conception 







4. The Kantian Doctrine of Human Dignity 
 
We have been applying the Kantian concept of ‘dignity’ in various claims concerning the 
moral standing of individuals, and one idea that has emerged is that of animal dignity:32 the 
idea of a certain dignity (a special kind of moral standing) that, it is said, pertains to 
individuals on account of their ‘animal’ or ‘sensitive’ nature (in their condition as beings 
capable of happiness in particular). This notion brings human beings under its scope insofar 
as they have the relevant capacity, and hence we seem to be justified in speaking of the 
‘animal dignity of human beings’. This is not the kind of idea that I am pursuing in this 
Part I, however. Instead, my goal is to argue for the existence of a distinctively human kind 
of dignity: the idea that human beings (first object) are – merely on account of their 
humanity – raised above non-human beings (second object) in terms of moral standing 
(dimension of elevation).  
 As you can see, it is a certain idea of human moral superiority that is at stake here; 
although, I repeat, we are yet to see any clue about what this superiority amounts to, what 
it entails and what it doesn’t entail, what follows from it and what doesn’t actually follow. 
A good way to start describing the fact of human moral superiority, to which corresponds 
the thought that human beings have a special kind of moral standing, is to introduce the 
notion of a special position or station in the moral universe that human beings alone occupy, 
and a special and distinctive role associated with that position which human beings alone 
are called to play in virtue of their capacity for morality. After all, human beings are exactly 
those beings who are called for morality, meaning of course that all properly moral roles in 
the moral community are by definition human roles (roles played by human beings).  
 
 
                                               
32 To clarify again, this is the dignity of sentient beings as such. One of the reasons I have decided to stay with 
‘animal dignity’ as the main designation is that it allows me to speak, in a way not so tedious, about things 
like ‘the animal dignity of human beings’ and ‘the animal rights of human beings’. For my final treatment of 
‘animality’ as a morally significant category and even as a general philosophical category, see 6.4 in Part II.  
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4.1 Humanity as a Capacity for Morality 
 
What is it that gives human beings their special dignity and raises them morally speaking 
above the non-human world? Kant’s answer to this question is very simple, namely: their 
humanity, and hence his substantive (non-reductive) conception of human dignity. Human 
beings have a special kind of dignity merely in virtue of their being human. But what does 
Kant mean by the word humanity, then, which we have established cannot just be 
membership in a certain biological species? What does it mean to be human in the Kantian 
picture?  
 Any answer we give to the latter question will be disputed by some interpreter of 
Kant or other, but in my mind it is clear what the answer has to be (in this context, at 
least).33 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant equates humanity with rational 
nature (G 4:429); and by saying that human beings are in essence rational creatures (in the 
sense that is of relevance in this context) he just means that they have a will that is 
responsive to the moral law, a will that indeed is to be regarded as the legislator of such a law 
(the authority behind it) and is therefore autonomous or self-legislating. Thus, humanity and 
                                               
33 I don’t mean to suggest it is a simple task to talk about the meaning of the term ‘humanity’ in Kant’s works. 
In Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, for instance, Kant treats ‘humanity’ as a non-moral kind of 
rational condition and proposes that we use “personality” for the moral kind (Rel 6:26–28). I cannot properly 
discuss the merits (or even the point) of this conceptual move in Kant. I will only say that it is immensely 
problematic from the perspective of my own project (given how I define central concepts) because it is part 
of my project to argue that all animals (all sentient beings) are persons. In fact, it is my view that no animal is less 
paradigmatically a ‘person’ than any other animal (e.g. Babe the pig versus Socrates), and this for two reasons: 
(i) because ‘sentience’ (animality as I have been treating it so far) is sufficient for personhood, and (ii) because 
in my final analysis ‘animal’ and ‘person’ are actually to be identified as the same general philosophical 
category (which of course calls into question the identity between ‘animality’ and ‘sensibility’ as I have been 
treating it thus far – see 6.4 in Part II). Now, Kant could have – in Religion – introduced the categories of 
‘animality’, ‘humanity’, and ‘moral personality’ as all belonging to ‘personhood’ or ‘personality’. Such a 
taxonomy is one that I could potentially endorse; what I cannot accept is reserving ‘personality’ (at least if 
taken as synonym for ‘personhood’ or ‘someone’s being a person’) for human beings on the basis that they 
alone are moral beings. Thus, again, my decision to stay with ‘humanity’ as treated by Kant in Groundwork, 
which of course you can equate – as I am doing right now – with ‘moral personality’. This decision makes 
sense of our reference to human dignity.   
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a capacity for morality (i.e. for self-legislated moral action) are one and the same thing as Kant 
understands these notions: that which makes us human – in the technical sense of the term 
that is of relevance in this context – is our responsiveness to the moral law, which allows us to 
become morally good or (what amounts to the same thing) to exemplify moral goodness in our 
conduct.34 
 Here we could also speak of the human being’s freedom to do what morality requires 
of him: the freedom to subordinate the call of self-love to that of moral duty (i.e. to give 
absolute practical priority to the latter vis-à-vis the former) and to thereby instantiate what 
Kant calls a good-will, a will of the kind that alone can be called morally good. It is this 
freedom, this capacity to act in the world as a matter of moral duty, that constitutes our 
capacity for morality and makes us moral creatures, and it is hardly surprising that being a 
moral creature (someone’s being capable of acting morally) be regarded as a morally 
significant feature of individuals, nor is it at all surprising that it be taken as the ground of 
human dignity in the substantive sense of the term. If you are a moral creature, i.e. a human 
being, then of course you are different in kind from non-moral creatures in general: you 
are raised above them along a strictly moral dimension and so are superior to them at least 
in that regard. Such is the basic meaning that we should attach to the word humanity, and 
such the basic meaning we should attach to the words human dignity substantively 
construed.  
 Again: humanity (i.e. a capacity for morality) makes human beings in general 
radically more important than non-human beings from the moral point of view. To be sure, 
and forgive me for the repetition, this is not the claim that human beings are radically 
superior to other animals in ever morally significant way: it is only to say that – as I am putting 
it – there is a special domain in the moral universe where only human beings belong, a 
                                               
34 By responsiveness here I mean a capacity to respond, not an actual response. Our ‘humanity’ is to be identified 
with our capacity to respond to the moral law, and our ‘human dignity’ (in the sense of our distinctive moral 
standing) has its basis in humanity thus understood. However, the realisation of our dignity as human beings is 
in fact based on our actual response to the moral law, and thus the idea that we have, not only a moral standing 
but also a certain moral stature. All human beings are by stipulation morally competent beings, and so equals 
in that sense, but some are (if they really are) morally better than others. I will say more about this in Section 
4.2 (next section). 
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special position that human beings alone occupy, and an associated role or function that they 
alone are called to perform precisely because they alone have a moral nature.  
 The Kantian (substantive) conception of human dignity has now been characterised 
in its most essential features, but a problem arises already concerning the application of 
this concept. If it is open for human beings to make good or bad use of their moral 
capabilities, such that in principle (and speaking in simplified fashion) some of them may 
turn out morally good and some of them morally evil, then the question arises whether we are 
supposed to think of all of them as having the same measure of dignity, which sounds 
strange from the perspective of our everyday parlance (as we speak of human beings as 
acting in dignified and undignified ways, thus presumably entailing that some are higher in 
dignity than others). 
 
4.2 Human Moral Equality and the Two Stages of Human Dignity: 
 
It might seem problematic to say that ‘scoundrels’ and ‘saints’ are equals in dignity. We think 
of the saint as acting with a dignity (a stature) that is lacking in the conduct of the scoundrel, 
and this thought seems to contradict the claim (which I have been making in the name of 
‘Kantian ethics’) that ‘human dignity’ and the associated idea of ‘human equality’ are to be 
understood in reference to our capacity for morality. To be clear, there is no complete and 
universal agreement on what the ‘true’ Kantian position is on these issues. For instance, 
some Kantians argue that human dignity is to be ascribed only to those human beings who 
we can regard as morally good, i.e. only to those who have “a commitment to actually obeying 
moral laws” (Dean, 2006, p. 246); others insist that no distinctions of dignity between 
different human beings (however moral or immoral they may be) should be made.35 These 
                                               
35 The first position here is clearly a minority position, whereas the second one is perhaps only imaginary 
(although sometimes people may seem to be arguing for it). The reason I refer to these two ‘extreme’ views is 
only to introduce my own view (which I take to be in line with the ‘majority view’) as a compromise or middle 
ground between the two. Most (if not all) Kantians reject the second view because they agree with Kant’s 
claim that morality itself (the actual fulfilment of moral duties) has a certain dignity (G 4:439–440): they think 
(as they ought to) that morality is radically superior to immorality, that morally good people are (in the actual 
worth of their conduct) radically superior to the morally evil. Accordingly, they deny the claim that no 
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two positions are strictly speaking false, for they present us with a choice that we don’t have 
to make; nevertheless, they contain the basic materials for a solution to the ‘puzzle’ we set 
ourselves to solve in this section. What we need to do here is actually very simple, namely 
differentiate the two kinds (or senses) of ‘human dignity’ that each of the views just 
presented emphasises and take them as two distinct stages of the one thing: ‘human dignity’. 
Borrowing Oliver Sensen’s terminology, I will name them: ‘initial human dignity’ and 
‘realised human dignity’ (Sensen, 2011, p.153). 
 Here’s the idea. There is a basic (or initial) kind of human dignity, or what could 
be called initial human dignity, pertaining to all human beings simply because they are 
‘human’: this is of course their elevation (their uniqueness) as the only beings capable of 
morality (the only beings whose conduct is subject to moral standards) and their consequent 
equality as members of that domain. And then, of course, there is human dignity in its 
realised stage, or what could be called realised human dignity: the state of realisation of the 
human being as such (as a moral being) in the instantiation of a morally good will. Only those 
human beings who make a good use of their moral capabilities can be said to have dignity 
in the second sense, that is. The first (initial) notion of human dignity relates to the 
distinctive kind of moral standing that sets human beings apart from the rest of creation; 
whereas the second relates to the moral stature individual human beings give themselves on 
account of the moral quality of their actual conduct. Let me offer an analysis of this 
distinction and the central notions involved, which I think reveals important facts about 
the moral centrality of human dignity discourse as I am arguing should have it.   
 Let me pose our initial ‘problem’ again. Does the dignity of a scoundrel compare 
to that of a saint? Our answer should be yes. It follows from everything that has been said 
that in some important sense it does compare: the scoundrel and the saint are equals in 
moral standing, both having equal membership in the domain of moral beings. But if so: 
                                               
distinctions of dignity whatsoever can be made between human beings. Those who reject the first view (the 
immense majority) do so because they think that all human beings are – quite irrespective of the moral quality 
of their conduct – worthy of what Stephen Darwall has called ‘recognition respect’ (Darwall 1977): (putting 
it simply) respect for their humanity. Accordingly, then, I think most Kantians would give their assent to the 
general view I am about to develop in the main text, deeming all human beings equals in moral standing but 
allowing for differences in their moral stature.  
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what happens when we point to the obvious moral difference between the saint and the 
scoundrel? Nothing happens. If you think about it, our judgements of moral stature putting 
human beings in the basic categories of ‘moral goodness’ and ‘moral evil’ are possible only 
under the assumption of their basic equality as beings capable of morality. This is very much 
like the need to first dignify claims or propositions as candidates for truth or falsehood – i.e. 
as being truth-apt – before judging them as either true or false. Surely we cannot assess the 
‘truth-value’ of propositions (their being true or false) unless we first grant their candidacy 
(their aptness) for the ascriptions of the relevant values, and so raise them in standing above 
mere nonsense and other kinds of sentences that don’t purport to express truths. To put it 
in simplified fashion, truth-aptness (_) is presumed of both truths (+) and falsities (–). 
Similarly in our case, of course: surely we cannot assess the ‘moral worth’ of actions unless 
we first grant their candidacy for the relevant value ascriptions, which we do that by 
affirming the initial dignity of all human beings as such – as creatures whose conduct is 
subject to moral standards – and their consequent ‘superiority’ with respect to the non-
human world. In simplified form: membership in the domain of ‘moral beings’ (_) is 
presumed of both the morally good (+) and morally evil (–). Just like both truths and falsities 
have to be regarded as equally truth-apt propositions (for otherwise they couldn’t be true or 
false), so both saints and scoundrels have to be regarded as equally moral (morally competent) 
creatures.  
 The purpose of this section is to gain clarity about our notions of equality and how 
they are used in relation to ascriptions of ‘human dignity’. Pushing the analogy above could 
help clarify this basic point even more. To begin with the epistemic case, the thought is 
that we are right to speak of truths and falsities as being equals in epistemic standing, since 
both are raised in kind (as truth-apt propositions) above, for instance, mere gibberish: 
nevertheless, this is not to deny the obvious fact that they are very much unequal when it 
comes to their epistemic stature (i.e. in their actual truth-value). There is a sense in which 
truths and falsities have ‘the same measure of dignity’, and another sense in which truths 
are ‘just superior’. It goes the same way in the case of human dignity, of course. We speak 
of the saint and the scoundrel as being each other’s equals, since they are both raised in moral 
standing above all entities lacking a morally rational nature (responsiveness to the moral 
law); nevertheless, it is obvious that they are very much unequal in their moral stature (i.e. in 
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the actual moral worth of their actions and/or character). There is a sense in which saints 
and scoundrels have ‘the same measure of dignity’, and another sense in which saints are 
‘just superior’. In both cases, the initial notions of equality in the relevant standing work as 
prerequisites for the value ascriptions that follow, namely that some claims are true and 
others false, that some human beings are morally good and others morally evil.  
 My main goal in this Part I is to argue for ‘humanity’ (understood as a ‘capacity for 
morality’) as a dignity-conferring feature of individuals, a claim that comes with a 
commitment to ideas of specifically human equality (the moral equality of all human beings). 
What has been said in this section explains why the project of human moral egalitarianism is 
in no way threatened by the thought that some human beings are (if in fact they are) morally 
superior to others.36  
 
4.3 Morality as a ‘Dignity Term’ 
 
This has been quite a detour from our direct conversations with the Utilitarians. But we 
haven’t been wasting our time, I think, for now we have the building blocks to mount a 
convincing reply to the utilitarian critique of human dignity as we saw it above. My 
reflections in the preceding section are in some way internal to the Kantian story, but they 
reveal something important in relation to our more general argument. They show that 
morality itself is a ‘dignity term’, one of the terms characteristic of human dignity discourse, 
which of course means that if you want morality (and Utilitarians surely want morality) 
then you want human dignity (distinctively human dignity, I mean). Let me explain. 
 Our practice of moral assessment is axiological in nature, since there what we are 
doing is ascribing moral valences in the proper sense of the term (moral positivity and moral 
negativity) to the conduct and character of human beings. ‘Morality’ (moral goodness) is 
                                               
36 As I will explain in detail in Part II, the kind of respect in relation to human beings that figures as a 
fundamental moral requirement (the kind that is enjoined by Kant’s ‘formula of humanity’) is respect for 
human beings as such, i.e. simply as human beings (in their ‘initial human dignity’) and therefore quite 
irrespective of their moral stature. As I will also explain in Part II, there is a specific kind of ‘respect’ that is 
distinctively directed to morally good human beings, but this second kind of ‘respect’ is not understood to be 
a moral requirement but simply something that we do naturally or inevitably (if only as moral beings). 
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the most common name we use for moral positivity in this strict sense (+), and ‘immorality’ 
(moral badness or moral evil) the one we use for moral negativity proper (–).37 These 
valences are clearly distinct from other philosophically interesting valences,38 capturing as 
they do the moral stature of human beings (regarded in their capacity for ‘free choice’) and 
their actions (regarded ‘deeds of freedom’). Accordingly, the terms referring to these 
valences we may call ‘stature terms’. But if ‘stature terms’ are ‘dignity terms’ (which they 
obviously are), then morality itself (positive moral stature) is also by implication a dignity 
term: morality is the term we use in reference to the state of realisation of human beings as 
such (the realisation of their initial dignity as morally rational beings) and to the goodness 
of their conduct as in fact equivalent to that self-realisation. ‘Immorality’ or ‘moral 
negativity proper’ is nothing but the corresponding state of failure, of course.  
 More follows trivially. If (i) the main explanandum in moral philosophy is morality 
itself, and if (ii) morality itself is one of the terms of human dignity (a ‘dignity term’ in that 
sense), then (iii) everything we say in moral philosophy has a reference (at least implicit) to 
human dignity. The crucial premise here is the second one, for the first one is just plainly 
obvious. If you think about it, it is obvious (analytic) that morality itself is the main 
explanandum in moral philosophy. But the truth of the second premise in the argument 
should also seem obvious given what was said in previous paragraphs: morality itself (moral 
goodness) is obviously a matter of human dignity in the substantive sense of the term, i.e. 
if humanity (that which makes us ‘human’) is identified with our capacity for morality (our 
capacity to be morally good). Once ‘humanity’ has been defined in terms of the ‘capacity for 
morality’ we assume ourselves as having, it just becomes obvious that morality (that capacity 
for which constitutes our humanity) is a dignity term – one of the terms of human dignity 
discourse – referring to the realisation of the human being as such. And so we get the 
conclusion of the short argument at the top of this paragraph, which is the same as the 
                                               
37 Very often we talk about virtue (+) and vice (–) in this context, in reference to the same basic moral valences.  
38 Morality (moral goodness) and immorality (moral evil) are clearly distinct from, say, happiness and 
unhappiness, utility and disutility, prudence and imprudence.  
 49 
opening claim of this Part I: everything we say in moral philosophy assumes a substantive 
conception of human dignity of the kind that we find in Kant.39  
 Now, at this point we should really be wondering about the credibility of 
Utilitarianism as a view that supports (or is said to support) incredulity with respect to 
substantive notions of human dignity. For if the ‘Utilitarian critique’ is misguided (as we 
should by now be thinking that it is, at least as we saw it stated above), then the view that 
generated that critique in the first place (Utilitarianism) should be similarly misguided. In 
coming sections I will be offering an extensive argument against ‘Utilitarianism’ in its 
standard formulation (as most people understand the view in our present context), and as 
first preamble to that I would like to raise a few questions inviting reflection: Can we have 
a coherent moral philosophy without the idea that the capacity for morality confers a certain 
dignity (moral standing) on those who have it? If the answer is no (as I think it is), what 
follows about the nature of morality? And what about the credibility of Utilitarianism as a 
theory that – it is said – only has eyes for the capacity for happiness? I’ll address the basic 
concern that is expressed in these questions before going into the deeper argument about 
the nature and merits of Utilitarianism.  
 
5. Interlude: On The Agent vs Patient Distinction  
 
Advocates of human dignity have been accused of raising the moral standing of human 
beings on an arbitrary basis. But surely the Kantian view I have been developing is not 
guilty of that, since (as I have been trying to show) it can account very well for the dignity-
conferring power of ‘humanity’ (someone’s ‘being human’ in the technical-philosophical 
sense) as a feature of particular individuals. Human beings are – by the stipulations the 
view – the only moral beings in the world, the only bearers of moral duties and the only 
                                               
39 The claim there, remember, was that moral philosophy is always to done under two related assumptions: 
(i) that human beings have dignity with respect to all non-human creatures, and (ii) that morality is all about 
the realisation of this dignity. Now we understand with perfect clarity what this claim means, and there is 
nothing mysterious or morally pernicious about it. I understand the suspicion that some people may initially 
have, of course: I understand why people become suspicious of human dignity discourse when it is most often 
used for things like opposing ‘abortion’ and justifying the extermination of animals for food.  
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candidate-bearers of that which constitutes moral goodness (as a distinct or sui generis kind of 
goodness).40 The moral vocation is here identified with the distinctively human vocation, 
and the most basic assumption of all moral discourse is thereby supplied: the necessary 
reference to the agents (human beings) whose activity alone is subject to moral standards, 
in whose existence all moral realities are rooted.  
 But there is something very strange in all of this. If the assumption of human moral 
superiority (substantive or distinctively human dignity) is so basic that without it moral 
philosophy would lack a reference point and a subject matter, then we should find it very 
puzzling that people advancing moral claims of all kinds (as Utilitarians do) should stand 
in opposition to the making of this assumption. Let me suggest a solution to this apparent 
puzzle. If ideas of human moral superiority can be misused (i.e. used for evil purposes), and 
if – as I think is the case – they have in fact been misused, then it might be this phenomenon 
that Utilitarians (and others who we may identify as ‘critics of human dignity’) have been 
reacting so strongly against. I mean: maybe it is not ideas of substantive human dignity 
themselves that are problematic in Utilitarian philosophy, but only appeals to those ideas, as 
premises, to argue for the objectification (or less than full moral appreciation) of animal 
life as such, which is what Kant and other champions of human dignity seem to have been 
doing.41 Kant, for instance, is naturally read as saying that by virtue of human moral 
superiority we are entitled (and even required) to regard non-human animals as ‘things’ 
and treat them as ‘mere means’ (see Part II, Section 1.); and what I am suggesting is that 
the Utilitarian critique of anthropocentric ideas (in relation Kant and people arguing along 
                                               
40 Again, the stipulation here is not that all the members of the ‘human species’ (the biological category) 
should be counted as moral beings. Rather, it is simply that those beings who in fact count as moral beings 
(because they have a capacity for morality) we should count as ‘human beings’ in the technical-philosophical 
sense of the term that is relevant in discussions of the kind that we’ve been having.  
41 I wonder how Utilitarians like Singer would have reacted to substantive ideas of human dignity if those 
who made them central to their philosophies (Kant in particular) had made it clear that (i) non-human 
animals are not meant to be reduced to ‘things’ but must instead be regarded as ‘persons’ (even if not as 
‘moral subjects’), and (ii) that non-human animals are, no less than we are, proper objects of the kind of 
benevolence (kindness) that morality fundamentally requires. Feel free to disagree, but my hunch is that there 
would be no such thing as a Utilitarian (or in any way ‘sentio-centric’) critique of human dignity.   
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similar lines) should be interpreted as agreeing with the premise (human moral superiority 
as such) but disagreeing with the conclusion being derived from it.42  
 If we understand the Utilitarian critique in this way, i.e. as not objecting to ideas 
of human moral superiority themselves but only to misuses of them in the objectification 
(or less than full moral appreciation) of animal or sentient life, the initial puzzlement seems 
to vanish completely.43 Again, what seems puzzling in the ‘Utilitarian critique’ as we say it 
above (in its two initial premises and their respective conclusions) is the apparent denial of 
a moral standpoint characterising the human – as opposed to the animal – condition. But 
that is really not what utilitarians mean to be doing, I don’t think. If some of them see 
themselves as doing that, I invite them to reconsider: our arguments in defence of our ideas 
of animal dignity and animal equality (as pertaining to the domain of intended beneficiaries 
of morality) shouldn’t depend on denying human uniqueness, since the whole argument 
is precisely about that: the call (the duty, the mission, etc.) to love all sentient beings without 
distinction (under a principle of equality) is something distinctively human. In fact, you don’t 
have to agree with my proposed ideas of ‘animal dignity’ and ‘animal equality’ to appreciate 
that in putting them forward for consideration I am trying to say something morally 
substantial, something about the human (moral) condition, namely that in the eyes of 
human beings (in our moral eyes) all animals figure in a certain way. Anticipating a little, 
the point here is that there is a moral duty of kindness or benevolence that puts us (moral 
beings) in relation to sentient beings in general as intended beneficiaries of our own activity, 
a relation in which the little kid figures in the same as the old lady, the first minister the 
same as the nomad, and the human being the same as the pig, and the cow, and the 
chicken.44 This kind of animal egalitarianism is a moral idea, an idea about how individuals 
(persons) are to be regarded from the moral (distinctively human) point of view.  
                                               
42 This means that they object to the principle (the so far unstated premise in Kant’s argument) by which the 
conclusion is derived from the premise. My argument in relation to Kant’s ‘animal ethics’ (which does provide 
a connecting principle that can be challenged) constitutes a large portion of Part II below.  
43 It is not puzzling, I think, that people would (i) oppose attempts at objectifying the ‘animal condition’ and 
(ii) try to defend the dignity (special moral standing) of all sentient beings. That is as it should be. 
44 It is part of my argument in Part II that all animals count as persons for moral purposes. Given this thesis 
and the other developments made in Part II, the maxim just stated in the main text should be read as follows: 
 52 
 Again, whatever your take is on ‘Utilitarian’ (or in any case ‘sentio-centric’) ideas, 
you can appreciate that in putting them forward for consideration I need to presuppose a 
certain conception of human dignity (in the substantive sense of the term) giving me a 
moral reference point, making sense of the very place where I stand on, and the audience 
I am addressing, in thinking and talking about these issues. In particular, the duty of 
kindness towards all sentient beings that I think we have is meant to be a moral duty, and as 
such it presupposes our condition as the relevant duty-bearers (the bearers of this particular 
moral duty). Thus, if Utilitarians believe (as of course they do) in the existence of a moral 
duty of universal kindness or benevolence,45 and if they think (which of course they also do) 
that the burden of this duty falls exclusively on human shoulders, then surely they have to 
acknowledge that in our capacity for morality we (human beings) are radically superior to non-
human animals. There seems to be no way around the fact that Utilitarians – however 
‘radical’ they may be in their Utilitarianism – have to presuppose ideas of human moral 
superiority if only to place the moral burden on the right shoulders. Utilitarians are no 
different than anybody else in this regard, as for instance Onora O’Neill has acknowledged 
in her description of a necessary logo-centrism (O’Neill, 1998). The success of the ‘Utilitarian’ 
cause – the cause of defending the notions of ‘animal dignity’ and ‘animal equality’ – 
cannot be predicated on denying that which is distinctively human: the Utilitarian cause is 
a distinctly human cause, a project for morally rational beings.  
 Let me make the same point from a slightly different angle. The argument so far 
has been mainly that Utilitarianism is best read as being implicitly committed to ideas of 
substantive human dignity. However, there seems to be some explicit (if only perhaps 
inconsistent) support as well. If you think about it, the affirmation of human moral 
superiority is normally taken as a premise in the project of ‘utilitarian animal ethics’ as we 
have it already in the literature (even in the work of Singer himself, who therefore is wrongly 
read as denying any special place for human beings in the moral universe), the central case 
of which goes as follows: non-human animals are not moral agents, granted, but this doesn’t 
                                               
all persons (insofar as they are capable of happiness, and quite independently of their ‘moral credentials’) are 
equal in their condition as intended beneficiaries of the moral enterprise. 
45 I assume the truth of this claim in the thought that the duty in question is the quintessential Utilitarian 
duty. 
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condemn them to having the status of a ‘mere means to human ends’, since they can still 
count as moral patients with respect to us, meaning that we (moral agents) can still have 
duties to them.46 The truth seems to be that Utilitarian philosophy is already committed to 
ideas of substantive human dignity (human moral superiority) and specifically human equality, 
the only qualification being that these ideas have to be understood as pertaining to the 
‘first side’ in the moral equation as it were: the placing of moral burdens on the relevant 
shoulders. If understood as belonging also to the ‘second side’ of the moral equation, i.e. 
to the moral patient side (which for Utilitarians tends to take the form of an intended 
beneficiary), anthropocentric ideas are completely out of place. Again, it is the idea that 
‘humanity’ fixes the domain of ‘moral patients’ that Utilitarians mean to be taking 
exception to, not the mere affirmation of the kind of human moral superiority that – as I 
have explained – is necessarily assumed in all moral theorising. What Utilitarians are telling 
us is that when it comes to the issue of moral patients (intended beneficiaries in particular), it 
is the dignity of all animals – human and non-human alike – that has to be honoured, which 
we do (philosophically speaking) by saying that morality is something that we do for the 
benefit (the happiness) of all sentient beings.  
 Kantians can respond to the initial ‘Utilitarian critique’ as we saw them doing 
already, pointing to ‘humanity’ (as a ‘capacity for morality’) and its paramount moral 
significance: its being the ground of all moral realities, for instance. But if – as I am 
suggesting – Utilitarians can come to agree on this point, situating ‘humanity’ in the picture 
as the moral reference point; and now that the target of their critique has been qualified 
                                               
46 Lori Gruen, for instance, has put the point as follows: “The moral universe, as it were, thus can be said to 
have two levels: a level that contains moral agents, actors who are responsible for doing the right thing; and 
a level that contains moral patients, those to whom right or wrong actions are directed, but who may or may 
not be moral agents themselves” (Gruen, 2011, p.61). Paola Cavalieri has explained the distinction between 
moral agents and moral patients by saying that: “If the moral agent is a being whose behavior may be subject 
to moral evaluation, the moral patient is a being whose treatment may be subject to moral evaluation” 
(Cavalieri, 2001, p.29). She also thinks that “the criterion of consciousness remains the only plausible 
candidate with respect to the access to the status of moral patient” (Cavalieri, 2001, p.40), and on this basis 
includes all animals (all sentient beings) in that domain. The domain of ‘moral agents’ remains exactly as 
Kantians would have it, taking it for granted that “only rational and autonomous beings can be morally 
responsible” (Cavalieri, 2001, p.28). 
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accordingly, it seems as if Kantians who reduce animal or sentient life to nothing more 
than a ‘mere means’ (something with ‘price’ instead of ‘dignity’) are either (i) putting 
themselves in a difficult position or (ii) called to say much more than they have done so 
far, to explain to us exactly why we should believe as they do. Why is it that only human 
beings count as moral patients? More importantly still, why should humanity (the capacity 
for morality) be taken to fix – or be in any way material to fixing – the domain of direct 
moral considerability (and in particular the domain of intended beneficiaries of morality)? 
Addressing questions of this kind demands introducing a lot of nuance in the argument, 
and actually they are material for Part II below (where my argument for the dignity of 
sentient beings in general consists mostly of showing how it fits into a basic ‘Kantian’ – 
including ‘Contractualist’ – framework positing various irreducible intra-personal and 
inter-personal moral relations, some of which are such that only human beings count as 
direct participants). 
 The basic goal of this section has been to qualify the Utilitarian (sentio-centric) 
critique above as objecting, not to ideas of human moral superiority as such but only to the 
misuse of them in the objectification or less than full appreciation of animal or sentient life: 
the objectification of individuals, human and not, in their capacity for happiness.  
 Now, all of the above might be nice to hear, but it seems to me that Kantians have 
grounds to still remain sceptical of the story I have been telling on behalf of the Utilitarian 
view, especially as one deserving the ‘Utilitarian’ label. If Utilitarians are telling us that they 
agree on ‘humanity’ being essential as a moral reference point, i.e. as providing the first 
(properly moral) side in the moral equation, then surely this means that they also have to 
agree with making ‘humanity’ (human life) the very ground of all moral realities (precisely 
because it fixes the properly moral side in the moral equation); and yet, if you read the 
accounts of the nature of morality that Utilitarians typically offer, and if you pay attention 
to the conceptions of moral agency they typically work with, most (if not all) the work seems 
to be done by felicific (i.e. happiness related) considerations. For instance, they typically tell 
us that morality is a matter of utility, of actions having the best consequences over the well-being 
of sentient creatures (be that in actuality or in expectation). It’s as if Utilitarians were giving 
‘humanity’ its proper due with one hand, only to immediately dispossess it with the other. 
And so I ask: Why should we bother talking about distinctively human dignity if the actions 
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of cats, and trees and rocks also have consequences of the kind that are said to constitute 
the morality (the moral value) of human activity? Why should we bother if moral valences 
in the strict sense of the term (morality and immorality) depend on something that doesn’t 
belong in human life as such?47  
 It is not a secret that Kantians take issue with Utilitarian conceptions of ‘morality’ 
as we know them and the related conceptions of ‘moral agency’ they seem to be working 
with. The way Kantians typically regard the matter means that we should be questioning 
whether Utilitarians (insofar as we see them trying to reduce ‘morality’ to ‘utility’ or 
‘conduciveness to everyone’s happiness’ in some form) are even engaging in moral talk. 
Maybe it would be a little hasty for a Kantian to insist on this suggestion, since sometimes 
it happens that false reductionisms (and I agree that the one just mentioned – the reduction 
of morality to utility – is a textbook example of that kind of mistake) have some important 
truth lying behind them which people are failing to spell out correctly and which may 
escape people who don’t even try to go there.48 I submit that Kantians should hold their 
judgement over the possibility of a credible Utilitarian story about the nature of morality 
at this point: I would invite them to first hear what I have to say about what Utilitarianism 
                                               
47 This may sound as already misrepresenting Utilitarianism as an ethical theory, for it is by no means clear 
that the view necessarily involves a commitment to morality depending on anything other than the intrinsic 
qualities of human volition. Consider this line by Mill (1861/2003, p.196): “The morality of the action 
depends entirely upon the intention – that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the 
feeling which makes him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: 
though it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent.” I don’t want to read too much into 
this statement by Mill just yet, but it should at least generate doubts on Utilitarianism actually reducing the 
moral qualities of human activity to its felicific properties considered in a certain light (without of course 
having to deny that there are all kinds of statements by Utilitarians suggesting otherwise, as we will see shortly 
in the main text). What I mean to do here is warn you that the argument I am about to present against 
‘Standard Utilitarianism’ (‘Consequentialism’ + ‘Welfarism’) is not an argument against what I regard as 
Utilitarianism in its correct formulation. Part II is my attempt to develop and defend what I regard as the real 
thing (thus hopefully redeeming myself for the occasional sweepingness of my claims in the argument shortly 
to come).  
48 That is exactly what I think happens in this case. For my diagnosis of false reductionisms in which both 
Utilitarians and Kantians tend typically to fall into, see Sections 3. to 5. of  Part II (culminating in long 
footnote in subsection 5.5, which condenses most of the general argument). 
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amounts to (which I do mostly in Part II), if only for us to be clear on what exactly it is that 
they want to reject.49 What Kantians have to do at this point, I think, is criticise those 
‘Utilitarian’ conceptions of morality and moral agency that they reject as false on the basis 
of their own positive conceptions; more importantly still, they are called to point to those 
aspects of their own conceptions which they take to be crucial, so that the fruitful 
conversation that I am proposing can move forward.  
 For the moment, I need to deal with the undeniable fact that ‘standard’ Utilitarian 
conceptions of morality and moral agency appear to be in tension with their Kantian 
counterparts. The general argument for ‘Kantian ethics’ (i.e. for what I take to be the 
essence of Kantian ethics) will emerge out my critique of Utilitarian conceptions of the 
ethical as we usually find them formulated in the literature.  
 
6. Against ‘Standard Utilitarianism’ (For Kantian Ethics) 
 
I have been developing the Kantian doctrine of human dignity vis-à-vis alleged (and 
progressively vanishing) Utilitarian incredulity, touching mainly on conceptual and 
definitional matters with the aim clarifying and qualifying my claims. However, I have 
barely touched on more substantive issues concerning the nature of morality itself, upon 
which everything depends.  
 The Kantian makes human dignity revolve around the ‘capacity for morality’ that 
separates human beings in kind above non-human entities in general; but of course anyone 
can accept this thought and propose his own account of the nature of morality, which may 
not be Kantian in the least. Utilitarians, for instance, could well agree to the elevation of 
humans beings as moral subjects, and yet make morality depend on the felicific properties 
of human activity: its consequences and consequential tendencies with respect to the well-
being of sentient creatures in general. Such view could hardly be called Kantian, and by the 
same token it would also seem strange to put this label on the corresponding account of 
human dignity. If humanity (the feature of someone’s being human is the relevant sense of 
                                               
49 In Part II, I will be arguing that Utilitarianism should not be styled as a version of ‘Consequentialism’, but 
instead as a kind of Ethical Agapism. 
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the term) didn’t constitute an independent source of value; if the human condition didn’t 
come with a capacity to realise something of intrinsic value, i.e. something whose value could 
not possibly be reduced to the value of something else belonging to a different condition 
(e.g. happiness, which belongs to the ‘animal condition’), then it is hard to see how human 
beings could as such have dignity, or (in other words) how there could be such a thing as 
substantive human dignity: the ‘value’ of human beings (if I may put it this way) would be 
reduced to the one that attaches to them as bearers and/or causes of happiness. Besides, 
the issue is not whether such a view would deserve to be called ‘Kantian’, but instead 
whether it is true, and I submit that it is not true.  
 I am of course referring to the ‘standard’ utilitarian view (the one that is dominantly 
taught in universities), which explicitly reduces all ‘goodness’ (even presumably moral 
goodness) to ‘felicific goodness’ and as such can be seen as destroying our intuitive categories: 
it destroys morality (moral value) properly defined (i.e. as residing in the internal activity of a 
moral being, and as consisting in activity that is done from duty or in any case from a 
distinctively moral motive or maxim) and, also by implication, human dignity substantively 
understood (i.e. understood as belonging to human beings on account of their humanity). 
Kantians are in a very different position in relation to these issues, as they seem to have 
what it takes to provide a non-reductive conception of morality and so also a credible 
account of the kind of human dignity we are looking for: the kind of dignity that belongs 
to human beings in exclusivity, the kind of dignity that cannot be reduced to the purported 
‘animal dignity of the human being’.  
 From this point onwards, what I will do is develop my case for a recognisably 
Kantian conception of morality. However, the argument is meant to emerge from a ‘Kantian 
critique’ of Utilitarianism as we know it in dominant narrative in philosophy (i.e. as we 
have it in the books and teach it in universities). The ‘standard utilitarian formula’ – as I 
am going to call it – has portrayed Utilitarianism as the conjunction of ‘Consequentialism’ 
and ‘Welfarism’: as the view according to which the moral qualities of actions are a function 
of the relevant consequences, coupled with the view that the relevant consequences in that 
equation are the ones concerning the well-being (or happiness) of sentient creatures in 
general. Both those constitutive views (both ‘Consequentialism’ and ‘Welfarism’) make 
demonstrably false claims, I argue, and thus Utilitarianism is also by implication 
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demonstrably false.50 Here, again, I am referring to Utilitarianism in its ‘standard 
formulation’, leaving it open whether there is some better way of construing the view, which 
I argue there is. The following two sections tackle the ‘Consequentialist’ side of the 
equation, and the one after provides an extended argument against ‘Welfarism’.   
 
6.1 Against ‘Consequentialism’ – Defining the View 
 
‘Consequentialism’ has been given definitions that make it a view in moral metaphysics or 
moral ontology, i.e. a view that purports to account for the nature of morality, and it is in that 
capacity (as a view in moral metaphysics) that ‘Consequentialism’ will be a target for me in 
this section.51 In his entry to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong offers one such definition, which I take will take up as my initial definition in 
preference to other definitions that have been proposed (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019): 
 
                                               
50 To anticipate the crux of my argument against ‘Welfarism’ (the thesis that happiness or well-being is ‘the 
only intrinsic good’), this view is false not because there are kinds of outcomes other than felicific outcomes 
which we should morally pursue in the manner that (as Utilitarians think of it) we ought to pursue felicific 
outcomes. The problem with ‘Welfarism’ is rather that it is blind to the ‘intrinsic moral value’ that attaches 
to the good-will as such (regarded as cause, not as consequence).  
51 Some people understand ‘Consequentialism’ as the view according to which morality is all about the 
‘promotion of the good’, issuing no ‘side-constrains’ (no constraints or prohibitions above and beyond the 
ones that the ‘the promotion of the good’ involves) and no ‘special prerogatives’ for the agent to give 
disproportionate weight to his good vis-à-vis the good of others (Scheffler, 1982; Kagan, 1992; Cummiskey, 
1996). I won’t say much (if anything) about ‘Consequentialism’ under this definition, partly because I need 
definitions with more of a focus on how ‘Consequentialism’ purportedly depicts the nature (in a descriptive 
sense) of moral realities and the moral qualities of human activity, and also partly because (depending on 
how the view be developed further) I may just be a ‘Consequentialist’ under this particular construal (as I 
think there are no moral prohibitions above and beyond the ones that are grounded in agape, and so no 
prohibitions that don’t exist for everyone’s happiness, nor do I recognise the existence of ‘special 
prerogatives’). Perhaps my major qualm with respect to dominant theorising in this area is that all specific 
moral prohibitions being grounded in agape, and so being constitutive of the ‘promotion of the good’, as I 
think they are, in no way entails that these prohibitions are anything less than absolute prohibitions. 
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Consequentialism, as its name suggests, is simply the view that normative properties depend only 
on consequences. [...] This general approach can be applied at different levels to different 
normative properties of different kinds of things, but the most prominent example is 
probably consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act 
is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that 
act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind. 52  
 
The first thing to say about this definition is that it does a good job at capturing the 
theoretical ambitions of the view: as defined, ‘Consequentialism’ is a daring attempt to 
account for the ‘normative properties’ of actions (and of other things perhaps) by reference 
to the one thing that – as they see it – ultimately matters about them, namely their relevant 
consequences. For Utilitarians the ‘relevant consequences’ are those that pertain to the 
happiness or well-being of sentient creatures (because they see themselves as welfarists about 
value), but Consequentialists endorsing other axiologies will identify different 
consequences as the relevant ones to consider.53 I will keep referring to ‘Consequentialism’ 
having the generic view in mind, but please forgive me if at any point I lapse into addressing 
Utilitarians in particular. 
 So far so good, but we cannot move forward without first touching on at least two 
other points concerning our initial definition. Please note that this definition speaks of 
‘normative properties’ as that which is being explained by the view, which is potentially 
misleading given that the normative domain is wider than the moral domain, including as 
it does things like aesthetics and epistemology. We can rectify this problem while still 
following the path of our initial definition by noting that ‘Consequentialism’ is a view 
                                               
52 Both emphases are mine.  
53 This is a familiar point in the literature. The only thing to add is that instead of talking about ‘relevant 
consequences’ we could speak of the ‘value of consequences’. You can think of actions as having many kinds 
of consequences, some of which are ‘of value in themselves’ and some of which are not. The ‘value of 
consequences’ reduces to the value of those consequences in particular that are of value in and of themselves, 
and we can speak of the latter as the ‘relevant consequences’. 
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purporting to account for moral qualities, which it does by positing a metaphysical 
dependence of all such qualities on the relevant consequences (whatever those are).54 
 One last thing to note is that the definition above contains an idea that has come 
to be known as Global Consequentialism: the idea that ‘consequentialist evaluation’ can be 
applied “at different levels to different normative properties of different kinds of things” 
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2019). We can put this idea to the side for the moment. After all, 
Consequentialists typically restrict the domain of application of their principles to the few 
things that figure in our common moral discourse as fitting objects of moral evaluation: the 
actions and underlying intentions, motives and rules of human beings.55 Our initial 
definition fairly captures this point when it says that the “most prominent example is 
consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2019), although 
the truth is that consequentialists also often speak of the ‘value of actions’ (e.g. Scarre 1996 
p.101), the ‘moral value of actions’ (e.g. Crisp 1997, p.140), the ‘moral status of actions’ 
(e.g. Driver 2012, p.86), and the ‘morality of actions’ (e.g. Mulgan 2006, p.55). 
 The kinds of views that Consequentialists typically propose, then, are ones that 
focus primarily on the evaluation of actions (the actions of the relevant agents), and different 
terms are used to pick out the ‘moral qualities’ that actions are identified as having: they 
call actions ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘good’ and ‘bad’, all of this – they say – on account of 
(considerations of) their relevant consequences. We can then take all these points into 
account and modify our definition of ‘Consequentialism’ accordingly, thereby crafting a 
second definition of the view that we can take up as our own: ‘Consequentialism’ – we can 
now say – is the view according to which the moral qualities of actions (i.e. of the relevant 
actions, i.e. human actions) ultimately depend on (considerations of) their relevant 
consequences.     
 We are not quite there yet. It seems to me that our second definition is a decent 
enough version of the ‘standard definition’, but it is still vague in one important respect. 
                                               
54 This is not a point against Sinnott-Armstrong’s treatment of this issue, as he explicitly qualifies his 
definition of Consequentialism as a view about the moral properties of actions (Sinnott-Armstrong 2019).  
55 They don’t necessarily deny that we can appreciate the ‘utility’ of all things that have a ‘utility’. What they 
deny – I assume – is that evaluations targeting things other than the distinctive activity of rational agents 
count as moral evaluations.  
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We are about to see arguments against ‘Consequentialism’ as a theory in a certain capacity, 
and we absolutely need to conceive of it as a theory in that capacity. My arguments against 
‘Consequentialism’ take it as a theory that purports to account for the nature of morality, 
and even though talking about the ‘moral qualities of actions’ seems to do justice to that, 
the case is that it may not. Well, this depends on what ‘moral qualities’ we have in mind 
and how we define those qualities. If the qualities of actions that we have in mind are things 
like their ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’, or even (if you wish) their ‘moral rightness’ and 
‘moral wrongness’, then (depending what we mean by these properties) we might be losing 
sight of the real thing – we might be losing sight of the morality of actions.  
 The concern just raised is based on the Kantian distinction – that I endorse – 
between the ‘legality’ and the ‘morality’ of actions, a distinction Kant illustrates in his 
famous portrayal of a shopkeeper in the Groundwork (G 4:397). As you probably know, 
Kant’s shopkeeper is a person who does the right thing (charging the same price to all his 
costumers) but does so on non-moral grounds and so fails to give moral worth to her actions. 
In terms of the original distinction, the person here acts legally, but nevertheless fails to act 
morally. We can also think of the person who adopts a vegan or plant-based diet (excluding 
all animals from her menu) but does so on non-moral grounds: in some sense this person does 
the right thing and so acts legally (with regards to her abstinence at least), but morality is 
nowhere to be found there. Now, if this distinction is real and ‘morality’ is not to be found 
in simply doing the right thing (in the mere external conformity of actions with moral 
commands, which only gives us ‘legality’ or ‘rightness’), then we should indeed find it 
problematic to take ‘Consequentialism’ as a theory about that. I mean, if we really want to 
see ‘Consequentialism’ as trying to account for the nature of morality.  
 The picture has become messy before us even getting going with the argument. To 
make things simple, let me propose one final amendment to our second definition above. 
Since we need ‘Consequentialism’ to be a theory about the nature of morality (the real thing 
as opposed to mere legality of conduct), I see no option but to make it so and see what 
happens. Our final definition then has it that ‘Consequentialism’ is the view according to 
which the morality of actions depends entirely on their relevant consequences. Now, if it 
turns out that ‘Consequentialism’ aims to account for the nature of morality (the real thing) 
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and fails in that attempt, then all the worse for it. By construing ‘Consequentialism’ in this 
way we at least give it the dignity of counting as a false moral philosophy.56  
 
6.2 Against Consequentialism – The Argument  
 
Let me pose the question. What is wrong with ‘Consequentialism’ as a theory aiming to 
provide us with our basic moral framework? Simple: it tells us that the morality (moral 
value) of actions is a function of their relevant consequences, when the truth is the 
complete opposite of that: actions are ‘moral’ or ‘immoral’ only on account of their relevant 
causes – only on account of the motives or the maxims from which they are done. Morality 
is irreducibly a matter of attitude on the part of the moral agent herself, not a matter of 
universal ‘utility’ or ‘expediency’: it is a matter of acting on good motives or maxims, not a 
matter of producing (or even promising to produce in the ‘expected value’ sense as applied 
to human conduct) the best consequences. We have come to associate these claims with 
Immanuel Kant, the ‘anti-consequentialist’ par excellence, although the truth is that many 
(if not most) philosophers in history have defended some version of this view (many of 
them portraying it as the view that all human beings of themselves already hold).57 Now, 
                                               
56 I acknowledge that nobody regards ‘Consequentialism’ as a complete moral theory. What my argument is 
meant to show, then, is that any complete ‘Consequentialist’ theory (any theory making the morality of 
actions depend in any way on the value of its consequences, whatever those are) is false.   
57 Kant portrays this and closely related thoughts as part and parcel of our ‘common moral cognition’. But 
it’s not only Kant who thinks this. We find basically the same view in philosophers historically more closely 
associated with the ‘Utilitarian tradition’, e.g. Adam Smith, whom I’d like to quote on the particular 
(1759/1976, p.93): “The only consequences for which he can be answerable, or by which he can deserve 
either approbation or disapprobation of any kind, are those which were someway or other intended, or those 
which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the intention of the heart, from which he 
acted. To the intention or affection of the heart, therefore, to the propriety or impropriety, to the beneficence 
or hurtfulness of the design, all praise or blame, all approbation or disapprobation, of any kind, which can 
justly be bestowed upon any action, must ultimately belong. When this maxim is thus proposed, in abstract 
and general terms, there is nobody who does not agree to it. Its self-evident justice is acknowledged by all the 
world, and there is not a dissenting voice among all mankind. Every body allows, that how different soever 
the accidental, the unintended and unforeseen consequences of different actions, yet, if the intentions or 
affections from which they arose were, on the one hand, equally proper and equally beneficent, or, on the 
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given that I find Kant particularly helpful in discussions of this kind, I will take the liberty 
to speak of the ‘Kantian thesis’. To repeat: morality and immorality (moral valences proper) 
depend entirely on the relevant causes of actions.  
 If the ‘Kantian thesis’ is true, ‘Consequentialism’ is false (at least as an ethical 
theory). That much is clear. Now, one thing to note about the ‘Kantian thesis’ is that it 
follows from a certain axiological view that I also take the liberty to designate with the name 
‘Kantian axiology’ (which, to be clear, is not to say that this kind of axiology is only present 
in Kant). The problem with ‘Consequentialism’ (as a general framework upon which to 
build a moral theory) is ultimately to be explained with reference to this axiological view, 
which might at first sound paradoxical given that ‘Consequentialism’ is normally 
understood as being neutral between different axiologies. Now, given my claims here, I 
should be able to make this apparent paradox disappear, which I do as follows: if ‘Kantian 
axiology’ undermines ‘Consequentialism’ because it generates a thesis about the nature of 
morality (as of itself an axiological item) that makes the consequences of actions immaterial 
to their morality (the Kantian thesis), then the truth is that ‘Consequentialism’ is not so 
axiologically neutral after all.58 But how does ‘Kantian axiology’ generate the ‘Kantian 
thesis’? And what does ‘Kantian axiology’ say in the first place? 
 One of the essentials of ‘Kantian axiology’ is the claim that the good-will (the morally 
determined will) is intrinsically good: the good-will is good in itself and as such has no need 
of something else (e.g. happiness) conferring goodness upon it for it to be good. Kant thus 
                                               
other, equally improper and equally malevolent, the merit or demerit of the actions is still the same, and the 
agent is equally the suitable object either of gratitude or of resentment.”  
58 The reason why Consequentialism has come to be understood as neutral between different axiologies is 
that reflection on the distinctive valences attaching to the relevant causes of actions (relevant from the 
perspective of moral judgement properly understood) has been avoided. They attach valences to causes (even 
to the relevant causes, i.e. to those items that figure as ‘moral evaluands’ in our common moral discourse) on 
account of their ‘relevant consequences’, to be sure (which they are right to do insofar they mean to be 
accounting – in the case of ‘Welfarists’ at least – for the ‘beneficial character’ of human activity); however, 
insisting on these ‘consequentialist valences’ as the only ones in the picture – which they seem to do because 
otherwise they wouldn’t call themselves ‘Consequentialists’ – is to completely omit those distinctive valences 
I am talking about (moral valences in the proper sense of the term): morality (+) and immorality (–), which are 
always predicated of the causality of the human will as such. 
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famously compares the good-will with a jewel shining its own light (G 4:394).59 Now, it is 
not just any kind of goodness that attaches to the good-will in this intrinsic kind of way: 
only the kind of goodness we call ‘moral’ does. The good-will is thus intrinsically morally good 
– it has (we might say) intrinsic moral goodness. Now, it is exactly this piece of Kantian axiology 
that generates the ‘Kantian thesis’, and my main task in this section is to explain how this 
transition happens. I will also try to defend the axiological claim itself, but that will be in 
the next section (where I offer an extended argument against ‘Welfarism’ on the basis of 
an argument for ‘Kantian axiology’, thus also completing my argument against 
‘Consequentialism’).  
 So, if you take the Kantian affirmation of the intrinsic moral value of the good-will, 
and put it together with the claim that the good-will counts as a cause of actions (in the 
relevance sense of counting as a cause in this context),60 then we start to get very close to the 
‘Kantian thesis’. Let me make this into an argument. (1) If ‘moral goodness’ attaches 
intrinsically to the good-will (the morally-determined will), and (2) the good-will counts as a 
cause of actions (in the relevant sense of ‘counting as a cause’ in this context), then the 
conclusion follows that (3) ‘moral goodness’ attaches intrinsically to something (the good-
will) that counts as a cause of actions in the relevant sense. Premise (1) will be defended in 
the next section, but we can take it for granted for the sake of the argument here. Premise 
(2) is more important for us at this point, since it gives us the thought of the good-will (that 
which gives us moral goodness) as something that counts as a cause of actions in the relevant 
sense. And this is important because: if one has the further thought – the truth of which 
                                               
59 I will amply discuss the relevant passage (Kant’s ‘jewel passage’ in the Groundwork) in the next section.  
60 I’m speaking of the good-will as ‘counting as a cause in the relevant sense’ rather than just as ‘counting as a 
cause’ (simpliciter as it were) mainly because I don’t mean to deny the metaphysical status of the good-will as 
a consequence, as something that is brought about by certain causes. I don’t find it crazy to think that the good-
wills in the world (if there are any) count – at least in some sense – as consequences with respect to the ‘creation 
of the world’, for instance, and even perhaps with respect to the choices on the part of the relevant subjects to 
act morally (although those choices would themselves have to count as constitutive of good-willing). What I 
mean to indicate is simply that it is an assumption of the practice of moral assessment that we must be targeting 
the relevant kind of causality of the relevant kind of agents: we must be targeting human conduct (the conduct 
of morally rational beings) regarded as free, i.e. as responsive to moral considerations and therefore ultimately 
to the moral law.  
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seems obvious – that ‘morality’ is all about the realisation of ‘moral goodness’, i.e. if 
‘morality’ and ‘moral goodness’ are two names for one and the same positive valence (moral 
positivity proper),61 then one has made it all the way to the ‘Kantian thesis’: morality (‘moral 
goodness’ obtaining) is something that depends on the relevant cause of actions (the good-
will) being instantiated by the relevant agents. Morality (the real thing) depends entirely on 
the cause, not a single bit on the consequences. 
 This argument against ‘Consequentialism’ as a theory in moral metaphysics (or 
moral ontology) is meant to be conclusive, but I am yet to defend its crucial premise: the 
piece of ‘Kantian axiology’ that generates the ‘Kantian thesis’. The claim, that is, that the 
good-will (‘moral virtue’ if you will) is intrinsically good in the relevant sense (the only thing 
that has ‘intrinsic moral value’ and so the only thing capable of giving us morality of actions). 
Everything hinges on whether this piece of axiology holds true, and I will be arguing for it 
under the rubric of ‘Kantian axiology’.  
 
6.3 Against ‘Welfarism’ (For ‘Kantian Axiology’) 
 
The Welfarist theory of value that Utilitarians typically endorse has two claims: (i) that 
happiness (well-being)62 has ‘intrinsic value’, and (ii) that happiness is the only thing of 
‘intrinsic value’. The first claim is true, the second false. I reject (ii) on the basis of the 
‘Kantian thesis’ as characteristic of what I am calling ‘Kantian axiology’: the claim that the 
                                               
61 Similarly with ‘moral evil’ and ‘immorality’, of course. 
62 In line with conventional Kantian and Utilitarian practice (without denying the exceptions), I’m using 
‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’ as synonyms. I take them to stand for the specific kind of benefit that is the object 
of love (love as ‘benevolence’ or ‘kindness’, that is), which we can name the substantively beneficial in order to 
distinguish it from other senses of the beneficial (e.g. the beneficial in the functional sense of the term: that 
which constitutes or contributes to the well-functioning of an entity that by nature has that function). In any 
case, it should always be clear that we are talking about goodness (benefit) in the well-being sense, i.e. about the 
felicific (happiness), which obviously doesn’t apply to all things that have functions. A car, for instance, no 
matter how well it performs its functions, cannot be called happy (at least not literally).  
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‘good-will’ (the ‘morally-determined will’) is intrinsically good. I will argue for this claim – 
thus undermining (ii) – after giving a basic explanation for why (i) holds true.63  
 
6.3.1 The Intrinsic Value of Happiness 
 
Let me then start by arguing for happiness being something of ‘intrinsic value’ (a claim 
which I consider essential to what I call ‘Kantian axiology’, as it will soon become more 
explicit).64 The claim here is that happiness is something that is good in itself, something that 
is good simply in virtue of what it is, something that that has no need of an external thing 
conferring goodness upon it for it to be a good thing, something that contains the source 
of its own (distinctive) value, a.k.a. an ‘intrinsic good’. How does one argue for this kind of 
claim? Let me try the following. A cup of tea can be a good thing for you in terms of your own 
                                               
63 I won’t be doing any kind of technical analysis of the term ‘intrinsic value’ to begin with – i.e. before getting 
into the argument – because that is bound to make things complicated that are actually very simple. I will try 
to be precise in my claims and use of words, hoping that this will be enough to be able to convey my main 
points.  
64 In the literature, the standard formulation of ‘Kantian axiology’ (as a ‘dualistic axiology’ that has for that 
reason come to be known as ‘Kantian axiological dualism’) has it that the good-will (virtue) is intrinsically and 
unconditionally good, whereas happiness (well-being) is intrinsically, yet only conditionally good (Bader 2015, pp. 
175-201). This ‘Kantian axiological dualism’ relates closely to Kant’s dualistic human psychology and the theory 
of ‘practical reason’ that takes that psychology for its basis: the psychological thesis being the idea that the 
human mind is driven by the two forces of sensibility (in the form of self-love, in which the agent pursues her 
own happiness for its own sake) and reason (in the form of a ‘sense of duty’), which in the context of practical 
philosophy becomes a matter of there being two fundamental practical principles (prudence and morality) 
that pull in potentially different directions but nevertheless interact in terms of practical priority – the priority 
of course being that morality always has to take precedence in virtue of the categoricity of the moral principle, 
which is why happiness (i.e. the agent’s own happiness) is deemed intrinsically, yet only conditionally good: we 
pursue it for its own sake – as a final end – but only within the limits of morality. To be clear, I am assuming this 
kind of Kantian dualism in my entire argument, but such is not the main subject of this section. It is really a 
much more basic point that I am trying to make in the main text. When (in the main text) I talk about Kant’s 
dualistic axiology what I am referring to is Kant’s recognition (which I am using to argue against Welfarism 
as purported moral axiology) of two independent and irreducible dimensions of value, two distinct and 
heterogenous kinds of valences, namely the moral and the felicific.  
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personal benefit, but only (and thus the point) if it brings you happiness, i.e. if you enjoy it 
directly or if your drinking it leads to some further increase in the balance of your pleasures 
and pains (by relieving an ongoing pain, for instance, or by improving your health and thus 
giving you a longer enjoyable life), whereas that enjoyment and those further pleasures would 
be immediately or directly good (i.e. beneficial) for you. It’s not like, having enjoyed those 
pleasures, you would still need a further thing obtaining for the relevant benefit (the 
relevant ‘good’) to obtain. More pleasure would just mean more of the relevant benefit, 
and more of anything else (many more cups of tea, for instance) would mean nothing – in 
the relevant sense – unless it brings you pleasure. 
 It then seems perfectly clear that we can explain the ‘value’ (the felicific or benefit-
related value) of things like cups of tea in terms of their instrumental contribution to the 
creation of happiness; more importantly still, what this basic analysis reveals is that we can 
explain the value of happiness in a self-referential way, simply by pointing to happiness as 
something that contains the source of its own value, as something that is good in itself in the 
relevant, benefit-related, sense – as that without which things in general couldn’t possibly 
be of any value in that sense.  
 So far so good. But now take this analysis that the ‘Welfarist’ is offering and reflect 
on the thesis that all value (of all morally significant value, i.e. all value that is of direct 
interest for moral philosophy, and so presumably also ‘moral value’ as such) ultimately 
reduces to felicific value (i.e. to the kind of value that happiness has intrinsically and other 
things have only extrinsically). For ‘Welfarists’, remember, not only is it the case that 
happiness (well-being) is intrinsically good, it is also the case that nothing else is; not only is 
it the case that happiness can confer or impart value on other things, it is also the case that 
nothing else can. We have the internal value of happiness itself (as intrinsic value), and the 
value that happiness confers on other things by simply following from them as a 
consequence (as extrinsic value). That’s it! That’s all the ‘value’ that there is in the Welfarist 
picture: intrinsic felicific value, and extrinsic, but still always felicific, value.  
 What Welfarists are claiming, then, is that the kind of analysis (in reference to the 
intrinsic value of happiness) that we apply to cups of tea in our attempt to account for their 
substantively beneficial character can be used to fully account for the value (the morally 
significant value, and even, presumably, the ‘moral value’ as such) of all other things. Why 
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is the physical health of sentient beings a good thing? Because it normally sustains and 
enhances their happiness. Why is death normally a very bad thing? Because it extinguishes 
all prospects of happiness. Why is beauty important to the extent that it is important? 
Because of the rejoicing of those who stand in its presence. Why is virtue itself (moral 
activity) such a wonderful thing? Because, and only because, it puts us in the path of an 
ever happier world. And so on. Let me ask: is that the right story to tell in the context of 
our moral axiology? More importantly still: are we supposed to accept this story as an 
attempted ‘moral axiology’ at all? The answer to both questions is a resounding no, an 
answer that I give on the basis of the truth of the ‘Kantian thesis’.  
 But I cannot jump straight into defending the ‘Kantian thesis’ without first 
qualifying what its pretensions are, especially vis-à-vis the claims of Welfarism, some of 
which I argue (and Kant argues) are true (G 4:394): 
 
A good will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness 
to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by 
itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be 
brought about by it in favour of some inclination, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all 
inclinations [a.k.a. happiness]. Even if by some particular disfavour of fate, or by the scanty 
endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this will should entire lack the capacity to carry 
through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, an only 
the good will were to remain (not, of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all 
means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as 
something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add 
anything to this worth, nor take anything away from it.65  
 
I take this to be Kant’s principal statement of what I am calling the ‘Kantian thesis’, and I 
will begin by telling you what I think Kant is doing here. Kant is advancing claims 
concerning the moral import of the utility and disutility of the good-will (its conduciveness 
or otherwise to happiness, presumably universal happiness since he is talking about the 
strivings of a morally good will), and these claims are (just be sure) all negative in nature. 
                                               
65 All emphases in bold are mine (as well as the square brackets). 
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What Kant is doing is in fact denying ‘utility’ (and so by implication also ‘happiness’, even 
if taken universally) any power to alter – i.e. to diminish or augment – the moral worth that 
attaches to the good-will (and therefore to human actions since human actions have moral 
worth only if done from a good-will), which Kant claims is intrinsic to it. This is of course 
the ‘Kantian thesis’. But denying ‘utility’ any moral import of the kind Kant is talking about 
in this context, i.e. any power to make human activity moral or immoral, morally good or 
morally evil, which certainly amounts to denying happiness (as that with respect to which 
the good will has utility) intrinsic moral value, is by no means the same as denying it intrinsic 
value. Thinking that these two things are the same is to think that ‘moral value’ is the only 
kind of ‘value’ that there is, an assumption that is unmotivated even as a reading of Kant 
(not to speak of the implausibility of an axiology that plays blind to the felicific as an 
independent dimension of value).  
 Again, it seems to me that saying (as Kant does) that the good-will can be useful or 
have utility – even in the context of denying this feature of the good-will any power to affect 
its moral worth – presupposes that there is ‘something’ with respect to which the good-will can 
be useful, namely – as we are assuming – happiness (everyone’s happiness). Now, ‘X being 
useful with respect Y’ seems to be the same as ‘X being a means to Y’; and something being 
a means to something else, or being useful with respect to that something, seems clearly to 
be one form of the extrinsically good: one form of that which is good in relation to something 
else that constitutes the source (the external source) of its value. Surely we have to presuppose 
that this thing with respect to which the good-will can be useful (viz. happiness) has a kind 
of value that doesn’t itself come from the good-will, for otherwise it would be senseless to 
even talk about the good-will as being useful (again, even in the context of denying this 
usefulness any moral import). Happiness, therefore, can be seen as that with respect to 
which the good-will can be useful, and the intrinsicality of its value is thereby presupposed. 
Its moral value (its power to alter the moral quality of human activity) is certainly being 
denied, but a certain notion of its intrinsic non-moral value is at the same time being 
affirmed. There is therefore a qualified ‘Welfarist’ thesis concerning the value of the human 
activity that holds true even in ‘Kantian axiology’: only to the extent that the good-will is in 
some way productive of happiness can we think of it as having a beneficial character. As far 
as felicific value is concerned, the good-will is very much like the cup of tea and the Sun: it 
 70 
is no ‘good’ unless happiness follows from it (or is expected to follow from it, in case we 
are talking about ‘expected value’) as a consequence. This is the same positive story that we 
saw the Welfarist telling in relation to cups of tea and other things morality included, only 
now read into Kant’s statements in his famous ‘jewel passage’. But the main purpose of this 
passage is of course not to tell that story itself (which I am merely reading into it, and which 
is better told by Kant in other places), but rather to protect moral goodness from it by 
isolating it in thought (G 4:394):  
 
Even if by some particular disfavour of fate […] this will should entire lack the capacity to 
carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, an 
only the good will were to remain (not, of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all 
means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as 
something that has its full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add 
anything to this worth, nor take anything away from it.66   
 
I think we have to be with Kant on this point. The distinctive value of the good-will (its 
moral worth) has to be isolated from felicific considerations altogether by saying that 
happiness (and conduciveness thereto in any form) is not its source. However, if the 
question is whether happiness constitutes the source of the felicific value (the substantively 
beneficial character) of the good-will, the only answer can be yes, of course. It is as much as 
analytic (a.k.a. obvious, tautologous even) that happiness constitutes the ultimate source of 
the good-will’s felicific value. But wait a second: isn’t it equally obvious (tautologous even) 
that the good-will (‘moral virtue’) alone is of itself morally good and that the ‘moral value of 
happiness’ has to reduce thereto in like manner?67 It is, and so I conclude that ‘Welfarism’ 
is false if taken as a purported moral axiology. Such is my main argument for the ‘Kantian 
                                               
66 My emphasis.  
67 I construe the property of happiness (everyone’s happiness) of being extrinsically morally good (in perhaps the 
only way I can make sense of it) as follows: happiness (everyone’s happiness) acquires a moral character (a 
moral necessity attaching to it as an end of ours in particular) in virtue of its pursuit being commanded by the 
moral law, or if you will in virtue of its pursuit from duty being essentially constitutive of morality, in virtue of 
it being something that the morally good person distinctively cares about.  
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thesis’, but I need to argue for it more thoroughly to avoid being taken as simply playing a 
game of words. 
 
6.3.2 The Moral Side of Things  
 
‘Utilitarians’ (thinking of those who consider themselves ‘Consequentialists’) might have 
plenty to say to defend themselves at this point. For one, it is by no means clear that they 
are necessarily committed to portraying happiness – even if taken universally – as being of 
itself a moral good, or as passing for the moral dimension of things. They may clarify their 
position by pointing out that their proposed ‘moral axiology’ (Welfarism) is not really a 
‘moral axiology’ in the strictest sense of the term (i.e. an account of moral goodness, at least 
not initially). Welfarism, they could further clarify, has been designed to tell us about the 
‘non-moral good’ that morality essentially refers to as its end (the end – the non-moral good 
– the pursuit of which morality essentially involves), and they can tell various philosophical 
stories about what exactly morality’s reference to everyone’s happiness as an end amounts 
to. They could, for instance, decide to be ‘Consequentialists’, making morality a matter of 
– to put it simply – conduciveness to everyone’s happiness (be it in actuality or in expectation, 
so there are at least two possible stories to be told here).  
 In this kind of analysis, the ‘properly moral’ side of things (e.g. the morality of 
actions) is not understood to lie in happiness itself; rather, morality is being identified with 
‘utility’ understood as the property of human actions of being conducive to everyone’s 
happiness (be it in actuality or in expectation). The word ‘Utilitarianism’ itself suggests that 
‘utility’ has something to do with morality, and ‘utility’ is not the same as happiness (even if 
taken universally). Happiness doesn’t equal utility, since utility is ‘conduciveness to 
happiness’. Bentham was explicit on this point (Bentham 1823/197, p.2):  
 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what 
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comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.68 
 
Utility doesn’t equal happiness, then, and Consequentialists (i.e. Utilitarians who regard 
themselves as Consequentialists) are not saying that happiness obtaining (felicific outcomes 
considered just as such) is the same as morality or moral goodness obtaining. Instead, what  
they are saying is that morality equals (or in any case depends on) utility as the conduciveness 
to everyone’s happiness of human conduct taken in some form.  
 Now, as between the options that these Consequentialists have at their disposal in 
this area, they do much better defining morality (the moral quality of actions) in relation 
to utility in expectation and not so in actuality, as actual felicific consequences are themselves 
beyond the control of intentional agents like us and morality is something that we rightly 
assume must be entirely within our control. Consequentialists can then begin to internalise 
morality and put it in human hands by arguing as follows: in her intentional activity, the 
moral agent is intending to put something out there (to promote everyone’s happiness), but 
once she has acted, once it is out there, it is no longer up to her, and therefore no part of 
her morality. Morality is this ‘intending to put something out there’, as opposed to 
something out there actually occurring. I submit that these thoughts are all good thoughts, 
thoughts that actually say something about the nature of morality. However, I argue that 
they have to be embedded in the right sort of moral framework, which, I also argue, is not 
a ‘Consequentialist’ framework of any sort.  
 The ‘Consequentialist’ framework that Utilitarians commonly endorse is a fit for 
Welfarism, but Welfarism (which I submit is the starting point for most Utilitarians, because 
they get to Consequentialism by first thinking that happiness is that which ultimately 
matters and then realising that what ultimately matters about human conduct is the impact 
that in has on everyone's happiness) is false, at least as a moral axiology in the proper sense 
of the term (i.e. as an account of moral goodness and moral evil, of morality and immorality 
as distinctively moral valences). We see the problem in the quote by Bentham that we have 
                                               
68 My emphasis.  
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been discussing in relation to the meaning of utility [although now with a different 
emphasis to indicate the new point] (Bentham, 1823/1907, p.2):  
 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes 
again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the 
party whose interest is considered. 
 
Is Bentham justified in equating happiness (pleasure, advantage, benefit) with ‘good’ or 
‘goodness’ itself? If you bracket moral goodness (the kind of goodness we ascribe to saints, for 
instance), perhaps. But we don’t want to bracket moral goodness because moral goodness 
(that which constitutes moral goodness, namely the human will in the realisation of its full 
moral relationality) is the very subject matter of moral philosophy. Is Bentham justified in 
equating unhappiness (pain, mischief, disbenefit) with ‘evil’? Again, bracketing moral evil 
(the kind of evil that we ascribe to scoundrels, for instance), maybe the only other negativity 
that remains which one may want to call ‘evil’ is pain itself, I agree. But obviously we cannot 
just bracket moral evil in ethics.  
 Now, it is true that Welfarists (Utilitarians acting as Welfarists but also trying to 
defend their Consequentialist commitments) may at this point insist (on a point that I 
noted at the top of this section) that they are not actually bracketing these things (moral 
goodness and moral evil) and forgetting about them but instead offering their own account 
of them. Having agreed on felicific goodness being a non-moral kind of goodness, and having 
put ‘Consequentialism’ in place as the normative framework that is meant to account for 
the ‘moral side of things’ (thus giving us a certain notion of the ‘morality’ or – as it is more 
often called the ‘moral rightness’ – of actions), they could define ‘moral goodness’ as the 
fundamental disposition of the moral subject to reliably do ‘the right thing’, which as such 
is assumed to be felicifically optimific in expectation. This may sound like the kind of thing 
that we distinctively ascribe to saints: the disposition to always do the right thing and to 
thereby maximise the chances of happiness for all sentient beings. But then of course we 
can imagine someone who is reliably and systematically disposed to do the right thing (and 
therefore also the felicifically optimific thing in expectation) but only out of fear of being 
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doomed, of being placed in Hell by a God who knows her every movement and expects her 
always to do the right thing. But I wonder: is she really being a morally good person? Are her 
apparently diligent actions morally good (genuinely moral) actions? I don’t see how they 
could be, and this thought alone shows that there has to be a more basic conception of 
‘moral goodness’ that escapes ‘Consequentialist’ analysis. Only when we think of the 
person as acting from a distinctively moral motive (i.e. from duty, or in practical love if you will, 
or even for everyone’s happiness, or all of the above together as it is the case in the final 
account) do we start to see any moral goodness in the action.  
 I can accept that ‘Consequentialists’ are free to point to the moral subject and her 
own volition (her intentions, what she intends to do) in their attempt to situate the morality 
of actions, thus initially deflecting the worry that they may be completely blind to the 
‘human’ (‘properly moral’) side of things; but I don’t think their project can ever succeed, 
as ‘Consequentialism’ is itself the result of avoiding reflection on moral valences (morality 
and immorality) properly so called, which we attach to the causality of the human will as 
such, as the special kind causality that it is in its different modes. Again, ‘Consequentialists’ 
may try to give humanity its due by pointing to human activity (even to our most 
fundamental disposition or maxim) as that which constitutes the ‘properly moral’ side of 
things; but the second they start judging this activity on the basis of ‘Consequentialist’ 
standards (which as such can be applied to assess the axiological – always non-moral – 
merits of all kinds of things, as Consequentialists themselves have acknowledged in ideas 
such as Global Consequentialism), they immediately undo the favour. Consequentialist 
evaluation is non-moral evaluation, and it remains the same even when applied to those 
things that actually of themselves constitute ‘the moral side of things’ (human maxims, 
motives, intentions and actions).  
 Nothing against Utilitarianism itself has been said here, of course, only against the 
formulation of the view that has become standard in academia. Remember that in the final 
account Utilitarianism is to be construed as an ‘Agapist’ (as opposed to ‘Consequentialist’) 
doctrine depicting morality as a matter of practical love, of the agent being benevolent (in a 
very precise sense that has to be described in detail, which is one of the things that I attempt 
to do in Part II) to all sentient beings. But depicting morality as a matter of exercising 
practical love (which as such involves acting for everyone’s happiness) is to depict morality as 
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irreducibly a matter of attitude on the part of individual moral agents, as a matter of these 
agents acting on good motives (principles, maxims) as opposed to producing or even 
‘promising’ to produce (in the ‘expected value’ sense as applied to their conduct) the best 
felicific consequences.69 Morality is therefore neither in happiness itself (even if taken 
universally) nor in the conduciveness thereto of human activity (i.e. in utility, be it in 
actuality or even in expectation), as it lies only in practical love for all sentient beings. This, 
according to Utilitarianism as it should be.  
  Having concluded my basic argument against the truth of both Welfarism and 
Consequentialism (and to bring this Part I finally to an end), I will end by giving you some 
further reflections on moral goodness.  
 
6.3.3 On Moral Goodness 
 
My general message so far has been that ‘moral goodness’ is as much as a misnomer when 
predicated of either happiness as such (intrinsic felicific goodness) or conduciveness to 
happiness (utility) as such (extrinsic felicific goodness). Even the most general reliability of 
the human will (considered in the most basic acts that it performs) to do that which 
‘promises’ the best felicific results in an indefinitely ongoing future cannot as such be called 
morally good. Which of course is not to say that the morally good person is indifferent to the 
promotion of happiness in the world, but nevertheless. ‘Moral goodness’ and ‘moral evil’ 
are the basic terms we use in our practice of moral assessment, which is always a judgement 
of reason targeting human conduct regarded as free, i.e. as being capable of guidance through 
                                               
69 If there is a promise that is of itself part of morality in relation to the happiness of subjects in a fundamental 
kind of way, it is the promise (in the literal sense of the term) that the human being address to all sentient 
beings (if only in thought) to be by their side to protect them for their own sake, to do her job as a guardian 
in a moral community that includes all of them as citizens with beneficiary status. The morally good person 
acts on this (as I would like to call it) agapist promise, and this manner of acting is essentially constitutive of 
morality. Then of course, we can assume, comes also the ‘Consequentialist promise’ (the sheer fact that – to 
put it simply – the probability of a happy world coming to pass has thereby – as a result of the morally good 
activity of the subject – been maximised); but this ‘promise’ (which goes by the name of ‘expected utility’) is 
not of itself part of morality.  
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the influence of reason in the form of a moral command addressing the human will directly 
(responsiveness to the moral law). Only obedience to the moral law in the privacy of human 
wills (only this obedience taken as such) can make human conduct in any proper sense 
morally good, a.k.a. genuinely moral; it takes obedience to the moral law in the privacy of 
human wills for things to improve morally, and all felicific properties of human action are 
on this account rendered morally immaterial (i.e. in the sense that is directly implicated 
here: the incapacity of felicific properties in general to alter the moral quality of human 
activity). 
 Now, people normally use the basic axiological terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in reference 
to the felicific as such. They say things like: I had a good time, that was a good concert, the 
pain was horrible, something very bad just happened, and so on. In my view, they have every 
right to do so, and I have been portraying Kant as agreeing with this judgement in virtue 
of his general axiological stance allowing for the felicific as an independent (irreducible) 
dimension of ‘value’. However, there are a few statements in Kant that seem to speak to the 
contrary, and we would do well to examine those statements, including (CPrR 5:60): “Thus 
good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to actions, not to the person’s state of feeling.” 
The most basic of axiological concepts – Kant tells us in this line – are ones that can only 
be predicated of human actions as such (regarded as ‘deeds of freedom’, would be the 
assumption here), and he seems to be making a closely related point when – only a few 
pages below – he states that the moral law is conceptually prior to the concepts of ‘good’ 
and ‘evil’ (CPrR 5:63): “the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the 
moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but 
only (as was done here) after it and by means of it.” These two lines are taken from Kant’s 
Second Critique, where he also explicitly distinguishes between the concepts of ‘das Gute’ or 
‘the good’, on the one hand, and ‘das Wohl’ or ‘well-being’ on the other (CPrR 5:59–60), 
thus giving to understand that well-being doesn’t of itself deserve the status of a ‘good’. 
And so I ask: What are we supposed to do with these statements by Kant apparently denying 
axiological status to – talk of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ in relation to – the felicific as such? 
Here is my suggestion (i.e. in relation to our reading of Kant, which is only secondary to 
the independent points I am trying to make concerning ‘moral goodness’).  
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 If we read Kant’s claims (those seemingly denying axiological status to felicific items 
as such) as expressing unqualified propositions, then a certain kind of ‘Kantian axiological 
monism’ would seem to follow unavoidably where the good-will is not only intrinsically 
good, but as much as the only ‘good’ properly so called. We could on this basis read Kant as 
engaging in the revisionist project of trying to reform our common axiological discourse, 
i.e. given that people (everywhere as far as I know) do in fact use axiological concepts such 
as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (‘evil’ even) in relation to the felicific as such. But I think it is possible 
to construe Kant’s apparently problematic statements in such a way as to avoid putting him 
in that position: Kant’s statements need not be read as unqualified propositions, as they 
can in fact be qualified in various ways to convey the important nuance that they mean to 
convey (as I will try to show after a small reflection on why ‘Kantian axiology’ has to be 
construed as dualistic at certain fundamental levels).  
 Thus, I submit that the claims developed so far in this section (e.g. the claims that 
I managed to read into Kant’s ‘jewel passage’) speak strongly in favour of a reading of Kant 
as giving us the distinction between ‘moral goodness’ and ‘felicific goodness’ as two 
perfectly distinguishable, heterogenous kinds of ‘goodness’. But there is explicit textual 
support as well in favour of that reading. In the Second Critique (the place where Kant makes 
some of his apparently problematic statements) he identifies moral virtue with ‘the worth 
of the person’, and well-being with ‘the worth of the person’s condition’ (CPrR 5:60), 
meaning that there are two distinct kinds of worth which persons (human beings in the 
context of Kant’s discussion) can realise in their lives. This is of course the same distinction 
as that between someone’s being a morally good person (moral goodness) and someone’s 
‘doing well’ or benefiting out of life (well-being / felicific goodness / happiness). Not only 
are there two heterogenous ‘goods’ which persons (human beings) can realise: these two 
‘goods’ (moral virtue and happiness) actually come together to constitute what Kant calls 
the “highest good in a person” (CPrR 5:110), or ‘the good of human beings’ as we might also 
call it.70 Kant conceives of this ‘highest good’ as the realisation of all that is intrinsically 
(irreducibly) good in the life of human beings, and consequently he also refers to it as the 
                                               
70 To be distinguished from the human good properly so called, the distinctively human good, which of course has 
to be moral virtue alone.   
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‘complete good’ (CPrR 5:110). Happiness may be a non-moral good, but it is a good 
nevertheless, a good that is as much as constitutive of (essential to) the realisation of human 
beings as persons (i.e. as both rational and sensitive beings).  
 It is worth noting that it is one of Kant’s major goals in this area of his philosophy 
to arbitrate between the Stoics (the champions of virtue) and the Epicureans (the 
champions of pleasure). Kant rejects ‘Epicurean’ philosophy because he takes it to 
misportray morality as the doctrine of how to make oneself happy (e.g. CPrR 5:112, 5:126), 
but he also rejects ‘Stoic’ philosophy because – among other things – it misportrays both 
virtue and pleasure: (i) virtue as being ‘its own reward’71 (which he strictly speaking 
denies),72 and (ii) pleasure as an ‘extrinsic good’ or an ‘indifferent’ (if only a ‘preferred 
indifferent’) from the perspective of one’s own happiness or well-being, which it plainly 
isn’t according to Kant (whom I read as an unqualified hedonist about well-being as such, 
which of course is not to deny that the pursuit of one’s well-being in self-love is always 
conditioned by moral duty in Kant’s theory of practical reason).73 The synthesis of the two 
views that Kant proposes (which he associates with ‘Christian philosophy’) has it that ethics 
(the doctrine of moral virtue) is not to be understood as a doctrine of how to ‘make oneself 
happy’, but instead as a doctrine of how to make oneself worthy of happiness (CPrR 5:130). 
But if virtue has the sense of worthiness of happiness or worthiness of reward, then it cannot be 
                                               
71 There are other ways in which Kant sees the ‘Stoics’ as misportraying virtue (CPrR 5:126–127) and the 
‘Christian’ doctrine as superior (i.e. truer), but I cannot afford going into the details of this right now (see 
Part III). 
72 To be fair to Kant, he does try to accommodate the idea that ‘virtue is its own reward’ in the idea of a 
“moral pleasure” (MM 6:391). But a ‘moral pleasure’ is a pleasure, of course, and consequently there is no 
argument here against ‘hedonism about well-being’ (not even against unqualified hedonism, which doesn’t care 
about the nature or the provenance of the pleasure for the sake of counting it towards well-being just as such). 
73 It is to this effect that Kant replies to the Stoic’s cry [in italics for emphasis]: “Pain, however you torment me I 
will still never admit that you are something evil” (CPrR 5:60). Kant concedes that the Stoic is right in thinking of 
pain as something that doesn’t in any way diminish the worth (the moral worth) of his person, but that 
nevertheless his cry “betrayed” the fact that “he felt that the pain was an ill” (CPrR 5:60). In other words, 
Kant would have liked the Stoic to admit that pain (no matter what he makes of it) is very much something 
that detracts from the worth his condition (i.e. from his well-being, which always comes down to hedonic states 
and as such is essentially the same in kind as that of any other sentient creature).  
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thought of as itself having the sense of reward. Virtue is not (nor does it of itself contain) 
its own reward. Only happiness understood as something distinct from virtue (viz. to put it 
simply, pleasure) has the proper sense of reward. The Epicurean view has then been saved 
in the latter idea,74 and the Stoic view has been saved in the idea of the purity (the 
disinterested nature, or more precisely the purely rational nature) of morality. However, it’s 
only the positive insights of both views that have been saved, and the reductive (monistic) 
pretensions of both have been rejected in favour of a dualism that has begun to take form 
in the ideas of the highest good as the sum of two heterogenous ‘goods’ (moral virtue + 
happiness) and the related idea of remunerative / punitive justice (happiness in proportion to 
virtue).75  
 Kant’s insistence on a certain idea of justice (happiness in proportion to virtue) and 
the related idea of the highest good (moral virtue + happiness) are usually taken to be essential 
to his view, and therefore also to any credible reconstruction of Kantian philosophy. I don’t 
mean to deny these claims here, but I am for the moment taking the ideas in question as 
‘problematic’ (as ideas yet to be discussed), and the reason I am appealing to them in this 
context is only to make a substantive point of my own: I have been using them as evidence 
that Kant is (in the context of our present discussion) a dualist insofar as he grants the 
intrinsic value of both virtue (morally good willing) and happiness or well-being (pleasure). 
To be perfectly clear, the point is not exactly to ‘prove’ that Kant is a dualist in this context, 
or even to defend some reading of Kant on purely exegetical grounds, but simply to seize 
the opportunity afforded by the themes being discussed (i.e. the opportunity to use my own 
                                               
74 This is of course Kant’s hedonism about well-being (CPrR 5:60): “Well-being or ill-being always signifies only 
a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid 
an object on this account we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure 
or displeasure it causes.”  
75 Please don’t take me to be arguing here for the validity of these two ideas, since it’s mostly in the Part III 
(Conclusion) that I get to discuss them in any detail. To anticipate, I will for the most part be avoiding 
pronouncements on the validity and significance of Kant's idea of remunerative / punitive justice in 
particular, although I will be explaining the reason for this decision towards the end of that concluding 
section. 
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understanding of Kant’s philosophy) to convey certain specific points that I need to convey 
concerning moral goodness.  
 Let’s go back to Kant’s idea of remunerative justice for a second. The reason why 
happiness can be seen as having the sense of reward is because it has the more fundamental 
(more indigenous to it) sense of benefit (i.e. of ‘substantive benefit’ to use my proposed 
terminology); in similar manner, the reason why moral virtue can be seen as having the 
sense of worthiness of reward is because it has the more fundamental (more indigenous to it) 
sense of fulfilment of a mission or task attaching to our existence as human beings (human 
dignity).76 You fulfil your mission, you stand to receive a benefit, is the idea. Now, the 
conclusion really seems to follow from this simple analysis that moral virtue and happiness 
have fundamentally different senses; each is ‘good’ in its distinctive (indigenous) kind of 
way. As to the good-will or moral virtue (for facility: acting from duty), the goodness that we 
distinctively attribute to it (moral goodness) is nothing but the recognition of it counting 
as the state of realisation of the human being as such, i.e. as realising that which makes a 
human being (in her own distinctive intentional activity) a good human being, as that which 
makes actions (as pertaining to the distinctive activity of human beings) good actions. Any 
ascription of moral goodness (to persons or their actions) is thus the recognition that there 
is a human being fulfilling her moral (distinctively human) mission in the world.77  
                                               
76 This point was not needed in the main text, but one could certainly argue as follows: Kant claims that 
happiness and nothing other than happiness is deserved (i.e. intrinsically, since of course one can deserve many 
things in virtue of deserving happiness) by people to the extent that they act virtuously. But how is this 
possible? It seems perfectly clear that one of the conditions of the possibility of this ‘deserving of happiness’ 
is the idea that there is something to happiness, and to nothing other than happiness, that makes it uniquely 
deservable, and what could this be apart from an internal value attaching to happiness (having the sense of 
benefit) that is prior to its actually being deserved? Happiness has ‘intrinsic deservability’, we might say. I mean, 
in Kant’s view, not that this is the only or even the best way to speak of the intrinsic value of happiness. Given 
the point of my argument, my emphasis in relation to happiness is one concerning the indigenous sense of 
substantive benefit that it has.   
77 Many questions arise at this point in relation to attributions of moral goodness, especially in relation to 
categories that have been introduced by Utilitarians: e.g. the distinction – which has to be understood in a 
specific way – between the ‘morality of the act’ and the ‘morality of the agent’ (e.g. Mill 1861/2003, p.196). 
I address the issue (although only in passing) when in Part II (section 7.1) I get to propose that this particular 
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 There is one last thing to be done, which I left in the air when I began listing general 
reasons for keeping ‘Kantian axiology’ as I have portrayed it in this work (as – among other 
things – preserving the axiological status of the felicific as such). What we are yet to do, of 
course, is address the question what to make of Kant’s seemingly problematic statements 
concerning the axiological status of the felicific as such. Let me bring these statements back 
for consideration: first we have the claim that “good or evil is, strictly speaking, referred to 
actions, not to the person’s state of feeling” (CPrR 5:60); which is compounded with the 
claim that there is ‘das Gute’ or ‘the good’, on the one hand, and ‘das Wohl’ or ‘well-being’ 
on the other (CPrR 5:59–60). But surely we can understand Kant’s claims in this context 
as referring to moral goodness in particular as that which (together with moral evil) is 
essentially referred to human actions (as deeds of freedom) and is always to be distinguished 
from well-being, and we seem to be equally free to qualify ‘goodness’ in reference to the 
latter: felicific goodness.  
 Kant’s other apparently problematic statements (i.e. problematic from the 
perspective of trying to preserve the axiological status of the felicific as such in our ordinary 
discourse) add more dimensions to our discussion. I cannot fully address the issues here, 
but I can make a few relevant points (CPrR 5:63): “the concept of good and evil must not 
be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have 
to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it.” Again: if 
qualified as referring to ‘moral goodness’ and ‘moral evil’ in particular, I agree with this 
claim. The concept of moral goodness cannot be defined without the concept of the moral 
                                               
distinction that Utilitarians have used better be mapped onto Kant’s basic distinction between ‘morality’ and 
‘legality’. This move admittedly loses the distinction itself between the ‘morality of the act’ and the ‘morality 
of the agent’ as Utilitarians have intended it, as in the Kantian picture there is only one morality (having its 
ultimate source in the fundamental maxims of the human will) that is equally predicated of both persons and 
their actions (the distinction being more or less artificial depending on the context). The promise, of course, 
is that this move will not damage but strengthen the credibility Utilitarianism as an ethical theory (since now 
we don’t need to call actions ‘moral’ – but perhaps only ‘right’ or ‘legal’ to the extent that they are, knowing 
that none of this will ever pass for ‘the morality of actions’ – that are done from merely self-serving motives 
or, worse still, from a morally evil maxim).  
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law, since moral goodness just is (in the sense of being essentially constituted by) obedience 
to the moral law or (as in common parlance) acting from duty.  
 The concept of what is ‘good’ in a wider practical-rational sense is also one that has 
to refer to the moral law as giving us the unconditioned condition (the supreme limiting 
condition) in our practical life, as Kant had emphasised already in the Groundwork in the 
claim that “nothing has any worth other than that which the law determines for it.” (G 
4:436) If, for instance, there is a kind of pleasure the pursuit of which is inconsistent with 
our morality, then surely we shouldn’t be calling it ‘good’ in any sense entailing that we 
have reason (justification) to pursue it. It is in this context that one is most tempted by the 
revisionist project of our common axiological discourse in general that we might read Kant 
as trying to propose: in relation to the eating of flesh, for instance (and you can imagine 
more examples), I would like to say: pleasant, perhaps, but no good. But I think I have every 
right to say this (i.e. to say it – and so in a way join Kant’s project – without giving up the 
points that I have been making) because this way of speaking makes perfect sense in the 
relevant context of utterance. In the context of giving justifications for conduct that may be 
challenged on moral grounds, it is just unacceptable to point to the pleasure one would 
derive from such conduct.  
 The conclusion that I draw from this basic reflection is the following: so long as 
terms are properly qualified, and so long as the use of terms be adequate given the context 
of utterance, I claim that there is no philosophical problem with calling pleasure ‘good’ 
and pain ‘bad’ (‘evil’ even).78 There is a problem with calling certain pleasures ‘good’ in 
                                               
78 The flipside here is that very little is gained philosophically speaking by being able to call pleasure ‘good’ 
and pain ‘evil’ (i.e. to call them by these terms considered just as such). Something that is gained (I mean, 
something that we won’t lose) is the right to talk about the happiness and unhappiness of animals in a certain 
way. The pain of an animal is a bad thing even in isolation from moral or rational considerations (in isolation 
from oughts of any kind), meaning of course that we don’t have to apologise for calling it ‘bad’ and instead 
call it only ‘painful’ or ‘disagreeable’ (just like we don’t have to apologise for calling the good-will ‘good’ 
instead of just ‘moral’ or ‘noble’, which I can imagine someone insisting that we do). After all, what I have 
been doing here (in so far as I have been arguing for preserving the axiological status of the felicific as such) 
is simply recognising the existence of an independent dimension of ‘value’ that merits the existence of a sub-
field in philosophy which of course relates closely to other fields: the theory of well-being, in the context of 
which well-being itself counts as ‘the good’. Having said this, I will insist on the idea that very little has been 
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certain (perhaps most) contexts of utterance, but that is something that can easily be solved 
in reference to the moral theory and the more general theory of practical reason (where 
morality figures as the unconditioned) that define the framework for our constructive 
dialogue as human beings. 
 If there is a part of ‘moral goodness’ that I would like to protect from any kind of 
qualification is not ‘goodness’, then, but moral, and so I want to address philosophers 
working on these issues (Utilitarians in particular): please qualify your use of axiological 
terms to always be very clear in what you mean, but never give me the term ‘moral’ in 
reference the felicific as such. Philosophers are deluded who think that calling pleasure 
‘good’ and pain ‘evil’ (even in conjunction with ‘Consequentialism’) will ever pass for a 
moral axiology. Moral goodness (perhaps the main explanandum in moral theory) belongs in 
exclusivity to the realisation of the human being as such in the instantiation of a morally 
good will (human dignity), and in recognition of this fact we have to reject ‘Standard 
Utilitarianism’ and join the project of ‘Kantian ethics’. But I argue that the ‘standard 
utilitarian formula’ (‘Consequentialism’ + ‘Welfarism’) is far from the correct formulation 
of Utilitarianism (which I argue has to be construed as an agapist doctrine that is perfectly 
consistent with the basic Kantian framework I have begun to put in place and will continue 
to develop in Part II). Let me now give you my own formulation of Utilitarianism and my 





                                               
gained philosophically speaking. For instance, if one wants to call happiness (e.g. the happiness of non-human 
animals) ‘good’ in a moral sense (as something that we ought morally to pursue, for instance) one needs to 
produce an independent theory accounting for the relevant moral ought (which we now understand has to be 
a theory of moral goodness as a sui generis kind of goodness belonging in a theory of human dignity in the 
Kantian sense of the term). One cannot get there by simply pointing to the felicific and insisting on its 
independent axiological status (e.g. by pointing to pain as something that is ‘just bad’), nor by simply pointing 
to the felicific tendencies of human activity. We need a theory of human moral relationality putting us in the 
right moral relation to sentient beings; hence my main objective in Part II. 
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Part II: Animal Dignity: A Defence of Utilitarianism 
 
 
Part I of this work was devoted to developing and defending the basic claims that constitute 
the Kantian doctrine of human dignity. In parallel, the argument was also made that we have 
to reject the ‘standard utilitarian formula’ (Consequentialism + Welfarism) in favour of a 
Kantian conception of morality making it depend entirely on the intrinsic quality of the 
human will. Felicific consequences are immaterial to the morality of human actions because 
– as we normally say – it’s the intention (the intrinsic quality of the individual’s volition, the 
maxim of the will ultimately) that counts!  
 Part I thus also left us with the thought that morality is necessarily logo-centric (or, 
to use the somewhat less accurate but more popular term, anthropocentric) in a very central 
and crucial sense. Moral standards are the very standards our humanity (our morally 
rational nature), from which it follows that the ground of all moral realities is to be located 
in human life as such, i.e. in the existence of human (morally rational) beings acting in the 
world. If it weren’t for the presence of human beings, if it weren’t because there are beings 
whose conduct stands under (self-represented) moral standards, beings who by their own 
nature carry the burden of moral duty, moral goodness and moral evil would be completely 
out of the question, and moral relations in general would be strictly speaking impossible. No 
wronging relations could exist in such a world, for instance, since there would be no 
potential wrong-doers. Human beings are in this way the protagonists of the show, the very 
ground and locus of all things moral. 
 Now, it has never been my claim that human beings are superior to other animals 
in every morally significant respect, and the main goal of this Part II is in fact to argue for 
the notion of animal dignity, to argue that there is a certain morally significant domain 
calling for the use of this notion.79 There is a lot to be said about what the notion of ‘animal 
                                               
79 I will later in the argument be questioning the identity between ‘animality’ and ‘sensibility’ (the capacity 
for happiness + concomitant agency) on the basis of the thought that ‘animal’ equals ‘person’ equals ‘subject’ 
as one and the same general philosophical category, thus in principle allowing for the existence of ‘purely 
rational (i.e. non-sensitive) animals’. To prevent misunderstandings, let me then warn you that when – in the 
 85 
dignity’ amounts to, but the basic point is actually very simple: animals in general (all animals 
qua animals, i.e. all sentient beings qua sentient, all beings capable of happiness as so capable) 
have a certain moral standing – whose nature we need to elucidate – raising them 
categorically above the non-animal (non-sentient) world. The claim here is not that animals 
(sentient beings) occupy a middle place between inanimate nature and rational beings 
(which of course they do in some sense), but rather that there is a special place in morality 
for sentient beings qua sentient, a place that not even the Highest Being (in case he were 
incapable of pleasure and pain) could occupy. This should be enough for the time being, 
but you can expect me to develop the claim further as the argument goes.  
 Importantly to be noted is that the title of this Part II makes the connection explicit 
between the project of making sense of the notion of ‘animal dignity’ (the dignity of 
sentient beings) and the project of defending Utilitarianism as an ethical theory. And that 
is because – as I see it – the notion of animal dignity holds (as a moral category) because 
Utilitarianism is true. Since the ‘standard utilitarian formula’ has been dismissed as 
inadequate, and given that a basic Kantian conception of morality and related ideas have 
already been established (if only for the purposes of this project), the argument ahead will 
have to include at least two things: (i) an explanation of what Utilitarianism actually 
amounts to, and (ii) an explanation of how Utilitarianism (thus understood) fits into the 
basic ethical framework put in place by Kantian ethics.  
 But it’s not only the nature of Utilitarianism that is problematic (unclear) at this 
point, since it is a similar story with Kantian ethics: we have fixed some ideas and concepts 
in the name of this view, but all of that is really nothing more than a very basic starting 
point. The promise is that in the final analysis – and very much against common 
conceptions of how things go in this area – it will be possible to say that animal dignity (the 
dignity of sentient beings) holds because Kantian ethics is true, because there is no real 
conflict between Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, or perhaps even more to the point: 
                                               
argument that follows – I speak of ‘animal dignity’ (or ‘distinctively animal dignity’) what I mean is ‘the 
dignity of sentient beings as such’, ‘the dignity of individuals or subjects as capable of happiness’. I will be 
constantly qualifying my claims anyway, so that confusions shouldn’t arise.  
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because the concepts of morality and (specifically) human dignity necessarily entail the 
dignity of all sentient beings. 
 As a final warning, let me note that I have decided to follow the same general 
pattern of argumentation that we saw in Part I, this time giving the first word to Kant and 
the dominant Kantian doctrine (which rejects the notions of ‘animal dignity’ and ‘respect 
for animals’) as my initial antagonist.  
 
1. Kant and the Rejection of ‘Animal Dignity’ and ‘Respect for Animals’ 
 
What is Kant’s story in the context of ‘animal ethics’, then? The first thought that Kant 
gives us is that that there are two – and only two – categories to which individuals can 
belong in terms of their basic moral standing. Namely: individuals are either persons (beings 
with ‘dignity’) or they are things (beings, not with dignity, but only with ‘price’) (G 4:428). 
This is of course one of the basic distinctions in Kant’s philosophy (as well as common 
discourse) that this work embraces: after all, it is one of my main goals in this work as a 
whole – if not the main goal – to offer an account of the dignity of persons. Now, Kant’s view 
becomes problematic when he gives us a second thought, namely that humanity (or lack 
thereof) is the only criterion for membership in each of the two basic categories just 
introduced. The thesis, in other words, that only human beings count as ‘persons’.  
 Again, if all and only persons have dignity, and if – as Kant argues – all and only 
human beings count as ‘persons’, then it just follows that non-human animals in general 
count as ‘non-persons’, i.e. they count as things, and entities that belong in the category of 
‘things’ have been stipulated to have ‘price’ and ‘price’ only (‘relative worth merely as 
means’), no ‘dignity’ whatsoever (G 4:428). Looking at Kant’s fundamental claims here, 
one can only conclude that the notions of animal dignity and respect for animals have no place 
in his philosophy. But what exactly does it mean (morally speaking) to deny animals 
‘dignity’ and declare them ‘things’ alongside inanimate objects? Let me quote a couple of 
lines by Kant which may give us a good initial sense of what he may have in mind: 
 
The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely 
above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the 
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unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person – 
i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational 
animals, with which one can do as one likes.80 (Anth 7:127) 
 
When [man] first said to the sheep, “the pelt which you wear was given to you by nature not 
for your own use, but for mine” and took it from the sheep to wear it himself, he became 
aware of a prerogative which, by his nature, he enjoyed over all the animals; and he now no longer 
regarded them as fellow creatures, but as means and instruments to be used at will for the 
attainment of whatever ends he pleased.81 (CBHH 8:114) 
 
If in the final account it is shown that Kant’s fundamental principles (properly understood) 
are consistent with the notions of ‘animal dignity’ and ‘respect for non-human animals as 
persons’, it will be very much against Kant’s own judgement. To be fair, Kant has much 
more to say about non-human animals than I have registered so far, including some 
partially redeeming claims that are potentially in tension with the ones we just read. I will 
be discussing those claims in due course. For now, however, that is what we get: a very 
negative – almost mocking – take on the moral standing of non-human animals.  
 The two lines by Kant I just quoted manage to express two main philosophical 
ideas: (i) that human beings are higher in rank with respect to the other animals, and radically 
so, and (ii) that human beings ‘naturally’ conceive of themselves in that way. In a certain 
sense, therefore, these are statements of human dignity in the substantive or non-reductive 
sense of the term: statements affirming the elevation (in moral standing) of human beings 
as such with respect to the non-human world (non-human animals in particular), an 
elevation which we ‘naturally’ (if only from our perspective as moral beings) see ourselves 
as having. We have what is normally called a ‘sense of dignity’: a sense of our unique 
importance as human (morally rational) beings.  
 However, it’s not like Kant is here – in these two lines – giving us those ideas of 
human moral superiority themselves: he is not telling us about how we are – and consider 
ourselves – singularly important in virtue of the moral burden that we alone bear. Instead, 
                                               
80 The second emphasis is mine.  
81 Both emphases are mine.  
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what Kant is saying is that human beings enjoy a certain prerogative over non-human animals 
that is part and parcel of their dignity: as the superior beings that they are, human beings 
are entitled to do with non-human animals as they wish (as the first passage suggests), to take 
their skin and wear it themselves for instance (as the second passage suggests).82  
 Don’t get me wrong: Kant does have in mind our moral uniqueness when he makes 
his claims in this context. We can take it for granted that when he speaks of the “I” that is 
assumed in our representations – which raises us as persons “above all other living beings 
on earth” (Anth 127) – he actually means the ‘moral I’, i.e. the ‘moral self’, of which we 
become aware in our judgements, our practical activity and our very way of seeing the 
world.83 It is this ‘moral I’ that – as Kant sees it – makes us so fantastically ‘important’ that 
a license to use non-human animals as resources (in the ordinary sense of ‘supplies’) 
obtains:84 a recognition of our moral nature – Kant thinks – raises us so high in ‘rank’ and 
‘importance’ in our own eyes that we now look at the other animals and just fail to see 
them as our fellow creatures. And so the thought goes: when I encounter a human being, 
I cannot say to her that her skin and flesh belong to me: I cannot say to her that the she is 
alive to grow and fortify skin so that I wear it, or to keep meat fresh so that I eat it, and this 
simply because I recognise her as a fellow human being. If, on the contrary, it is a non-
                                               
82 When Kant says that we can treat animals ‘as we wish’, he doesn’t mean to say that we can treat them as if 
there were no moral duties in place, which is how one may naturally (and understandably) read the claim. 
What Kant means, rather, I think, is that we have a prerogative to decide on the general fate of animals, i.e. 
to use them for food or clothing or work-force or companionship, etc. (thus treating them ‘as we wish’ in this 
general discretionary sense), but then of course we have a duty to ‘treat them well’ whatever purpose we give 
them (e.g. trying not to inflict ‘unnecessary’ suffering and death).  
83 Kant cannot possibly mean that only human beings have an I, since all animals (i.e. insofar as they are 
animals) clearly have one: many of the non-humans (the majority, if not all, of those whom we systematically 
exploit) are experiential subjects (obviously) endowed with various levels of self-awareness, complex emotional 
capacities, volitions, various kinds of intelligence and perhaps even rationality of some sort. Only human 
beings, however, have a moral I – only human beings have an I that stands in relation to self-represented moral 
standards. Only human beings are morally rational.  
84 One can describe Kant’s general taken on the moral standing of animals is that they are ‘resources’, which 
I argue he means in the ordinary sense of ‘supplies’. However, it is worth noting that perhaps the most 
important use we can make of animals (still regarded as supplies) is as equipment for our moral training, 
which we do by simply being kind or benevolent to them and caring for their happiness.  
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human animal that I encounter (a pig, say), now I am at liberty to say exactly those things 
that were out of place in relation to my fellow human. That skin which you wear is mine, 
give it to me! I can say. That ‘meat’ covering your bones is also mine, give it to me! I can 
say.85 To speak allegorically, it’s as if God’s act of appointing human beings their moral 
mission (a great thing on its own) were necessarily bound up with the act of addressing the 
animals and the rest of the world to human beings (under the rubric of ‘God’s special love 
for human beings’) as a present or as a gift. Not only have we been given all ‘things’ for 
own ends and benefit to the exclusion of the ends and benefit of other animals; these 
animals are themselves part of the ‘gift’ bestowed: ‘mere gifts’ we might call them.  
 
1.1 Appraisal Respect 
 
Kant’s stated views in the context of his ‘animal ethics’ are suspicious to say the least, and 
what is worrisome is that they are not peripheral to Kant’s positive moral doctrine but 
instead quite central to it, following directly and unequivocally from the fundamental 
principle of morality as described in the Groundwork and elsewhere. His famous ‘formula 
of humanity’, for instance, depicts morality as requiring that we treat humanity in persons 
as ‘an end in itself’ and “never merely as a means” (G 4:429), thus giving to understand the 
all beings lacking humanity (including the animals among them) are rightly treated as ‘mere 
means’.  
 I don’t want to jump to conclusions just yet about the credibility of Kant’s moral 
philosophy as stated, not before doing an effort to figure out what he might be trying to get 
at, or whether there is some important lesson to be learned in what he’s saying. I will now 
begin to discuss some of the other claims that Kant makes in relation to the moral standing 
                                               
85 As far as I know, Kant never explicitly argued for the moral permissibility of eating animals, but he did 
make a number of remarks seemingly entailing that he considered it perfectly permissible (e.g. MM 6:409). 
Kant is by no means alone in this, however; Jeremy Bentham (who some portray as an animal liberationist) 
argued for us being allowed to kill animals whom “we like to eat”, adding (Bentham 1823/1907, p.311): “we 
are the better for it, and they are never the worse. […] The death they suffer in our hands commonly is, and 
always may be, a speedier, and by that means a less painful one, than that which would await them in the 
inevitable course of nature.” 
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of animals, hence trying to provide a larger picture and preparing the ground for the story 
that I came to tell. The following passage from the Second Critique (which I will be referring 
to as the ‘respect passage’) strikes me as the best place to start dialectically speaking.86 Let 
me start by giving you the first line only (CPrR 5:76): 
 
Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things. The latter can awaken in us 
inclination and even love if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, and so forth), or also fear, 
like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect.  
 
Kant is here telling us that respect (important word) is owed only to persons (a.k.a. human 
beings), and so people take him to be denying the validity of the kinds of ideas of ‘animal 
dignity’ and ‘animal equality’ that utilitarians (and others who identify themselves 
differently but who nevertheless defend the moral standing of sentient beings in general) 
have been advancing. For if the proper object of ‘respect’ is that which alone has ‘dignity’ 
(G 4:435), and only persons (a.k.a. human beings) are proper objects of ‘respect’ (as the line 
just quoted suggests), then it follows that only human beings have ‘dignity’. Non-human 
animals are beyond the scope of ‘respect’, and this alone entails their lack of ‘dignity’.  
 But if non-human animals lack dignity and human beings (who are animals but not 
‘mere animals’) have it, thus counting as the sole proper objects of respect, then it is not 
the case – what Utilitarians take to be the case – that all animals are equals in dignity and 
that therefore we ought to respect them all as equals: some animals don’t even have dignity, 
and those who have it (human beings) have it only on account of their humanity. If 
distinctively ‘animal dignity’ falls, as it does if humanity (the capacity for morality) is made 
the sole criterion for ‘dignity’ and ‘personhood’ and so on, the corollary notion of ‘animal 
                                               
86 We will see Kant advancing some claims and remarks concerning ‘respect’ and its proper objects, explicitly 
putting non-human animals out of scope of this attitude. However, I will be explaining why this passage in 
particular doesn’t in the least contribute (even by Kant’s own lights) to the exclusion of non-human animals 
from the scope of respect (in the sense in which people defending the notion of ‘respect for animals’ typically 
mean it). In other words: even though it may initially appear otherwise, and even though it is very often 
treated otherwise, the following passage is not part of the ‘negative’ story that Kant tells in his ‘animal ethics’ 
(which we certainly do well to clear up in order to better understand and assess that ‘negative’ story, thus the 
idea that this might be the best place to start dialectically speaking). 
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equality’ also falls, and the related notion of ‘respect for all animals as equals’ is thereby 
also dismissed as inadequate, which of course is what Kant seems explicitly to saying in his 
famous ‘respect passage’. But I ask: is that really the story that Kant means to be telling in 
this particular passage? I don’t think it is, and Kant himself will tell you that it isn’t. Let me 
give you the entire piece (the line already quoted included), and then I’ll discuss it bringing 
back the relevant lines (CPrR 5:76–77): 
 
Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things. The latter can awaken in us 
inclination and even love if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, and so forth), or also fear, 
like the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect. Something that comes nearer to 
this feeling is admiration, and this as an affect, amazement, can be directed to things also, 
for example, lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and distance of the heavenly bodies, 
the strength and swiftness of many animals, and so forth. But none of this is respect. A 
human being can also be an object of my love, fear, or admiration even to amazement and 
yet not be an object of respect. His jocular humor, his courage and strength, the power he 
has by his rank among others, could inspire me with feelings of this kind even though inner 
respect toward him is lacking. Fontenelle says, “I bow before an eminent man, but my spirit 
does not bow.” I can add: before a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of 
character in a higher degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows, whether I want it 
or whether I do not and hold my head ever so high, that he may not overlook my superior 
position. Why is this? His example holds before me a law that strikes down my self-conceit 
when I compare it with my conduct, and I see observance of that law and hence its 
practicability proved before me in fact. Now, I may even be aware of a like degree of 
uprightness in myself, and yet the respect remains. For, since in human beings all good is 
defective, the law made intuitive by an example still strikes down my pride, the standard 
being furnished by the man I see before me whose impurity, such as it may be, is not so well 
known to me as is my own who therefore appears to me in a purer light. Respect is a tribute 
that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not; we may indeed withhold 
it outwardly but we still cannot help feeling it inwardly.  
 
Again, there is no doubt that Kant is here advancing claims about ‘respect’ and its proper 
objects, excluding non-human animals on the basis of the premise that only ‘persons’ (a.k.a. 
human beings) fall under the scope of this attitude. However, it is equally clear, I submit, 
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that Kant’s claims in this passage concern a very particular kind of ‘respect’, and one that 
nobody – neither I nor anyone else I know of – is claiming for non-human animals (at least 
under the assumption that they are really non-human). We just have to realise that that the 
object of the kind of ‘respect’ that Kant is talking about in this context (known in the 
literature as ‘appraisal respect’)87 is always someone – some human being – represented as 
morally good, or as having a high or positive moral stature: “before a humble common man 
in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am aware of in myself 
my spirit bows” (CPrR 5:76–77).88 But I am not making my case for animal dignity depend 
on the suggestion that our spirit should bow in moral admiration for non-human animals, 
obviously, and therefore I am not going to be bothered by Kant’s ‘respect passage’, which 
according to some people I should be because – as they see it, presumably – Kant is here 
‘excluding animals from the scope of respect’.89 No, not really. Nobody defending the 
dignity and respectability of animals (sentient beings) in general should be bothered by 
Kant’s famous ‘respect passage’ because it doesn’t even speak to the relevant effect: we can 
just read those lines and agree on the fundamental point. 
 But there are further problems that arise from portraying Kant’s ‘respect passage’ 
in his Second Critique as adding to his negative story in the context of ‘animal ethics’. Recall 
that in this particular context the proper object of ‘respect’ (‘appraisal respect’) is always 
someone regarded as morally good, which obviously puts morally evil human beings out of 
scope. Scoundrels (all of whom are human beings) are not suitable objects of this “tribute 
that we cannot refuse to pay to merit”.90 (CPrR 5:77). Kant concedes the point quite openly 
(CPrR 5:76): “A human being can also be an object of my love, fear, or admiration even to 
                                               
87 I am appropriating Stephen Darwall’s terminological distinction between ‘appraisal respect’ and 
‘recognition respect’ (Darwall, 1977).  
88 My emphasis. 
89 People who have appealed to Kant’s ‘respect passage’ in this way include: Kain, 2010, p.210; Wood, 1998, 
p.197. However, it’s not these direct appeals in written argumentation that worries me most, but the general 
lack of pertinent clarification in Kantian scholarship on the particular, and also how easy the passage is 
normally just added to Kant’s ‘negative’ story in the context of ‘animal ethics’ without protest.  
90 My emphasis. 
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amazement and yet not be an object of respect [a.k.a. of moral admiration / ‘appraisal 
respect’]”.91  
 Hence: if non-human animals go out of the scope of ‘respect’ (unqualifiedly, as it 
were) on the basis of the truth of Kant’s claims in his ‘respect passage’, then so do those 
among us who fail to be morally good as well, which may just be all of us.92 But of course it 
is essential to Kantian ethics (the positive ethical doctrine) that all human beings ought morally 
to be respected in their dignity as human beings, that there is something like respect for human 
beings as such and in general and so quite irrespective of thoughts concerning the moral worth 
of their character and conduct: a kind of respect that has nothing essentially to do with 
applauding or bowing before morally good human beings. And this can only mean one 
thing: Kant’s ‘respect passage’ cannot be treated as giving us an exhaustive account of 
‘respect’ and its proper objects – which is how it would have to be treated is if it is to be 
perceived as putting non-human animals unqualifiedly out of scope – because that is not its 
purpose.93 As I have pointed out, Kant’s ‘respect passage’ is intended as an account of a 
                                               
91 My own emphasis. The square brackets are also mine, of course, to make a contrast between ‘respect’ (which 
here I construe as ‘moral admiration’) and the kind of ‘admiration’ Kant is referring to in the line I just 
quoted in the main text, which (given the context of what he is saying) I construe as ‘wonder’ or ‘amazement’ 
with the non-moral perfections of a human being, e.g. her sheer skills as a footballer, something of the same 
general kind that may also apply in relation to non-human animals (e.g. amazement at the juggling skills of 
an utter).  
92 If it would turn out that no real morality has ever been found in human action, as Kant himself entertains 
(G 4:407), then Kant’s ‘respect passage’ would entail that no human being has ever been a proper object of 
‘respect’.  
93 Someone might insist on the relevance of ‘appraisal respect’ to the issues on the table by pointing out the 
following: even though evil human beings are not in fact worthy (proper objects) of ‘appraisal respect’, which 
makes it seems as if they are on a par with non-human animals in this regard, i.e. all of them just failing to be 
morally good, nevertheless they are real candidates for this worthiness: all human beings can in principle – at 
any point in their lives – become proper objects of ‘appraisal respect’ by making themselves morally good. In 
this, the argument goes, human beings are all quite different from non-human animals, and different in kind 
in fact, and different in virtue of their humanity, and different in a way that may strike us as morally significant. I 
don’t want to deny the connections here, nor do I mean to deny what is obviously true: a morally evil human 
being is to ‘appraisal respect’ what a ‘loser’ in a sporting competition is to the awarding of the winner’s price, 
which is very different form how a non-participant stands in both scenarios: the one (the person on the 
 94 
particular type of ‘respect’ (‘appraisal respect’) which exists and is present in our minds: 
that’s all there is to it. Kantians almost universally agree that there is also such a thing as 
‘respect for all human beings’ as something that morality requires of us, and I am suggesting 
that we should include in the picture a similar (duty-involving) kind of respect for animals 
(sentient beings) as such.  
 There is an important thought that just suggested itself. The notion of ‘respect for 
animals’ that I am pursuing in this Part II is meant to pick out an attitude the instantiation 
of which (in action) is morally required of us, and it is a notorious feature of ‘appraisal respect’ 
(the kind of respect implicated in Kant’s ‘respect passage’) that it cannot be so required. 
‘Appraisal respect’ is thought of as a feeling that we naturally or inevitably – if only as moral 
beings – have as a result of representing some person or deed as morally good, and it is 
plainly incoherent to think of something as a duty which one cannot avoid doing. “Respect 
is a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not; we may indeed 
withhold it outwardly but we still cannot help feeling it inwardly” (CPrR 5:77).94 But if the 
kind of ‘respect for animals’ that I am proposing is meant to feature as a moral requirement, 
and the kind of respect that Kant is talking about in his ‘respect passage’ (viz. ‘appraisal 
respect’) is not, and this by Kant’s own admission, then we have yet another powerful 
reason to oppose portraying Kant’s ‘respect passage’ as excluding non-human animals from 
the scope of the relevant kind of ‘respect’. The lesson here should be that the term ‘respect’ 
has more than one legitimate use in our moral discourse, and it is perfectly clear that 
‘appraisal respect’ (the scope of which everyone seems to agree on) is not the relevant kind 
in the context of our discussion about the moral standing of non-human animals. 
 The kind of ‘respect for animals’ that I am trying to motivate is intended as a 
fundamental moral requirement, a form of what is known in the literature as recognition respect 
                                               
stands) certainly fails to win the price, and the other (the animal walking around being completely oblivious 
to morality) certainly fails to be morally good, but that is because neither of them even bid for the relevant 
achievement. What I fail to see, however, is how this particular difference between human beings and other 
animals is going to undermine notions of ‘respect for animals’ of the kind that I and many other people are 
defending (which aim to protect their beneficiary status in the moral community and in no way their 
participation as moral actors, which we admit is out of place as soon as we call an animal non-human). 
94 The emphases are mine.  
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(Darwall, 1977).  As I have it, this is the kind of respect that consists in relating to a person 
(as a matter of duty) with full recognition and consideration for her existence as a person.  
 
1.2 Towards Recognition Respect for All Sentient Beings 
 
A different story has been anticipated when it comes to ‘recognition respect’. Not only is 
there widespread agreement (among Kantians but also more broadly) that all human beings 
are worthy – i.e. proper objects – of this kind of respect (respect for their humanity quite 
irrespective of the actual moral worth of their conduct), thus making it clear that reference 
to ‘appraisal respect’ is not going to exhaust talk about ‘respect’ and its proper objects. It is 
also agreed that this kind of respect is required by morality, meaning that we are in the right 
kind of philosophical territory.  
 What is truly at stake in our disagreement (which we are supposed to be having in 
relation to the moral standing of non-human animals) is nothing but the scope of a 
particular type of respect (recognition respect) the exemplification of which constitutes – 
as Kantians have intended it in relation to human beings as such, and as I am intending it 
in relation to both human beings as such and sentient beings as such – a moral duty of ours. 
Again, it is only here that we get a genuine disagreement between Kant’s view and the one 
that I am proposing: while I take the fundamental ethical notion of ‘respect for persons’ 
(the one that features as a fundamental moral requirement, a.k.a. ‘recognition respect’) to 
contain that of ‘respect for animals (sentient beings) as such and in general’, Kant and many 
of his followers have made it their goal to defend a thoroughly anthropocentric philosophy 
equating the notion of ‘respect for persons’ with that of ‘respect for all human beings as such’, 
not to say ‘persons’ with ‘human beings’ and ‘dignity’ with ‘human worth’. 
 In saying that there is something like ‘recognition respect’ in relation to animals 
(sentient beings) as such, I don’t mean to suggest that we take the kind of ‘recognition 
respect’ that is enjoined by Kant’s ‘formula of humanity’ (respect for humanity in persons) 
and somehow extend the scope of it to cover all the other (non-human) animals. Again, 
what I am doing is positing the existence of two distinct types of ‘recognition respect’, one 
concerned with the existence of human beings as such and the other one concerned with the 
existence of animals (sentient beings) as such (including human beings qua animals or – what 
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is the same here – qua capable of happiness). Now, speaking of two types in this context may 
give to understand that there is a ‘duty of recognition respect for human beings’ over here 
and a ‘duty of recognition respect for sentient beings’ over there which may potentially 
(given that it is a ‘different type’ and so apparently a ‘separate duty’) come into conflict with 
each other, which I really don’t mean to suggest. The point is rather that there are two 
aspects to ‘recognition respect’ for persons as such: two phases to the personhood of 
individuals and two corresponding and clearly distinguishable ways of relating to them that 
are fundamentally required by morality (always to be realised together) under the one rubric 
of respect for persons as such. 
 In the final picture all ‘duties of respect for persons’ feature as both ‘duties of respect 
for sentient beings as such and in general’ and ‘duties of respect for human beings as such 
and in general’. That is the claim that I am making, and all the questions that this claim 
raises (which there are many) I will try to address as the argument goes. For now, the point 
is simply to state the claim as strongly as possible: not only is ‘respect for animals / sentient 
beings’ something real and irreducible, it is also something that permeates the entirety of 
our moral vocation, featuring as an essential aspect of every moral duty that we have. In 
other words, there is no moral duty that we have that is not a duty of respect for animals 
(sentient beings) as such. There is no moral duty that is not a duty of ‘respect for human 
beings as such’ either, but nevertheless the reference to ‘animality’ (here as individuals in 
their capacity for happiness) is always equally essential. We can preserve and try to make sense 
of Kant’s ‘formula of humanity’ as it is; we need only introduce a new formula – a ‘formula 
of animality’ formalising the principle of ‘respect for animals’ – and try to put the two 
together in the formulation of a single principle of ‘respect for persons’ / ‘respect for all 
persons in their dignity’. The success of this project will depend on us managing to 
introduce sufficient and (more importantly) adequate nuance into the picture: something 
like a model or schema putting all the fundamental pieces together into a single structure is 





2. The Agapist Project in ‘Animal Ethics’ 
 
Let me remind you that Kant categorises non-human animals as ‘things’ as opposed to 
‘persons’. This is closely connected with the rejection of recognition-respect towards these 
beings, of course, as the basic idea is that this kind of respect is (even as I define it) 
necessarily directed to persons (which for Kant only human beings count as). Nevertheless, 
it should be noted from the outset that Kant is not thereby doing away with all ideas of the 
special moral significance of non-human animals vis-à-vis inanimate entities, and so I will 
begin this section by describing Kant’s (as I would like to call it) agapist project in ‘animal 
ethics’: the project of making ‘love’ – as opposed to ‘respect’ – the critical attitude in our 
interactions with non-human animals. We see a hint of this in Kant’s ‘respect passage’, 
which we have discussed before (CPrR 5:76):   
 
Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things. The latter can awaken in us 
inclination and even love if they are animals (e.g., horses, dogs, and so forth), or also fear, like 
the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect.95  
 
Animals seem to be worthy – i.e. proper objects – of love in Kant’s view, then. Not so 
‘respect’, to be sure, but nevertheless: it is not as if a cow and a car (or even a tree) belong 
in the exact same fine-grained moral category (let alone in the same ‘category of being’). For 
even though both belong in the general moral category of ‘things’ in terms of their basic 
moral standing (respectability / membership in the moral community / citizenship), 
nevertheless the cow is a proper object of ‘love’, whereas the car and the tree obviously are 
not, i.e. at least not of the kind that is relevant in this context, namely benevolence or kindness. 
So there you go: the reason Kant is prepared to dismiss the notion of ‘respect for animals’ 
and related notions, and to do so openly and without fear of failing to do justice to animals, 
is that he takes himself to be giving animals their actual due, namely ‘kindness’ or ‘love’.  
 Judging from experience, most Kantians seem to be perfectly happy with this kind 
of arrangement, and by way of defending Kant they can always point to his most ‘animal-
                                               
95 The emphasis is mine.  
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friendly’ moments (all of which emphasise the notion of ‘love’) as ones that captures all 
that we really want to say in the context of ‘animal ethics’ (LE 27:710):96  
 
Any action whereby we may torment animals, or let them suffer distress, or otherwise treat 
them without love, is demeaning to ourselves.  
 
Even if ‘respect’ is out of the question in relation to non-human animals, Kant is bringing 
‘love’ to the rescue and asking that we remain content with this (as he might see it) 
reasonable provision. I am not persuaded, however, but I have to be extremely careful 
explaining why I disagree. I’m not necessarily opposed to Kant’s – as I am initially 
construing it – agapist project in ‘animal ethics’, and I will just admit that his most ‘animal-
friendly’ line (the one quoted last) roughly captures the essence of what I myself want to 
say in the end: what morality requires of us in relation to animals is ‘love’, i.e. that we be 
kind or benevolent to them, that we relate to them on the basis of a fundamentally caring 
attitude. And it doesn’t come as a surprise that I am (at least initially) approving of Kant’s 
‘agapist’ project in this way, since the ethical view I am developing and defending in this 
Part II (Utilitarianism) is – as I have been describing it – an agapist doctrine that most 
essentially enjoins ‘practical love’ (i.e. benevolence or kindness from principle) for all 
sentient beings.97 In the end, however, I have to reject Kant’s own story in this area.  
 Why is it that I am not on board, then? Simple. While Kant’s ‘agapist project’ is 
offered as an alternative to the ‘respect project’ that he considers proper only in relation to 
human beings as such, my own agapist project in relation to animals (sentient beings) is one 
that is constitutive of the ‘respect project’ in relation to persons in general. I have made this 
point more than once, and it suffices on its own as a reason to reject Kant’s project in 
‘animal ethics’. But let me first point to what looks like a more fundamental setback of 
Kant’s approach in ‘animal ethics’. Initially at least, it is fundamentally unclear what type 
Kant has in mind when he talks about ‘love’ as the critical attitude in relation to non-
                                               
96 Not that Kantians need to point to anything in Kant to defend their philosophical point here, of course.  
97 I am interpreting Kant’s project as ‘agapist’ because he points to ‘love’ (benevolence or kindness) as the 
critical attitude. But agape is in essence love from duty, the pursuit of someone’s happiness as a morally obligatory 
end, and it is far from clear that Kant is giving animals this particular kind of love.  
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human animals. Even if we agree that Kant is using the word ‘love’ in this context to pick 
out something like ‘benevolence’ or ‘kindness’, i.e. an active concern for the happiness or 
well-being of animals, it still remains fundamentally unclear whether he is talking about the 
right kind of ‘love’; and if he is, whether his is drawing philosophical conclusions that are 
consistent with that. Is Kant talking about the kind that morality is typically thought to 
essentially involve – the one that is implicated in the command to love one’s neighbour? Or 
is he talking about some lesser kind (e.g. pathological love)?98 If he is talking about ‘practical 
love’ or ‘agape’ (the kind that morality is thought essentially to involve), then he couldn’t 
possibly in light of that remain wedded to the rejection of ‘respect for animals’ and related 
notions, i.e. unless he is prepared to introduce more categories of moral standing in the 
picture. How can it possibly be the case that one’s neighbour (as one calls the object of 
‘practical love’) is to be thought of as a ‘thing’ which exists as a ‘mere means to an end’? 
But then, of course, what is more likely is that Kant is giving non-human animals 
‘pathological love’ (i.e. sensibility or sympathy-based love) only, reserving the ‘practical’ 
(reason-based) kind for human beings alone.  
 And so I ask: is that enough ‘love’ to make up for no ‘respect’? I don’t think so. 
What this does is once again excluding non-human animals from the scope of morality 
altogether, at most bringing them back – as Kant tries to do – through the idea that 
cultivating kindness for animals (in ‘pathological love’) is useful for strengthening ‘practical 
love’ (which is essential to morality but is directed to human beings alone). But of course 
we ought not to go around destroying all kinds of things if we wish to strengthen (and even 
directly to fulfil) ‘practical love’ in relation to our fellow humans, and this brings us back 
to the idea that animals are – for Kant – essentially on a par with ‘other things’ from the 
moral point of view. Again, we can love (care for) animals in a way in which we cannot love 
(say) cars, namely we can be kind or benevolent to them (in the literal sense of the term), but 
this seems to make no essential difference for Kant, which I find very hard to understand. 
                                               
98 Kant’s theory of love has it that there are two philosophically significant kinds in this context, two types of 
benevolence (active concern for someone’s happiness) that are possible for human beings given their dualistic 
psychology. ‘Pathological love’ is love based on sensibility, and in particular in the sympathy that human beings 
‘naturally’ have for subjects in their happiness and unhappiness; ‘Practical love’ is love (benevolence) from 
duty – the pursuit of someone’s happiness as a morally obligatory end.  
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He is not saying (what one would imagine he would say having given animals ‘love’ as 
opposed to ‘respect’, or nothing in particular): treat human beings as ‘ends-in-themselves’ 
(respect + love), the other animals as ‘neighbours’ or – to go ‘less radical’ – ‘darlings’ (love), 
and the rest of nature as a mere resource. He is saying: treat human beings as ‘ends-in-
themselves’ and the rest of entities as ‘mere resources or supplies’, but do please treat all of 
the latter gently (especially the animals, because this comes much closer to our hearts) in 
order to fully treat human beings as ‘ends-in-themselves’, who alone deserve to be treated 
on the basis of truly moral attitudes like respect and practical love, who alone count as 
potential victims of theft and murder, and so on and so forth. Kant recognises that animals 
are special in that they, and not ‘other things’, are proper objects of ‘love’, but he makes 
no important effort on this basis to give animals – i.e. non-human animals – any truly 
special place in the moral universe. He doesn’t give them any kind of citizenship in the moral 
community on this basis, certainly.  
 Let me go into more detail to have clarity on the options available. We can appeal 
to Kant’s distinction between two kinds of love / benevolence to distinguish between two 
possible views that one can endorse (and I don’t mean as an interpretation of Kant, but 
simply for oneself): one saying that in relation to non-human animals only ‘pathological love’ 
is possible (then somehow – but only indirectly – making it part of morality), and another 
also affirming ‘practical love’ (i.e. love from duty, love grounded in fundamental moral 
principles, love that is itself essential to morality). We can bring it down to the antagonism 
between the ‘practical-love view’ and the ‘no practical-love view’, which, in premutation 
with the antagonism between the ‘respect view’ and the ‘no respect view’, between the view 
that affirms ‘respect for animals as such’ and the one that denies this notion, generates four 
possible views that one can endorse:99  
 
                                               
99 My position is (2) and the one most likely to be Kant’s is (3), both with their heading in bold. Of the other 
two, only (4) is of significant interest for my argument.  
 101 
[~PL + R] One is the view that denies ‘practical love’ for animals but nevertheless affirms 
the notion of ‘respect for animals as such’. This view cannot be attributed to Kant, nor is 
it the view that I am defending.100  
 
[PL + R] I will devote all my attention to the remaining three views, only one of which (the 
one that I am proposing) affirms the notion of respect for animals (sentient beings) as such. The 
view also affirms the notion practical love for all animals, and takes up the task of explaining 
how the two notions are related. For obvious exegetical reasons, this view (affirming both 
positives) cannot plausibly be attributed to Kant. I could of course insist that the view 
deserves – as I myself intend it – the label ‘Kantian’, if only side by side those of ‘Agapist’ 
and – as I also intend it – ‘Utilitarian’, but that is of course the argument that I am supposed 
to be giving in this work as a whole.  
 
[~PL + ~R] The third view is the one that denies both ‘practical love’ and ‘respect’ in 
relation to animals as such and therefore also in relation to non-human animals. It gives 
the latter ‘pathological love’ to be sure, but that and nothing more. This is the view that is 
most plausibly attributed to Kant, I think, since it coheres better than the others with his 
insistence on calling non-human animals ‘things’ and the other disdainful statements that 
he makes in relation to them: e.g. that we can go ahead and take their skin (and perhaps 
even their flesh, and so by implication their lives) with a sense of having a ‘right’ to do so, 
with a sense of taking something that belongs to us as a commodity (statements that I 
nevertheless take to be in some tension – at least in spirit – with some of the things that 
Kant says in relation to animals, including his remarks giving them – if only always 
pathological – love). 
 
[PL + ~R] It sounds almost incoherent to declare animals ‘things’ with no worth beyond 
‘price’ (usefulness) – which is how one seems forced to talk about them if one denies them 
‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ – and yet think of them as falling under the scope of ‘practical love’: 
                                               
100 The reason this option exists is simply that it was generated by the permutation that I suggested to produce 
the other three views on the table, which alone I will be discussing. 
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to first portray them as commodities and then include them among one’s neighbours or co-
beneficiaries of morality. Nevertheless, that is what appears to be the fourth possibility on the 
table, which we may want to attribute to Kant (for the sake of having a more ‘animal-
friendly’ reading of his moral philosophy) even in the face of his denigration of animals.101 
This is the view that many contemporary Kantians have adopted (e.g. Denis, 2000; 
Timmermann, 2005) in an attempt to prevent portraying concern for animals as depending 
for its justification on contingent facts about human psychology and society. To be clear, I 
don’t think these people are actually committed to calling animals ‘things’ (because they 
acknowledge there is something very odd about this) but are instead committed to them 
having a special kind of moral standing – which as far as I know they haven’t named – 
putting them above ‘things’ and below ‘persons’ (or – not to suggest that the point is to convey 
a simplistic hierarchy – at least distinguishing them from ‘things’ but not quite making 
them ‘persons’).  
 
At this point in the argument, the main goals for me have become: (i) to elucidate the 
nature of a certain duty of love (practical love) to animals that I think we have, and (ii) to show 
that this duty of love entails ‘recognition respect’ for animals (sentient beings) as such. I also 
have to (however briefly) explain why we have the duty in question in the first place, of 
course. Putting everything together, the goal is to argue for the existence of a respect-
entailing duty of ‘practical love’ for all animals (i.e. respect-entailing in relation to the 
animals themselves).  
 What I will do, then, is offer a critique of the so-called ‘indirect view’ that Kantians 
have tended to favour in their proposed accounts of our duties in relation to non-human 
animals: the view that our duties with regards to animals are not ‘duties to animals’ (in the 
same way that our duties with regards to cars are not ‘duties to cars’).  This target view, I 
                                               
101 The thought that this view may plausibly be attributed to Kant (even in the face of his denigration of 
animals) is motivated more by philosophical than merely exegetical considerations. Maybe we have to agree 
that Kant himself never gave his assent to the notion of ‘practical love’ in relation to non-human animals, 
but he got so close, or his views allowed for it so perfectly (to the point of calling for it when one looks at the 
big picture), that one may just take the next step on his behalf. Similarly with the notion of ‘respect for 
animals’, which I argue is entailed by the notion of ‘practical love’. 
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take it, is indistinguishable from the ‘no respect view’, only more accessible to criticism (in 
virtue of the unpacking of concepts that it does, telling us what ‘recognition respect’ actually 
amounts to). If I show that we have duties to animals (duties to individuals as capable of 
happiness, duties in which sentient beings as such figure as moral patients or direct moral 
considerables), I will have done all that can possibly be asked by way of justifying the notion 
of ‘respect for animals /sentient beings as such’, and those of ‘animal dignity’ and ‘animal 
equality’ (the dignity and consequent equality of all sentient beings as intended 
beneficiaries of morality) will follow. The notion of ‘practical love’ remains central to the 
argument, of course, and even more so now as we begin to move into the territory of stating 
Utilitarianism as an ethical theory.  
 
3. The Notion of ‘Duties To Animals’  
 
The only proper argument that Kant gives against the notion of ‘duties to animals’ – on 
the ground that only duties to human beings are possible – appears in a section of the Doctrine 
of Virtue entitled ‘On an amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection’. I will give you the 
entire piece (conveniently edited to make it shorter and also to separate the two parts that 
it has) so you can get a good sense of what Kant has in mind in this context; then I will 
discuss it in detail quoting the relevant lines again (MM 6:442–443): 
 
As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings (himself 
and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject’s will. Hence the 
constraining (binding) subject must, first, be a person; and this person must, secondly, be given 
as an object of experience, since the human being is to strive for the end of this person’s will 
and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two beings that exist (for a mere 
thought-entity cannot be the cause of any result in terms of ends). But from all our experience 
we know of no being other than a human being that would be capable of obligation (active 
or passive). A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human 
beings; and if he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of 
reflection, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this 





With regard to the animate but nonrational part of creation, violent and cruel treatment of 
animals is far more intimately opposed to a human being’s duty to himself, and he has a duty 
to refrain from this; for it dulls his shared feeling of their suffering and so weakens and 
gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one’s 
relations with other people. The human being is authorized to kill animals quickly (without 
pain) and to put them to work that does not strain them beyond their capacities (such work 
as he himself must submit to). But agonizing physical experiments for the sake of mere 
speculation, when the end could also be achieved without these, are to be abhorred. – Even 
gratitude for the long service of an old horse or dog (just as if they were members of the 
household) belongs indirectly to a human being’s duty with regard to these animals; considered 
as a direct duty, however, it is always only a duty of the human being to himself.  
 
Something that should be perfectly clear – from just reading the text – is that Kant is not 
denying the existence of duties to treat animals well. After all, the whole philosophical point 
that he is making in the context of his argument concerns the nature of those very duties: 
what he is saying is that our duties to treat animals well, which exist, are not to be thought 
of as ‘duties to animals’ but only as ‘duties to human beings with regards to animals’ – duties 
to humanity that of course relate to animals in that they are the duties that govern our 
interactions with animals. And not only that. Kant is even giving us a list of some such duties 
that he thinks we have. He says of a certain attitude that he thinks we ought to have 
(gratitude for the services of horses and dogs) that it “belongs indirectly to a human being's 
duty with regard to these animals” (MM 6:443). He also says of a duty that he thinks we have 
(the duty not to perform experiments on animals for purposes of sheer speculation) that 
failure to honour this duty is “to be abhorred” (MM 6:443).102 And the list is completed by 
a couple of constraints on the way we ‘use’ animals for our ends and benefit: that we are 
allowed (“authorised”) to kill animals (for purposes like eating them, presumably) but only 
                                               
102 I don’t fully appreciate the claim here (let animals never be taken as experimentation material), but I do 
very much appreciate the language.  
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quickly and without pain, and that we can put them to work but only in ways that don’t 
overload them (MM 6:443).  
 That is as pertains to the second part of Kant’s passage as quoted, where he is doing 
an effort to explain the practical implications of the view he is proposing. The argument that 
Kant gives for the view itself (his so-called ‘indirect view’) is condensed in the first part of 
the passage, which I will be quoting again in a second. Before doing that, I need to go over 
two preliminary points concerning two (crucially important) dialectical facts that emerge in 
relation to second part of the passage: 
 (1) Kant’s proposed list of duties with regards to animals (in the second part of the 
passage above and elsewhere in his work) is bound to strike many people as falling short of 
our true demands in this context. However, this is not the place to correct Kant on the 
particular (at least not in any significant detail, and certainly not in the mood of arguing 
against people who would declare themselves sceptical to begin with). Here we are not as 
concerned with ‘the list’ as we are with the nature (or the structure) of the duties that make 
up the list. After all, it seems possible – dialectically speaking – for people who see the need 
of a more robust list of duties to treat animals well to remain faithful to Kant’s 
philosophical analysis (his so-called ‘indirect view’). They can resist revising Kant’s more 
foundational claims in philosophy while providing more satisfactory ‘content’. In light of 
this dialectical fact, it is proper for me to bracket (i.e. for the most part, and at least for the 
time being) the issue of ‘content’ (meaning ‘the list of things that we ought to do’ without 
looking very much at their nature in the more philosophical sense) and focus on the 
philosophical analysis itself. Just to be clear, I will be assuming that veganism (here as the 
keeping of all animals outside the palate of resources or supplies at our disposal) is one of 
our general duties in this context. 
 (2) Perhaps the best way to state the basic disagreement between Kant’s view and 
the one I am proposing is to notice what is at stake in terms of conceptualising our moral 
relations with non-human animals. If your preferred strategy in developing ‘Kantian animal 
ethics’ (i.e. if that is what you are doing) is to endorse the ‘indirect view’ and revise it only 
at the level of practical prescriptions, i.e. in terms of the list of duties that we have in their 
extension, you can certainly think of violations of those prescriptions as rendering our 
actions immoral; what you won’t be able to say, of course, is that animals are thereby wronged 
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in their dignity as persons. If you think that ‘veganism’ is among our duties, for instance, 
but agree with Kant on its not being a ‘duty to animals’, then you won’t be able to say that 
violations of it are such that animals are thereby wronged or disrespected (at least not in the 
relevant sense of the term). You won’t, for instance, be able to say that killing animals 
unlawfully (morally unlawfully) counts as murder. But I do want to affirm – what I admit is 
a painful truth – that in our practice of killing animals (for food, for instance) we are 
committing the sacrilege of murdering our fellow persons. Accordingly, I need to revise 
Kantian ethics in a much more fundamental way (i.e. provided that I want to claim the 
label ‘Kantian’ for myself) if only to be able to call things by their name; to call things 
‘murder’, and ‘rape’, and ‘genocide’, when I think they are.  
 Knowing what is at stake (generally speaking) in our ‘dispute’, we can finally move 
to the analysis of Kant’s more technical statement of – and argument for – the so-called 
‘indirect view’. Let me quote the relevant piece again (MM 6:442):  
 
As far as reason alone can judge, a human being has duties only to human beings (himself 
and others), since his duty to any subject is moral constraint by that subject's will. Hence the 
constraining (binding) subject must, first, be a person; and this person must, secondly, be given 
as an object of experience, since the human being is to strive for the end of this person's will 
and this can happen only in a relation to each other of two beings that exist (for a mere 
thought-entity cannot be the cause of any result in terms of ends). But from all our experience 
we know of no being other than a human being that would be capable of obligation (active 
or passive). A human being can therefore have no duty to any beings other than human 
beings; and if he thinks he has such duties, it is because of an amphiboly in his concepts of 
reflection, and his supposed duty to other beings is only a duty to himself. He is led to this 
misunderstanding by mistaking his duty with regard to other beings for a duty to those beings.  
 
The general thought that Kant wants to convey is that the notion of ‘duties to animals’ is a 
kind of illusion or deceptive appearance (an amphiboly as he calls it). We can only have duties 
to persons (a.k.a. human beings) who are objects of experience (whose presence we 
encounter), since only human beings are capable of active obligation (i.e. of obligating) and 
passive obligation (i.e. of being obligated). Kant recognises that at least some people take 
themselves to have ‘duties to animals’ (thus the purported amphiboly), but he tells them 
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that if they were to get in a more philosophical mood – and think about the actual grounds 
of their duties and the structure of their own moral relationality – they would understand 
that it is all about honouring their own humanity (self-legislation) and that of other human 
beings (co-legislation), not at all about honouring the animals they are interacting with 
(whom of course they are obliged to ‘treat well’). We can break down Kant’s argument – 
the relevant features of it – for closer examination as follows:  
 
(1) Having a duty to some subject means being constrained (obligated) by that subject’s will. 
(2) Animals (non-human animals) lack a will of the kind (a morally rational will) that 
is capable of imposing moral constraints, i.e. they lack a will capable of obligating.  
(3) Therefore, we cannot have duties to animals.  
 
People who want to take this argument seriously but want to reject its conclusion – because 
like me they hold belief in the existence of ‘duties to animals’ – can appeal to a number of 
strategies. They can reject premise (1) and try to show that Kant is wrong in thinking that 
‘having duties to someone’ means, or can only mean, ‘being morally constrained by that 
someone’s will’ – that ‘being obligated to’ – in a way that we recognise as essentially 
belonging to morality – doesn’t necessarily mean ‘being obligated by’. People who want to 
take this strategy can proceed by explaining how it is that we can have duties to animals (i.e. 
to sentient beings as such) without appeal to the idea that their will has the power to impose 
moral constraints on ours, or that we are obligated by them. People can also question 
premise (2) in the argument, which they can do by trying to show that despite lacking moral 
rationality ‘animal wills’ are still capable of imposing moral constraints on us, in some 
distinctive way that has to be specified. I guess someone could reject both (1) and (2), 
although I would expect most people to reject only one premise in this argument. As you 
might have guessed, my own strategy revolves around rejecting premise (1). The reason I 
think Kant’s argument fails is because I reject the claim that ‘having duties to someone’ 
means, or can only mean, ‘being constrained that that someone’s will’. 
 Now, it might initially seem that rejecting premise (1) in Kant’s argument commits 
me to denying that ‘having someone’s will impose moral constraints on one’ amounts to 
‘having a duty to that person’. If you think about it, however, it doesn’t. Rejecting the truth 
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of Kant’s first premise – as I am doing – is not the same as denying the positive connection 
that it posits, between ‘having a duty to someone’ and ‘having that someone’s will impose 
moral constraints on one’. In fact, I am agreeing with Kant that such is one of the valid 
meanings of the locution ‘having a duty to someone’: you can, for instance, think of 
morality (taken as a whole) as something that you owe to yourself because (or perhaps it 
would be better to say: in the sense that) you are morally obligated to by your own will. What 
I am rejecting, rather, is the far more ambitious claim that such is the only meaning that it 
has – or (to be more precise on how exactly I read the claim) the only valid meaning that it 
has and that we recognise as essentially belonging to morality.  
 I haven’t yet told you what the ‘second meaning’ is of the locution ‘having duties 
to someone’ (directed duties) which figures in our notion of ‘duties to animals’, but first I 
need to tell you what I don’t mean when I claim that such duties exist. In arguing that there 
is such a thing as ‘duties to animals’, I don’t meant to be locating the source of moral 
normativity or the ultimate ground of moral duty in sentient life as such, neither in 
happiness (its distinctive ‘good’) nor in self-love (its internal practical principle). Likewise, 
in arguing for Utilitarianism (the moral doctrine that enjoins impartial concern for all 
sentient creatures), the idea is not to make the morality of actions depend on their felicific 
consequences, neither partly nor indirectly, neither in actuality nor in expectation. As I am 
portraying them, remember, happiness and utility (conduciveness to happiness) fail to be 
source or ground of any moral normativity. All by itself, happiness is a moral zero (which is 
not to say that ‘it doesn’t matter’ because surely it matters in many ways, but simply that all 
by itself it fails to generate any kind of moral incumbency upon the human will).  
 If the happiness of subjects is morally incumbent upon us (which undoubtedly it 
is), it is only because the moral law (human reason) speaks in favour of – in the sense of demanding 
– relating to those subjects in a certain way. Now, following my initial assumptions in this 
work, I take it as a given (a fact that is known to begin with) that the happiness of animals in 
general is an unconditionally necessary object of the human will, something towards which 
our will (our intentional activity) ought unconditionally to be (outwardly) directed, but the 
explanation for this normative fact is not to be found in happiness itself, but in the moral 
prescriptions of our own intelligence. It’s our own existence as morally rational beings that 
gives happiness (everyone’s happiness) the kind of moral incumbency that we all assume it 
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has, which we have in mind when we think of it as something we ‘ought morally to do 
something about’. I am identifying this feature of happiness (which other things can also 
have, although perhaps not exactly in the same way) as the moral incumbency that we 
acknowledge it to have, although we can also talk about the obligatoriness that it has as an 
end for us. Or – if you will – we could also follow the somewhat extravagant ways of modern 
philosophy – which I find surprisingly useful – and describe this normative property of 
happiness (of everyone’s happiness) as its ‘ought-morally-to-do-something-aboutness’.  
 By the way, I don’t think one needs to give an elaborate argument for this Kantian 
point about the source or ground of the moral incumbency of happiness as an end for us 
(although you can of course avail yourself of the argument given in Part I against what I 
called ‘the standard utilitarian formula’). One need only ask: how can happiness (or 
anything else for that matter) have ‘ought-morally-to-be-pursuedness’, say, but for the 
existence of a moral ought addressing a suitably responsive will and thereby putting this will 
in the relevant normative relation with the happiness in question? Obviously, it cannot 
happen. And if we think, as we must (because it is fairly obvious), that moral oughts in 
general cannot exist in the absence of moral rational beings, then we are committed to 
thinking that the moral incumbency of things upon the activity of morally rational beings 
(upon their will) is grounded in the very existence of such beings, i.e. on the very existence 
of their will, which is then assumed to have the power of imposing moral duties upon itself. 
Moral oughts are generated by our own reason in its capacity to demand that certain things 
be done and certain others be left undone, and thus the sole origin of the moral burden 
that we bear as morally rational beings. If we care morally about anything, therefore, we do 
so only because we are obligated by the demands of our own reason.  
 But wait a minute. Saying – as I am doing – that we care morally about the 
happiness of animals ‘only because’ we care morally about living up to the demands our 
own humanity seems very much like toying with the ‘indirect view’ which Kantians have 
tended to favour, a view which I mean to be attacking instead of defending. I am saying 
that the moral incumbency of things in general is grounded in the prescriptions of our own 
reason, and this claim doesn’t discriminate between animals and other kinds of entities, 
which is exactly what a Utilitarian mind is supposed to find troubling: the ‘ought-morally-to-
be-protectedness’ that attaches to animals is just as uniquely grounded in human reason as 
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the ‘ought-morally-to-be-protectedness’ attaching to, say, churches (the buildings). Well, this 
is of course a ‘traditional Kantian’ claim that I am making, I admit, but you would be utterly 
confused if you took it as a statement of the so-called ‘indirect view’. I agree with Kant’s 
claim that human reason is the sole ultimate ground of moral normativity, that the moral 
incumbency of things in general upon our will is grounded in the moral prescriptions of our 
own reason. I just don’t see how the telling of this emancipating story about the source of 
moral obligation could – in a philosophically respectable way – turn into a story of exclusion 
– which of course is how I see it – of non-human animals from the domain of respectability 
or direct moral considerability; I mean, beyond simply saying that we ‘owe nothing to them’ 
by way of obeying or recognising their moral authority, which of course they have none to 
be respected or recognised.  
 Let me continue in the mode of reflection. If my own reason is that which alone 
puts me under obligation and makes things in general morally incumbent upon my will 
(that which alone morally obligates me), does that mean I owe nothing to animals by way 
of moral action? That if I were to mistreat them I wouldn’t be betraying them? I just don’t 
see how it could. I have seen many claims about how human beings are distinct from other 
animals, how human beings are special in ways that are of genuine moral significance: that 
they alone are morally rational, for one, which entails that they alone are bearers of moral 
duties, and that they alone are to be treated as themselves having moral duties, and in fact 
– to talk about the specific point we are discussing right now – that they alone are capable 
of morally obligating (of generating moral obligations by imposing them upon themselves). 
The truth of these claims I can see very clearly; what I don’t see is how this truth could 
possibly undermine the notion of duties to animals. Again, we can agree that the existence 
of human beings is alone responsible for introducing a moral dimension into the world, 
but this is a very technical statement (albeit a very elemental one) that merely opens the 
door for all substantive moral theorising instead of bringing it close to an end: it is certainly 
not going to prevent us from introducing morally charged language to describe the moral 
and immoral qualities of our interactions with non-human animals, nor is it going to stop 
us from thinking that non-human animals can in all kinds of ways be wronged and betrayed.  
 Let me try to give a kind of argument on the basis of what has been said so far. 
Granted that the moral incumbency of both churches (the buildings) and non-human 
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animals upon our will (as entities that we ought morally to protect, for instance) is equally 
grounded in the prescriptions of our own reason, it can still be the case that we have to 
ascribe to non-human animals, and not so to churches, ‘ought-morally-to-be-respectedness’ 
and ‘ought-morally-to-be-protected-for-their-own-sakeness’. In other words, it can still be the 
case that we have duties to animals and not so to churches or other inanimate entities. We 
can understand the point made by this argument as follows. Moral oughts can be connected 
to all kinds of things, and no matter what connection we have in mind it is always going to 
be the case that moral oughts are grounded in the prescriptions of our own reason; but the 
specific attitudes (whose instantiation in action) morality requires of us by means of her 
moral oughts are directed to very specific kinds of things, i.e. they have very specific direct 
objects, which means that we do have to discriminate between different kinds of objects 
(some of which are of course subjects) when it comes to thinking about the directedness of our 
moral duties, this being the specific kind of connection that is at stake in our discussion. 
Practical love, for instance, is exclusively directed to sentient beings as intended beneficiaries, 
meaning of course that all duties of love are duties to (duties towards) sentient beings as intended 
beneficiaries.  
 The ‘indirect’ / ‘no duties to animals’ / ‘no respect’ view which the majority of 
Kantians favour in the context of ‘animal ethics’ is intended quite explicitly to prevent a 
kind of false reductionism that Utilitarians have seen themselves tempted to fall into: the 
idea that our mistreatment of animals is wrong or (more to the point) immoral, not in virtue 
of something going on within ourselves as moral beings (something having to do with the 
intrinsic quality of our own morally-informed volition), but in virtue of facts about the well-
being of animals. Altman, for instance, has protested that the claim (which Utilitarians and 
others often make) that animals should be considered directly “is meant to make sure that 
animals are considered even when our moral characters are not affected.” (Altman 2019, 
p.280). I don’t like to keep rehearsing points that I have made more than once, but I really 
feel like I have to: of course we have to accept that if some action in relation to animals fails 
to render us (i.e. our own will) moral or immoral, morally good or morally evil (valences 
that I take to be irreducible to the felicific in any form), then it just follows that such an 
action falls outside the scope of moral assessment altogether. The question in the context 
of ‘animal ethics’ is not, say, whether harming animals really harms animals: of course it 
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does. Nor is it whether, say, harm done to animals counts as an intrinsically bad thing: of 
course it does, at least in some sense – surely, for one, in the strict felicific sense, which of 
itself entails nothing morally practical (no ‘moral-oughtness’) but is not for that reason 
‘unimportant’. The real question is whether, say, there is something to harming animals, 
something about us connected with the harming of animals, which could perhaps render us 
and our conduct (as human beings) immoral.  
 Altman makes it seem as if people endorsing the ‘direct duty view’ (the contender 
of his own ‘indirect view’) are not even addressing the right question. But I just raised the 
right question, and I reject the ‘indirect view’ in favour of the ‘direct’ or ‘duties to animals’ 
view. He also makes it seem as if people endorsing the ‘direct duty view’ are committed to 
explaining the immorality of our mistreatment of animals in terms of something happening 
to animals themselves, such as the harm (the pain and the privation of happiness) we inflict 
on them. But I am not committed to any such claim. In fact, we needn’t even be talking 
about harm in this context, since it has already been established that immorality always 
features as a failure of attitude on the part of a morally rational being (see Part I), a failure 
that may or may not translate into harm. I have even pointed to the relevant (relationally-
specific) attitude in this context: it is the failure of practical love in our interactions with 
animals that renders our actions immoral, which it does directly and therefore quite 
independently of all felicific properties that may attach to our personality and conduct. If 
this is the critique coming from the ‘indirect view’, I cannot but think that people 
advancing this critique – and endorsing the view – are missing the point. These Kantians 
may be right in pointing to a peculiar kind of false reductionism that Utilitarians have been 
tempted to fall into (although it would have to be shown who among them – and how and 
when exactly – they actually fall into it), but I don’t think they are saying anything that 
could pose a threat to the notion of duties to animals (i.e. to non-human animals) and related 
notions. This will take me some effort, but I would like to take the offensive and argue that 
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that ‘indirect view’ in ‘animal ethics’ can be shown to be guilty of a false reductionism of its 
own, and that therefore it is false.103 
 Saying – as I am doing – that bad felicific consequences are morally immaterial in 
that they don’t contribute, let alone ground, the immorality of our mistreatment of animals, 
is not the same as, nor does it entail, denying the existence of wronging relations involving 
animals as victims. Likewise, saying that the benefits (the happiness) that animals derive 
from our treatment of them doesn’t as such contribute to, let alone ground, the moral 
goodness of our conduct, is not the same as, nor does it entail, denying that morality 
essentially involves acting for the sake of animals. In order to show that I am wrong here and 
that one thing really follows from the other, that non-human animals failing to be the 
ground of anything moral entails their non-participation (not even as objects or recipients) 
in fundamental moral relations, it would have be shown that reason (the admitted ground 
of our moral duties) fails to generate a ‘duty to animals’, that it (reason) fails to put us in 
special kind of moral relation to sentient beings as such which we recognise as essentially 
belonging to morality. I will be giving a chance to the ‘indirect view’ to try to do exactly 
what I am saying it has to do, but not before beginning to develop a more elaborate case 
for my own view.  
  
4. ‘Kant’s Dictum’, Practical Love for Animals, and Self-Givingness  
 
There is a crucial question that I haven’t yet addressed: Why is it (normatively speaking) 
that we have to care for the happiness of animals in the first place? Independently of what 
we think about the nature of our duty to ‘treat animals well’, to be practically concerned 
with their happiness, why do we even have this duty to begin with? Why should we even 
care? Believe it or not, the answer that I want to give to this question is an adaptation of 
one of Kant’s dictums: “I want everyone else to be benevolent toward me (benevolentiam); 
hence I ought also to be benevolent toward everyone else.” (MM 6:451). The point can be 
                                               
103 I will be substantiating this charge of false reductionism, but I have to warn you that it will take me some 
time to prepare the ground for that argument. The argument is closed in the only (long) footnote in 
subsection 5.5 below. 
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made in a more elaborate way by saying – as Kant also says – that “reason […] permits you 
to be benevolent to yourself on the condition of your being benevolent to every other as 
well.” (MM 6:451) I will focus on discussing the first of these lines, which I will be referring 
to as ‘Kant’s dictum’.  
 
4.1 Kant’s Dictum 
 
It is my view that, unless we put an emphasis in the wrong place with the explicit purpose 
of excluding non-human animals, a proper analysis of Kant’s dictum (‘I want the 
benevolence of others, therefore I ought to be benevolent to every other’) is bound to lead 
us to the conclusion that all animals fall under the scope of our duty generalised 
benevolence or practical love. Kant himself presumably disagrees, remember [~PL + ~R].  
In relation to non-human animals, Kant says: I don’t owe benevolence – in the sense of 
practical love – to these animals, but only to human beings, because I cannot even want 
them to be benevolent to me, since they can only (in virtue of their own ‘brute 
constitution’) be benevolent to themselves.104 If I cannot even have an interest (the initial 
interest that is registered in Kant’s dictum) in the benevolence of animals because such is 
impossible, then (the argument runs) there is no contradiction in me denying animals my 
benevolence: there is no imbalance or free-riding, no ‘exceptions for oneself’, no violations 
of the requirement of ‘reciprocity’, in denying ‘giving’ when one cannot even entertain the 
                                               
104 The difficulty arises from the very start that we may not have clarity about the exact meaning of the claim 
(which I am putting Kant to say in this context on the basis that he excludes non-human animals from the 
scope of practical love) that we don’t owe benevolence to animals. Is it simply that the benevolence we ought to 
have to them is not owed to them? Or is it that we need not even be benevolent to them to begin with? Or is 
it that we ought to be benevolent to them, but since we ‘don’t owe it to them’ we can take this benevolence 
less seriously than we take benevolence to human beings (to whom the benevolence is owed in reciprocity)? 
These questions relate to the question what kind of ‘love’ it is that Kant gives to animals, which I have 
concluded is only pathological or sympathy-based. Now, it is always hard to pinpoint exactly what it is that 
Kant denies to animals at any particular point, but I will be assuming that he goes as far as denying 
benevolence itself (at least in the form of ‘practical love’) to non-human animals.  
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possibility of ‘receiving’ from the relevant party. Or so, again, the thought goes (presumably, 
for the moment).105 
 I want the benevolence of others, therefore I ought to be benevolent to every other. 
Who is the ‘every other’ here? Well, if you put the emphasis on the benevolence of others (as 
I just did just to illustrate what Kant may have in mind which leads him to exclude non-
human animals from the picture) could lead you to think that it is right and proper to limit 
the scope of benevolence (one’s own requirement of practical love) to the domain of human 
beings, who alone can be universally benevolent (or at the very least benevolent to 
individuals other than themselves) and whose benevolence alone I can want while holding it 
to be possible: more importantly still, whose benevolence alone I can consider in relations 
of reciprocity with mine. To the human being whom I am helping, I can say: I know you 
would do the same for me! To the non-human animal, however, I just cannot say that. So, 
if non-human animals don’t even figure in the matter that I plug into the formal principle 
of reason (i.e. my initial desire for everyone else’s benevolence, which given a basic 
recognition of the nature of things can only be a desire for the benevolence of those who alone 
can be benevolent to me, and with whom alone I can therefore enter into relations of reciprocity, a.k.a. 
human beings), how can I even entertain the notion of benevolence to these animals as a 
fundamental moral requirement incumbent upon me? How indeed. Can I justify to myself 
being indifferent (in the sense of ‘practical love’) to the happiness of a pig, say, because 
‘given his brute constitution’ he cannot be benevolent to me? Here I just have to say (and 
I take responsibility for this) that I find the thought completely absurd. I cannot justify to 
myself being indifferent to the happiness of human babies on the grounds that they cannot 
benevolent to me, and just like that I cannot justify indifference to the happiness of non-
human animals on the grounds that they cannot benevolent to me. Can I even justify 
‘greater benevolence’ (benevolence greater in kind or even in degree) for a human being 
                                               
105 I will continue invoking ‘reciprocity’ in subsequent paragraphs in the context of my argument for all 
animals falling squarely under the scope of ‘practical love’ (our duty of ‘generalised benevolence’), but I will 
come back to this theme (now under the heading of ‘Contractualism’) in the context of my argument for the 
notion of ‘respect for animals’ (which constitutes my final argument for the notion of ‘duties to animals’, and 
in fact for the notion that ‘we owe’ moral activity as a whole to animals). I do more of an effort to do proper 
justice to ‘Kantian reciprocity’ in that context than I do in the present subsection. 
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vis-à-vis a pig because only the former can be benevolent to me or because only the former 
can stand to me in relations of ‘reciprocity’? Again, I don’t see how I could: practical love 
(benevolence from principle) is the kind of attitude  that is blind to the moral credentials 
of its object, assuming only that it (i.e. the object, which of course is always a subject) be 
capable of happiness.  
 If there is something truly uncontroversial in our discussion (in terms of the 
meaning of basic concepts) is that the notion of ‘benevolence’ / ‘kindness’ equally covers 
all animals under its scope. We are agreeing that ‘benevolence’ is defined as practical concern 
for someone’s happiness, that is, and ‘animals’ (sentient beings) are exactly those beings who 
are capable of happiness. Therefore, all animals fall under the scope of benevolence. I don’t 
take any Kantian to be denying this fact. Kant certainly doesn’t deny it, since he allows for 
the notion of ‘pathological love’ (i.e. sympathy-grounded benevolence) in relation to non-
human animals. In principle, therefore, without yet thinking of benevolence (kindness) as 
a moral requirement, let alone as a fundamental one, it is perfectly clear that we can be 
benevolent to a pig and a dog and a cat and a human being, but not so to a table or a car 
or painting or a tree. We can only be benevolent to sentient beings. But if this so, i.e. if 
benevolence – considered just as benevolence – is properly directed to non-human animals 
because in fact it is always essentially directed to animals (sentient beings) as such, how is it 
that when we make it into a moral requirement (when we think of it as directly incumbent 
– as a duty – upon our will) all of a sudden it isn’t?  
 Well, again, we can certainly point to the incapacity of non-human animals to be 
benevolent to us, which might get in the way because of some concern about ‘reciprocity’: 
perhaps that it would be unfair to care for someone as an equal who doesn’t have duties 
himself (who would count as something like a ‘free-rider’ in the moral community), that 
some kind of imbalance of forces in the moral community would thereby obtain (one 
exactly of the kind that reciprocity is supposed to prevent: no rights without duties).106 But 
                                               
106 This is of course not a very plausible thought, which I would like to avoid ascribing to anyone and 
discussion of which in the main text I therefore want to avoid as much as possible. Nobody, I hope, thinks it 
unfair, say, to welcome a certain member of the family to participate with beneficiary status who is utterly 
incapable of carrying a moral burden herself. Nobody would call her a ‘free-rider’ in any sense suggesting that 
‘reciprocity’ has been violated, and quite properly so. The name for this station that individuals occupy in 
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even if the story is not meant to exclude non-human animals (from the scope of practical 
love) on the ground that it would be ‘unfair’ to allow an enormous amount of ‘free-riding’ 
(as it were) but on some other, more recognisably moral ground (e.g. on the basis of the 
fact that non-human animals don’t participate in the Moral Law which makes human 
beings special in their own eyes and even, if you will, in the eyes of God), I cannot buy it.  
 My basic tendency in relation to this issue is in fact to think that the more 
sophisticated the story of human reciprocity (and human moral uniqueness in general) 
becomes, the more it favours recognising non-human animals as falling under the scope of 
practical love on a par with human beings. I find it particularly odd to see human beings 
claiming to uniquely be representatives of the All-loving on this Earth, to be in special co-
operation with the All-loving Himself as those who are called to be his servants and carry 
out his will as a matter of moral duty, and then pointing to this peculiarity of theirs (this 
remarkable fact about their existence) as justifying the exclusion of non-human animals 
from the scope of love.107 What I see people doing here (those who really mean to be 
excluding non-human animals from the scope of practical love on the basis of human moral 
superiority) is deceptively introducing an irrelevant factor, one that nobody would miss if it 
weren’t introduced and made to look relevant (a factor that is of course otherwise very 
relevant and therefore has some potential to be sold as relevant everywhere, even where it 
is not), with the sole purpose of blocking a conclusion that presents itself as unavoidable 
given the nature of our concepts and the whole of our moral experience: morality essentially 
involves being benevolent or kind (in the sense of ‘practical love’) to all sentient beings (i.e. 
to all natural objects of benevolence).108  
                                               
the moral community (who partake of the ‘benefits’ without carrying any moral burdens) is not ‘free-riders’ but 
passive citizens (see subsection 6.2 below). 
107 If there is a God whose image we bear, surely he loves all animals quite independently of their moral 
nobility, and all the rest just follows in the theological picture that we might like to paint on the basis of our 
ethical theory: our Imago Dei means that we are obliged to care for all sentient beings as the objects of God’s 
love, as the intended beneficiaries of the love that is behind the very creation of the world (see 5.4 below). 
108 By ‘natural objects of benevolence’ I don’t mean objects to which we ‘naturally’ (non-morally) direct our 
benevolence, but simply – what relates to the point being made above in this paragraph – objects of the kind 
that fall under the scope of benevolence given the definition of benevolence merely as benevolence (without yet 
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 I want the benevolence of others, therefore I ought to be benevolent to every other. 
The real ‘derivation’ that Kant is proposing here for the existence of a moral requirement 
of universal benevolence or universal practical love (i.e. the one that we can make proper 
sense of) goes as follows: I (as a being capable of happiness) have an interest in the 
benevolence of others, therefore I ought to benevolent to all those who (because they are 
in the same initial condition as me, i.e. all beings capable of happiness) have an interest in 
my benevolence. I can agree that our interest in the benevolence of others is always – given 
recognition of the nature of things – an interest in the benevolence of human beings. But 
the interest is not itself one belonging to our human (morally rational) nature, of course, 
since it is completely parasitic on our (distinctively animal) interest in our own happiness: 
it’s only because we desire our own happiness that we come to desire (in the sense of a 
felicific desire) the benevolence of others. Accordingly, there is an input (matter) in our 
thinking referencing our animal nature (our sensibility and our natural interest in our own 
happiness) as its source, and you would expect that our final maxim of generalised 
benevolence should embody recognition of this particular provenance (i.e. the provenance 
of the relevant matter, not of course of the obligatoriness) by extending its scope to all 
animals.  
 Some people will of course try to make me look as putting the emphasis in the 
wrong place and drawing a hasty conclusion from the fact that ‘animal nature’ or 
‘sensibility’ (our capacity for happiness in particular) figures somewhere in our moral 
thinking. I will let them make their argument. The truth is that it is them, and not me, who 
is in the business of placing special emphases. Let me put the emphasis in the fact that the 
‘benevolence of others’ which one can initially desire is always the benevolence of human 
beings: in my picture, this is respected in the final, moral binding, maxim of action in the 
fact this final maxim is the maxim of a human being, a maxim that I also implicitly prescribe 
(if only in my mind) for every human being. Let me now put the emphasis on the input 
referencing our ‘animal nature’: in my picture, this is respected in the final, morally 
binding, maxim of action in the fact that the scope of the moral concern that this maxim 
                                               
thinking of it as a moral requirement). A human being is a ‘natural object’ of benevolence because it is 
possible – metaphysically speaking – to be benevolent to him.  
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constitutes extends to all animals as objects: the benevolence that morality requires of us 
(human beings) is – as I have it – benevolence to animals (sentient beings).  
 
4.2 Kant and the Notion of Self-Givingness 
 
This is the end of my argument for non-human animals being proper objects of our duty 
of practical love, which has also given us a basic way of ‘justifying’ (explaining to ourselves – 
making sense of) the existence of the duty itself. I will keep doing work that contributes to 
the latter kind of understanding, so I really don’t need to stop and make the point quite 
explicitly.  
 But have I done enough to justify the for-the-sake-of relation that grounds the 
directedness of our ‘duties to animals’? Have I said enough to the effect that morality involves 
acting for the benefit of animals? I think my arguments so far speak clearly to that effect, but 
I can still say more. In fact, there is more in Kant that I can bring to bear in support of the 
idea that morality essentially involves an element of self-givingness, i.e. of acting for the 
happiness of subjects.109 Let me quote his longer rendition of the derivation of the maxim of 
universal benevolence (MM 6:393): 
 
The reason that it is a duty to be beneficent is this: since our self-love cannot be separated 
from our need to be loved (helped in case of need) by others as well, we therefore make 
ourselves an end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is through its 
qualification as a universal law, hence through our will to make others our ends as well. The 
happiness of others is therefore an end that is also a duty.110 
                                               
109 Since I take it that non-human animals are subjects for whose happiness we are called to act in self-
givingness, the resources that I take from Kant in support of the general idea of self-givingness also support 
the thought that morality essentially involves acting for the happiness of non-human animals. 
110 Let us not be distracted (in the main text, I mean) by the fact that Kant is using the word ‘beneficent’ as 
opposed to ‘benevolent’. He thinks of ‘beneficence’ as an active kind of benevolence – in fact calling it “active 
benevolence” (MM 6:452) – which needs to be distinguished from a passive kind (the act of merely wishing 
someone well). Now, one of the reasons Kant distinguishes these two kinds is to make the point that whereas 
in ‘passive benevolence’ we can “be equally benevolent to everyone” (MM 6:452), in active benevolence we 
cannot. More precisely, he thinks that we can allow for degrees of ‘practical benevolence’ without violating 
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Saying, as Kant does, that we “make ourselves an end for others” merely through “the need 
to be loved” (MM 6:393) is to admit that there is an input in our moral reasoning 
referencing our animal nature: after all, it’s only animals (sentient beings) as such who have 
a need to be loved. This reinforces the thoughts that I already developed, but I think we can 
go even further. What we have so far is a need (for love) the recognition of which, in 
conjunction with the formal principle of reason, generates the idea that we ought morally 
to make others our ends: “the only way this maxim [the maxim of benevolence] can be binding 
is through its qualification as a universal law, hence through our will to make others our 
ends as well” (MM 6:393).111 But making ourselves an end for others (as in the initial step) 
is to make others a means for us; and making others our ends (as Kant says we ought to do 
when it comes to the final, universal, maxim of benevolence that is morally binding) is to 
make oneself into a means for them. Some people may find this strange (because rumours 
and myths abound in philosophy), but here we are reading Kant saying that in morality we 
make ourselves into a means for the happiness of others. His ‘argument’ goes: I need others to 
be there (as a means) for my happiness, therefore (on pains of inconsistency) I ought to be 
there (as a means) for the happiness of others.  
 We have been told that ‘Kantian morality’ is done for duty’s sake and duty alone, 
and therefore not for the happiness of subjects. I don’t deny that Kant himself said this 
multiple times, nor do I want to deny that there is a construal of this particular dictum that 
makes it true: the only obedience that is of itself part of morality is obedience to the moral law 
                                               
the universality of the maxim of generalised benevolence. I don’t stand by these claims (at least as they are 
stated) because I don’t allow for degrees of benevolence in ‘practical love’, nor am I even clear that this is 
what Kant really wants to say given that it might be more plausible to talk about ‘degrees of attention in 
benevolence’ – in virtue of some idea of the ‘distribution of responsibilities’ among human beings, perhaps 
in interaction with some notion of there being ‘patients’ who in various ways need more direct attention than 
others, etc. – without having to talk about ‘degrees of benevolence’. I am not necessarily registering my final 
view here, only trying to read Kant’s larger claims in a plausible way. None of that matters here, however. 
What I really care about (in the context of my argument in the main text) is that Kant is talking about an 
active kind of benevolence (i.e. about what I am calling practical love, or at least about a part of it since we also 
need to introduce non-maleficence in the picture as well).  
111 The square brackets are mine, to indicate by name the maxim Kant is talking about.  
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within. In terms of what authority it is that we have to obey in morality, animals are not the 
answer, happiness is not the answer, and only reason is the answer: all obedience in morality 
is obedience to the moral law of our own reason. However, this point doesn’t detract from 
the fact that Kant is at the same time committed to there being a perfectly respectable sense 
of the notion of acting for the happiness of subjects (which we identify as essentially belonging 
to morality, and which therefore has to be consistent with the motive of duty being the sole 
genuine moral motive, which now we are only describing further) and therefore of these 
subjects themselves figuring as intended beneficiaries of morality.  
 What is crucial from the perspective of Kantian philosophy is that we do that which 
constitutes our duty simply because it is our duty; and even though I see how talking about 
happiness might be perceived as introducing a new ‘because’ that is potentially in tension 
with the first one (a potential threat to the ‘purity of morality’, a ‘reason of the wrong kind’ 
that seems to threaten the ‘reason of the right kind’ already in place), the truth is that it 
just doesn’t do that. There is no ‘because’ here that could compete with the authority of 
reason, no extra moral-normative property being posited as ground of the relevant duty, 
much less an additional incentive of self-love that needs to come as a supplement for the 
moral incentive (which I agree has to be ‘pure’ in the sense of ‘independently effective’); 
what is being introduced is only a for connecting us with the intended beneficiaries of the 
relevant duty, that’s all. There is no contradiction in saying that we ought morally to do 
something for someone’s happiness, and so it seems to me that I can say: yes, I am doing 
something ‘simply because I ought to’, simply because I ought to do something for someone’s (i.e. 
everyone’s) happiness. Here, as before, no contradiction is apparent. Through the notion of 
‘practical love’ that features as a fundamental moral requirement, a special and irreducible 
bond is posited between the moral being and all animals as the intended beneficiaries of her 
conduct, a bond (called ‘practical love’) involving the notion of acting for the happiness of 
subjects. Through this notion of practical love as a fundamental (i.e. both essential to 
morality and universally pervasive of it) moral requirement, our most general ‘moral slogan’ 
becomes: from duty, for everyone’s happiness.112  
                                               
112 The same ‘slogan’ was already introduced by Jacob Lautrup Kristensen in his 2015 doctoral work: From 
Duty, For Happiness – Authority and Value in Kant’s Theory of Practical Reason. The ‘slogan’ is used in that work 
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5. Respect for Animals 
 
Having prepared the ground as much as I have, I should by now be able to explain why the 
notion of ‘practical love’ entails – as I intend it – the notion of ‘respect for animals (sentient 
beings) as such’. But I cannot get to that without giving a last chance to the ‘Kantian 
indirect view’, if only to try to persuade us that there is some important truth that it 
contains and we haven’t yet seen (for we have seen a few already). Here we run the risk of 
taking a few steps back, since I will have to call into question (if only for the sake of the 
argument) the idea that ‘practical love’ – as developed in the preceding section – entails 
‘duties to’ and therefore ‘respect for’ non-human animals; however, this just seems 
necessary for me to try to do full justice to Kant’s ‘indirect view’.  
 Thus, someone may grant that we ought morally to be benevolent to animals (even 
as a matter of ‘practical love’, i.e. benevolence from duty) and still deny that we ought to do 
anything for the sake of the animals themselves, thus blocking the notion of ‘duties to animals’, 
and therefore ‘respect’, and therefore ‘dignity’, etc. And so we are transported back to 
Kant’s idea of what it means to ‘have a duty to someone’ and the recognition that non-
human animals don’t fit the relevant bill. Kant’s claim, remember, is that ‘having a duty to 
someone’ means ‘being constrained by that someone’s will’ (MM 6:442), and what it takes 
for someone’s will to constraint morally is for it to have the moral authority to do so, first, 
and second to be able to address its claim or demand to a suitably responsive will (i.e. to be 
an object of experience for the subject that is meant to be bound), all of which is beyond 
the powers of non-human animals because they are assumed to lack the original authority 
that would allow them to present themselves to us as ‘making moral demands’.  
 Now, I am omitting the problem that if we take Kant’s definition of what it means 
to ‘have a duty to someone’ as it reads, i.e. as literally requiring that the ‘obligor’ (the 
                                               
as an abstraction for a general argument concerning Kant’s dualism between reason and sensibility in 
philosophy (especially moral philosophy) addressing some of the themes that I have myself been discussing. 
This work is similar to mine in that they are both trying to ‘re-think’ the moral significance of happiness / 
hedonic well-being (in something like the way Utilitarians typically have it) in Kant’s moral philosophy. This 
work is recommended for readers interested in a wider – and in many ways deeper – examination of Kant’s 
philosophy which is also more conversant with current Kantian scholarship.  
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obligating subject) have the power to impose a moral constraint on the obligee’s will (the will 
of the subject putatively being placed under obligation), then – given Kantian autonomy – 
the conclusion follows that a human being can only have duties (i.e. ethical duties) to himself. No 
one apart from myself can make the moral law and its commands authoritative upon my 
will: not the animals, not my fellow humans, only I alone as a morally autonomous being. 
I am omitting this ‘problem’, I say, in the sense of assuming that nobody in this discussion 
is meaning to step over it. I am taking it for granted that advocates of the ‘indirect view’ 
(who want to allow for ‘duties to human beings in general’ while denying ‘duties to 
animals’) are arguing on the basis of some account of ‘bipolar obligations’ (a.k.a. ‘directed 
duties’, ‘duties to someone’) that doesn’t require ‘other human beings’ having the power to 
directly (or even literally) place the individual under obligation. This is a safe assumption to 
make given the most prominent stories that have been told in this area, including Stephen 
Darwall’s.113  
 
5.1 The Contractualist Challenge 
 
Granted that human beings cannot be morally obligated except through their own self-
obligating power (i.e. their moral autonomy), it remains the case that human beings still 
figure, for every other human being, as having a shared second-personal authority to ‘make 
claims’ and ‘address demands’ (Darwall, 2006). We might agree to describe human beings 
as ‘obligors’ and ‘obligees’ with respect to each other on the basis of the fact that every 
human being’s moral prescriptions are necessarily universal (i.e. given that human beings 
always implicitly prescribe for all human beings); or maybe we only agree to describe human 
beings as ‘co-legislators’ in the moral community in a way that doesn’t entail their actually 
being obligors and obligees with respect to each other but only with respect to themselves (in 
which case the act of co-legislation would have to be understood as the moral agent putting 
                                               
113 Darwall’s account of bipolar obligations appears in Bipolar Obligation (2012). However, he puts this 
particular point better in The Second-Person Standpoint, which he does in the name of “Pufendorf’s Point” 
(Darwall 2006, p.112): “in holding people responsible, we are committed to the assumption that they can 
hold themselves responsible by self-addressed demands from a perspective that we and they share.” (Darwall 
2006, p.112) 
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herself self alone under obligation, yet on the basis of prescriptions that are universal), 
leaving it open whether there is a more adequate name to for the role that they play in this 
particular inter-personal moral interaction (I mean, apart from co-legislators, on which we 
can safely agree).  
 Whatever we decide is the best name to use here in addition to ‘co-legislators’, what 
we are asked to acknowledge (before even doing any detailed conceptualisation) is that 
there is a special human-to-human moral relation whereby human beings stand to each 
other as moral equals, as being under shared moral standards (‘common laws’) who can on 
that basis ‘hold one another to mutual obligation’ (Darwall, 2006, p.119). This is the sense 
of ‘reciprocity’ that Kantian (Contractualist) philosophy is supposed to emphasise: 
‘reciprocal recognition’ between human beings as moral equals (as beings with equal moral 
authority in virtue of their equal participation in the Moral Law).  
 Now, it should be noted that this concept of ‘reciprocity’ is closer to the ‘Christian’ 
idea of relating to human beings as image-bearers of God (as co-representatives of God on 
Earth) than it is to some of the other notions that have come up in relation the scope of 
the duty of generalised benevolence or ‘practical love’, e.g. the notion that ‘giving’ (in 
benevolence) is ‘obligatory’ only on condition that the ‘receiving party’ also have the duty 
to ‘give’ in reciprocity. But remember that here we are assuming benevolence to all animals 
to be a genuine duty, and that the story is only trying to undermine the claim that there 
exist duties to animals, duties that we owe it to animals themselves, which it does by appealing 
to the notion of co-legislation as one where only human beings can figure as direct 
participants: if only human beings participate in relations of co-legislation, and if it is the 
case that the duty to participate in these relations comprises all interpersonal duties so 
understood (i.e. all duties to others, whatever their content may be), then the conclusion 
follows that there are no duties to non-human animals.  
 If we want to generalise the point and include (Kantian) duties to self in the picture, 
we can say: One can have duties to someone only in virtue of self-legislation (duties to self) 
or in virtue of co-legislation (duties to other human beings). In relation to non-human 
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animals, we therefore say: we owe it to ourselves and to each other (or perhaps to human 
beings or humanity in general) to be benevolent and care for their happiness.114  
 
5.2 A Contractualist Reply to the Contractualist Challenge 
 
Having added more distinctively Contractualist (Kantian) elements to the background story 
that may still be told in support of the ‘indirect view’ in the context of ‘animal ethics’, we 
can ask: is it plausible to deny the notion of duties to animals (i.e. to non-human animals)? 
And the answer still seems to be no: emphasising the facts of ‘human moral uniqueness’ in 
all their metaphysical grandeur, even making ‘reciprocity’ a spiritual bond between human 
beings where other animals enjoy no participatory status (because they lack the authority 
to do so and therefore cannot count as our moral equals), is not going to help the ‘indirect 
view’ gain any relative plausibility as against the one that I am proposing in this work, since 
I am assuming those same facts: the same ‘human moral uniqueness’ (see Part I) and the 
same positive facts about distinctively human-to-human moral relationality (the reference 
to God in particular being only metaphorical as far as I am concerned, but the spiritual 
bond between human beings something very real). There is such a thing as reciprocal 
recognition between human beings as moral equals, a relation whereby we stand together 
as co-workers in the moral community (as perfect equals in that regard), and yet there are 
                                               
114 Two accounts that seem relevant here are those offered by John Rawls in Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1999, p. 
448) and Thomas Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Other (Scanlon, 2000, pp.185-186). These are two largely 
‘negative’ views in ‘animal ethics’. But ‘animal rights’ are not exactly absent in the history of what Rawls 
would call the ‘contract doctrine’, since we find them, for instance, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1987, pp.35-
36) [putting an emphasis on key terms]: “An end can also be made to the ancient disputes regarding the 
participation of animals in the natural law. For it is clear that, lacking intelligence and liberty, they cannot 
recognize this law; but since they share to some extent in our nature by virtue of the sentient quality with which 
they are endowed, one will judge that they should also participate in natural right, and that man is subject to 
some sort of duties toward them. It seems, in effect, that if I am obliged not to do any harm to my fellow man, 
it is less because he is a rational being than because he is a sentient being: a quality that, since it is common to both 
animals and men, should at least give the former the right not to be needlessly mistreated by the latter”. 
Contractualist (Rawlsian) arguments for the moral standing of sentient beings in general have already been 
produced, one prominent example being the one offered by Mark Rowlands in his book Animal Rights (2009). 
 126 
duties to non-human animals. Let me briefly discuss an example (often treated in the literature) 
that I think helps to illustrate my point.  
 Saying that we only have duties to human beings, and that ‘duties to animals’ are 
on this basis out of the question, is of course to say that only human beings can be wronged 
when mistreated. Thus, if I intentionally step on someone’s (i.e. a human being’s) foot 
without a good enough justification, I wrong him because (as a human being) he has the 
authority to make claims on me, including the claim that I don’t step on his foot without 
proper justification. If, however, I intentionally step hard on a dog’s tail for entertainment, 
I am certainly mistreating the dog and acting immorally; but since the dog lacks – as Darwall 
would put it – ‘second-personal authority’ (for he lacks the moral lights that someone would 
need to be able to generate moral claims and demands), it turns out that I don’t wrong him. 
Myself and other human beings perhaps, whom I let down as fellow moral authorities, but 
not the morally blind creature in front of me, whom I only harm. If the animal looks at me, 
it is perhaps with the fear that I am going to do something more severe to him; he is not 
invoking (at least not intentionally) the sacred law that addresses me and my fellow humans 
and on the basis of which ‘we make claims of each other’; therefore – I am supposed to 
conclude according to dominant ‘Contractualist’ doctrine – the animal in front of me has 
no ‘rights’, no duties directed to him. I ought to be kind to him, surely, but I don’t owe it to 
him. 
 But it appears to me manifest that if I (as a human being) have a special authority 
to issue the demand that nobody should step on my foot without good enough justification 
(to continue with our example), then I have the very same authority to demand that nobody 
should step on the dog’s tail, and I can use the language of ‘respect’ and ‘rights’ and 
‘personhood’ in relation to the subject whose interest I mean to protect through the issuing 
of the demand (the intended beneficiary), in the one case just as much as in the other. I can say: 
respect my right! And I can say: respect his right! This is of course the idea of ‘giving animals 
a voice’, which of course only means a ‘moral voice’, which in turn only means: 
representation of their interests (as owed to them in their condition as intended 
beneficiaries of morality) vis-à-vis human beings in general as co-legislators and – I would 
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now like to add – co-workers in the moral community.115 This idea of ‘giving animals a voice’ 
is itself a piece of Contractualist doctrine, the upshot of the interaction between the 
‘Kantian’ idea of co-legislation and the Utilitarian or Agapist idea of ‘practical love’ for all 
sentient beings.116 This simple story seems to me to reveal (in a very powerful way) that 
inter-personal human-to-human moral relations are in fact more complex and at the same 
time more interesting than the bare ‘Kantian’ idea of co-legislation – if spelled out in 
isolation – could possibly convey: co-legislation is as such irreducible to any other putative 
moral relation, but it seems to be nothing more than an aspect (an fundamental and very 
important aspect) of our more general relation as co-workers in the moral community, as co-
guardians in a moral community essentially including all sentient beings as having 
‘beneficiary status’.  
 There are two more positive cases that I can make in support in support of the 
notion of ‘respect for animals’, i.e. for the notion of ‘practical love’ for animals (which at 
this point we all agree on) being one according to which we owe it to animals, i.e. for our 
‘practical love for animals’ being a genuine duty to animals (a duty to respect animals). The 
first case is meant to show that theological ideas which could be appealed to in support of 
the ‘indirect view’ are actually themselves better understood (as narratives that could follow 
from a genuine concept of morality already in place) in light of a moral theory allowing for 
the notions of ‘duties to animals’ and ‘respect for animals’. The second is to make sense of 
the notion of ‘animal rights’, which is very often thought of as having no room in the 
                                               
115 This ‘Contractualist’ idea is not denying that non-human animals have their own voice (for they obviously 
have one), nor is it to suggest that this voice is not of itself salient from the moral point of view (which it 
obviously is); in fact, it is not even to say that the voice of any particular animal out there is not in fact a moral 
voice, since that is not for moral theory to judge.  
116 Stephen Darwall considers this kind of idea by saying that human beings may be said to act as ‘trustees’ 
(with respect to non-human animals) having the “authority to demand certain treatment on their behalf 
(perhaps also to claim certain rights, compensation, and so on, for them)” (Darwall 2006, p.29). However, 
Darwall also completely trivialises this idea by suggesting (through a certain literary reference) that human 
beings may have the authority to ‘speak for trees’ (Darwall 2006, p.29). Again, this completely trivialises the 
idea of ‘giving someone a voice’ because this idea only makes sense in relation to persons. A tree is not ‘someone’, 
a tree is not a ‘person’ or a ‘subject’, therefore it cannot have any kind of citizenship in the moral community 
(lacking the capacity for happiness, for instance, it cannot be said to have ‘beneficiary status’).  
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Kantian picture. Let me give you the latter first and the former second (each taking a 
separate subsection).117 
 
5.3 Animal Rights118   
 
The ‘Kantian view’ (on ‘rights’) has often been portrayed as saying that: since nothing about 
non-human animals themselves can serve as the suitable ground of ‘rights’, therefore non-
human animals lack rights. That since – to put it more generally and more to the point – 
felicific interests as such (the capacity for happiness or well-being) cannot be the ground of 
any rights, therefore individuals cannot come out as suitable right-holders on account of 
merely possessing interests of this kind. Human beings, who have rights, don’t have them 
because they have a capacity for happiness or well-being (or in any case ‘interests’ of some 
relevant kind),119 but for some other reason. But what is that reason exactly? Well, the 
thought suggests itself naturally that individuals only acquire rights through themselves 
possessing duties. If correct, this thought would offer a clean explanation of why – as most 
Kantians would have it – all human beings, and no non-human animals, have rights. But 
let us put this thought to the side for the moment, since I don’t think this is what the 
‘Kantian view’ is really trying to say.  
                                               
117 You can see me as closing my main reply to the ‘Contractualist Challenge’ at this point. It only takes 
showing that there is more to morality than people seem to assume who put forward that challenge. However, 
my reply actually continues in the following three subsections, which are meant to give support to the basic 
point that has been made in this section.  
118 The concept of ‘animal rights’ is not identical with the concept of ‘the rights of non-human animals’: 
animal rights are the rights that all animals possess simply ‘as animals’ (i.e. simply as beings capable of happiness), 
which entails that human beings – who are animals in this sense no less than pigs and dogs are – have ‘animal 
rights’ themselves. Also to be clear, there is a place in the view that I am proposing for ‘distinctively human 
rights’, rights that only human beings have, but there is more to ‘the rights of human beings’ than that: there 
is also – as I am arguing here – ‘the animal rights of human beings’. By the way, I conceive of ‘animal rights’ 
as always having the sense of beneficiary rights, rights that individuals have to participate in the moral 
community with ‘beneficiary status’.  
119 Except perhaps ‘irreducibly moral interests’. 
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 What I think the ‘Kantian view’ is trying to say, and what I myself take it to say in 
the version of it that I endorse, is that individuals acquire ‘rights’ only in virtue of having 
duties directed to them, in virtue of someone having duties to them. If this is so, then the 
actual commitment of the ‘Kantian view’ in relation to non-human animals is the 
following: for non-human animals to have ‘rights’, it has to be shown that we have duties 
to them. And hence of course we realise that we have already been giving an argument for 
‘animal rights’ as they are understood in the ‘Kantian view’, since we have been arguing for 
those duties which are meant to ground those rights. The idea of ‘animal rights’ has as 
much room in Kantian ethics as the notion of ‘duties to animals’ does, and they also stand 
or fall together because the one is a mere corollary of the other.  
 Defending the notion of ‘animal rights’ becomes difficult when one tries to make 
sense of the thought (that many people associate with the so-called ‘interest theory of rights’, 
which is meant to stand as an alternative to the ‘Kantian view’) that all animals or sentient 
beings have rights (i.e. ‘beneficiary rights’ in particular) merely on account of their capacity 
for happiness. Well, I guess we only have to be clear on what we mean, and what we don’t 
mean, when we make that claim. By now it is clear that we don’t reference the capacity for 
happiness in order to locate the ground (the ultimate metaphysical ground) of ‘beneficiary 
rights’, which is now understood to lie in our duty of practical love to animals. No, what 
we mean to be doing in saying that ‘animals have rights (of the relevant kind) merely on 
account of their capacity for happiness’ is simply that they fall under the scope of the relevant 
kind of protection because they have a capacity for happiness, because the principle that 
enjoins this protection (practical love) is essentially directed to all animals as intended 
beneficiaries. The ‘merely’ qualifier which we use to emphasise the point is again not to 
suggest that the referenced capacity is ‘all that it takes’ to generate the existence of 
‘beneficiary tights’; rather, it is only to note that individuals count as right-holders (holders 
of ‘beneficiary rights’ in this case) independently from themselves having or lacking any 
other capacity (including the capacity for morality, which may be otherwise relevant but not 
here).  
 It has always been a major objection to the ‘Kantian view’ in the ‘theory of rights’ 
that it is far too restrictive in terms of its scope of protection, but this deficiency can be 
amended in a principled way through clarification of our duty of practical love in its 
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directedness to animals in general as intended beneficiaries (with the qualification, of course, 
that ‘animal rights’ / ‘beneficiary rights’ are not meant to be exhaustive of the theory of 
rights). 
 
5.4 Animals (Human and Non-Human) and Their Place in Creation 
 
If the traditional Kantian story (purportedly supporting the ‘indirect view’) can be given 
‘theological support’ (in the sense of their being a good story to tell on the basis of a moral 
theory already in place to begin with), mine has every right. I can, for instance, accept the 
notion that human beings are uniquely image-bearers of God, and therefore I can also accept 
the idea of us having a duty to relate to every other human being as a co-image-bearer of God, 
as a co-worker in the moral community for instance. All of this I can accept. My point, 
then, is that this story requires a few more elements added, even for the sake of 
understanding what it means for us as individuals to be and act as bearers of God’s image.  
 Thus, to put my cards on the table, I submit that God did not create the world for 
the sake of human beings exercising their moral powers, but first and foremost for the sake 
of sentient beings (his children, human and non-human alike) enjoying life. God created sentient 
beings and the world as a whole (his children and a home for them to inhabit) for the sake 
of having someone to love, and he created human beings as morally rational beings (his 
representatives) for the sake of having someone through whom to love in the most thorough way. 
Given the reality of this spiritual idea (which we find present in the phenomenology of self-
givingness, i.e. a basic sense of existing for those subjects who are the beneficiaries of one’s 
love), it follows that a human being’s bearing of God’s image cannot be exhausted by her 
appearing in front of other human beings as having moral authority; in fact, it consists first 
and foremost (in terms of the point of her mission in this life) in being there to see to the 
benefit of all sentient beings, human and non-human alike. We are God’s hand in the 
world, and in this sense his subjects, his ‘servants’ if you will, standing alongside his other 
servants (all other human beings) as moral equals. However, we are also, and by the same 
token, the ‘servants’ of all animals: we are guardians in a moral community where all animals 
(all of God’s children, none of whom God forgets) participate with beneficiary status. 
Again, we (human beings) are uniquely God’s representatives on Earth, but surely this 
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entails being God’s hand in the world, and the thought suggests itself naturally (at least to 
me, of course, since this is the kind of ‘theological narrative’ that I would tell on the basis 
of my own ethical theory) that we ought to be God’s hand by the side of the creatures (i.e. we 
are here to see to be benefit of God’s children, all of whom are the intended beneficiaries 
of his love quite independently of their moral nobility). 
 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 
To recapitulate. What advocates of the ‘indirect view’ have been doing is taking the moral 
duties in question (our duties to treat animals well) and portraying them as involving only 
one fundamental moral relation, that between the acting subject and her own self-
legislation, between her capacity to form practical intentions and the deliverances of her 
own moral reason, thus saying that these duties are ones that we owe to ourselves as morally 
rational beings, and not to animals. Now, since it is part of their project to also make sense 
of duties to human beings in general, they allow for co-legislation (what is obviously a human-to-
human relation) as the only fundamental moral inter-personal relation, the only fundamental 
moral relation apart from the already stated intra-personal relation of self-legislation. And 
then what they do is portray their view as very simple and elegant, construing all 
fundamental moral relations as just various ways of honouring the moral law and having to 
introduce nothing more by way of the matter, or the point, or even the form of morality. It 
says: in light of the idea that all human beings are under the moral law (which puts them 
under obligation directly), and in light of the fact that they all share this law (which puts 
them all on a plane of moral equality), we can account for duties to human begins in general, 
‘duties to self’ and ‘duties to other human beings’, end of the fundamental philosophical 
story. It is true that we have to care about non-human animals and their happiness (as a 
matter of practical love even), but they only figure as part of the ‘content’ of morality and 
have nothing to do with the ‘form’, which is what matters most to philosophy: things like 
‘unconditional necessity’ and ‘universality’ and ‘justifiability’ and ‘accountability’, etc. In 
any case, they say, we can be benevolent to animals as a matter of moral duty without ever 
having to posit a single ‘duty to animals’. 
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 The reason I don’t buy this orthodox Kantian story (orthodox, I say, yet by now 
somewhat improved with respect to the one that Kant himself gave us, which goes as far as 
to reject practical love in relation to non-human animals, in fact regarding these animals 
very much as commodities) is because I take there to be more to the fundamentals of 
human moral relationality than just self-legislation and co-legislation. Now, since the orthodox 
Kantian picture (as represented by the ‘indirect view’ in ‘animal ethics’) presents itself as 
the complete philosophical story on fundamental moral relations, then we have to 
conclude that this picture is unduly reductionistic (a picture that unduly explains away 
certain fundamental aspects of morality).120 Morality (the whole of morality, morality as 
                                               
120 Here ends the argument for the orthodox Kantian picture (as represented by the ‘indirect view’ in ‘animal 
ethics’) being guilty of a peculiar false reductionism of its own: a picture that unduly explains away our ‘duties 
to animals’ and everything that comes with them (including the requirement of practical love in its full 
signification and dimension, a requirement that calls the moral agent to make herself into an instrument for 
the benefit of animals in general as an act of self-givingness). Let me add to this case (which I do here because 
I think it would ruin the cohesion of the argument in the main text) by pointing out some dialectical facts. 
Advocates of the ‘indirect view’ and I can in one voice reject the false reductionism that some people (some 
Utilitarians, for instance) have fallen into when they point to happiness itself as moral ground, and we certainly 
can to a large extent diagnose this error in the same way. The reason people are tempted to go in that direction 
may be that happiness presents itself as having intrinsic value, but this value is of itself non-moral and will never 
(however you take it) amount to the morality of actions. The idea is also tempting because happiness (the 
happiness of all subjects in this case) presents itself as morally incumbent upon us in some very fundamental 
way, but this moral incumbency (its ‘moral-practical value’, its ‘ought-morally-to-be-pursuedness’ if you will) 
attaches to it only as a represented end (i.e. not in itself, precisely because felicific outcomes are not themselves 
part of morality) and only in virtue of there being a principle in place demanding that we pursue it, a principle 
of practical love (in this case) addressing our own will directly. Happiness is not as such part of morality, nor 
is its pursuit morally required just because it is at stake. Ultimately, however, I don’t think that advocates of 
the ‘indirect view’ have all the resources that are needed to offer a real and satisfactory diagnosis of the mistake 
that some Utilitarians have been making (their peculiar kind of false reductionism). They can say as much as 
I just registered, but they cannot really explain why on Earth there is a view in moral philosophy (defended by 
human beings doing a more or less honest and dedicated effort, in many cases doing great work in all kinds 
of areas) reducing everything moral completely to the felicific. Knowing them very well, I bet the reason they 
are doing this (i.e. the reason for their philosophical mistake, at least in many cases) is not simply that 
happiness presents itself as having ‘intrinsic value’, or even because everyone’s happiness presents itself as 
morally incumbent in some fundamental way, but because they think of it as that which ultimately matters, 
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such and therefore every bit of it) has the sense of self-givingness, of something that one does 
for the benefit of all subjects, which in my view means for the happiness of sentient beings. Morality 
essentially involves a duty called ‘practical love’ that, because of its specificity (e.g. the 
specificity of its direct object: sentient beings in general as intended beneficiaries), the sense 
that it brings to morality (self-givingness), and the fact that it has its origin in the moral 
being as such, has to be counted among the fundamental moral relations that should 
feature in the very structure of our ethical theory. I am even claiming that this particular 
relation is ‘universally pervasive of morality’ in the sense that it features as an essential 
aspect of every moral duty that we have.  
 A central reason why we have to reject the orthodox Kantian picture (which we 
have been talking about from the very start) is that it fails to recognise all animals as persons. 
In virtue of the ‘duty’ of practical love (which is actually more like an aspect of every moral 
duty that we have), morality has the sense of self-givingness, of doing things for the benefit of 
all sentient beings. But this self-givingness that morality involves only makes sense in relation 
to persons, therefore all animals are persons. All animals have a right to participate as citizens 
in the moral community with beneficiary status (i.e. only animals have duties directed to 
them as intended beneficiaries); but only persons have rights, therefore all animals are 
persons. All animals are to be recognition-respected in their beneficiary status in the moral 
community; but only persons can be recognition-respected, therefore all animals are 
persons.  
                                               
which I argue is true – in some sense – even in the Kantian picture properly understood (as enjoining self-
givingness in practical love). Thinking of happiness (everyone’s happiness) as that which ‘ultimately matters’ 
(which I argue is a thought difficult to spell out in its moral signification and which – given dominant moral 
doctrine – is often taken as an attack on morality), they think that they can build their moral theory with the 
felicific as their ‘moral starting point’, thus portraying it as ‘the first moral reality’ or ‘the basic moral fact’ or 
as containing ‘the most fundamental moral distinction’ (viz. the value distinction – which they assume is a 
‘moral distinction’ already – between pleasure and pain). This explains the error as a philosophically naïve 
mistake that doesn’t necessarily involve any kind of genuine attack on morality (although it can mislead 
people a great deal and doesn’t make the philosophical gods any proud; and it may on occasion be a genuine 
attack, I also have to admit). This is a nuance of diagnosis that advocates of the ‘indirect view’ are incapable 
of conveying, since they seem to be claiming not to see the most important truth behind the mistake in unduly 
reductionistic versions of the ‘direct duty view’.  
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 We have often been told that including in morality any reference to the happiness 
of subjects is a threat to the purity of morality. But this cannot be right. What is a threat to 
morality is to include the wrong reference to happiness (trying to base morality on the 
pursuit of one’s own happiness in self-love being the one that Kant combated the most). In 
fact, if you think about it, there are references to morality that constitute a serious threat to 
the purity of morality. It is real threat to morality, I submit, to give morality for answer to 
the question (the fundamental moral question) as to what capacity it is that fixes the 
domain of intended beneficiaries of morality. A massive rationalisation that ends up robing the 
majority of persons of their personhood and their dignity and their rights (their ‘beneficiary 
status’ in this case) and which at the same time, and by the same token, disenfranchises 
essential aspects of our humanity (e.g. our duties to non-human animals) is a real threat to 
morality. The only thing that guarantees the purity of morality is always giving the right 
answer to moral questions, whatever that may be.  
 
6. Animals, Babies, Persons, and Human Beings 
 
I am not here joining the debate surrounding the issue of ‘marginal cases’. Let me express 
myself better: I am addressing some of the issues that are normally talked about under the 
rubric just mentioned, but I am rejecting the terms of the debate as most philosophers have 
been having it. I have always felt there is something wrong going on, some unfairness from 
the start in the very way that concepts are employed, and it has been some time since I 
realised exactly what the problem is.  
 
6.1 Animals, Babies, and Persons 
 
Talking about the moral standing or the dignity of ‘animals’ vis-à-vis that of ‘persons’ is an 
unfair deal to begin with, for all animals (all sentient beings) are persons. A cow, for 
instance, is a ‘someone’, not a ‘mere something’: she is a ‘subject’ or a ‘person’, not a ‘thing’ 
or a ‘mere object’. People often compare animals to babies (i.e. human babies) to argue 
analogically for the moral standing of the former, but I think they should mean it literally. 
They point to the unfairness of excluding ‘animals’ from the domain of direct moral 
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considerability while at the same time including ‘babies’ and other human beings with 
similar mental capacities as those of the animals being excluded, which I completely 
understand. But there is no ‘comparing’ animals (i.e. non-human animals) with ‘babies’ 
because animals are babies. In interpreting the command (particular as it is, both in content 
and use of terms) ‘not to torture babies’, for instance, we are not allowed to assume that 
any young member of the human species (e.g. an unviable embryo) counts as a ‘baby’ in the 
relevant sense, nor are we allowed to assume that all members of other species fail to count 
as ‘babies’ in the relevant sense because they don’t belong in the ‘human species’, or even 
because they lack a capacity for morality, or even because they are not young member of 
the human or any other particular species.121 The truth (which everyone knows) is that we 
are called to relate to sentient non-human (non-morally rational) animals in general 
(however old they are and whatever biological species they may belong to) ‘as babies’, as 
beings with beneficiary status and no moral responsibility whatsoever, as intended 
beneficiaries of our own activity (‘darlings’ if you will, and certainly also ‘neighbours’ or 
‘co-beneficiaries’ in the moral community) and nothing more. The ‘nothing more’ doesn’t 
mean that they are less important as intended beneficiaries, but simply that such is the only 
distinctive role they play in our moral thinking. Now, we need to look for a term more 
technical than ‘baby’ to talk about these matters,122 but you can see what I am getting at by 
                                               
121 There are at least three possible notions of ‘baby’ that one might talk about: (i) a ‘very young’ individual 
(a very young member of a certain species), (ii) someone incapable of fending for herself in a minimal sense, 
and (iii) a ‘necessarily innocent individual’, a ‘person capable of happiness but completely oblivious to 
morality’. The first (age-related) sense of the term will hardly be of any moral significance, since there are 
‘baby orchids’, and ‘baby orchids’ don’t count as babies for the purposes of our common injunctions not to 
mistreat babies. The second sense will also hardly be of any great significance in moral theory: granted that 
an individual (i.e. a sentient individual) incapable of fending for herself in a minimal way needs more attention 
than an individual more capable, that fact doesn’t give her any greater moral status: it certainly doesn’t make 
her more of an intended beneficiary of practical love (again, except in the sense – which amounts to nothing 
fundamental – that more direct attention should be devoted to her). The third sense of ‘baby’, however, i.e. 
the sense that I am pointing to in my argument, is of immense significance in moral theory because – as I 
will explain – it is equivalent to the category of ‘passive citizen’ which is structural of the moral community.  
122 Which is not to suggest that the use of the word is somehow inappropriate for common use in relation to 
non-human animals. To the contrary! 
 136 
appealing to a ‘technical’ version of it that equals ‘non-human animal’: (i) if ‘non-human 
animals’ count as ‘babies’ in the relevant sense of the term (because in this context they 
correspond to one and the same technical category); and (ii) if all ‘babies’ are ‘persons’ (if 
only ‘non-moral persons’); then, assuming that killing ‘persons’ for fun (or in any case 
morally unlawfully) constitutes murder, (iii) therefore, killing non-human animals for fun 
(e.g. for the taste of their flesh) constitutes murder. 
 That there is in fact a technical sense of a term like ‘baby’ which is personhood-
entailing and is equivalent (not only in extension but also in intension) to the notions of 
‘mere animal’, ‘non-human animal’, ‘necessarily innocent person’, ‘being cable of 
happiness but incapable of morality’ is attested in our ordinary moral discourse. For 
instance, we speak of adoption in relation to both human babies (and children in general) 
and non-human animals, and we mean it in the same sense in both cases. This is not to say 
that a ‘human baby’ with prospects of breaking free into a moral condition is exactly the 
same kind of ‘project’ that a cat (whom one adopts) is; in many ways it’s just different, but 
in the relevant respect (i.e. when it comes to protecting the happiness of the person for her 
own sake) it very much is: killing one’s cat for convenience is just as murderous as killing 
‘one’s baby’ for convenience, for the cat is himself one’s baby (a necessarily morally 
innocent person under one’s protection). Now, the fact (which I cannot deny) that people 
often speak of buying animals while treating it as something morally innocent is not going 
to prove me wrong: if anything, it proves the that human beings are capable of messing up. 
The case is that human beings should be speaking about adopting animals, never about 
‘buying them’ because animals are not ‘things to buy’.  
 Take also for illustration (a second piece of philosophically suggestive evidence to 
the effect that animals – i.e. non-human animals who really count as such – are properly to 
be regarded as ‘babies’ in the relevant technical sense) the way human beings often react 
when they feel disrespected in their condition as morally rational beings, for instance when 
they say things like: I am not an (mere) animal, or in fact: I am not a baby! The context in 
which phrases of this kind are ‘typically’ uttered (and of course I’m idealising here for the 
sake of making my point) is one where the moral agent is affirming his ‘right’ to be 
recognised as a morally competent agent, someone that is more than a mere intended 
beneficiary of morality, more than an object of practical love, but instead someone who is 
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here to also (and in a practical sense – from her own perspective – most importantly) play 
a part in the moral government of the world. But when a human being is about to be 
tortured for fun, she doesn’t say: I am not an animal! I am not a baby!, since that would 
give to understand that it would be alright (or perhaps ‘less bad’) for her torturer to instead 
go after the latter, which of course is a plainly wicked suggestion to make. To be sure, people 
say things like that, they say them and appear very proud, thus also appearing very wicked. 
A good human being who is about to be slaughtered to have her flesh taken for someone’s 
pleasure doesn’t say: I am not an animal! I am not a baby! There she rightly says, I am not a 
carrot, since carrots are the kind of thing that exist to be eaten: ‘animals’ and ‘babies’ (i.e. 
all ‘babies’ in the technical sense of the term) are not. I mean, of course the person in the 
latter scenario would say some other thing, but I hope this manages to convey the point. 
What I hope you can see, of course, is how certain appeals to morality and our capacity for 
it are straightforwardly wicked, and also how there are references to the individuals in their 
capacity for happiness that are simply necessary to keep our philosophy in touch with moral 
reality and our principles in their correct scope of application.  
 I can prove that I am not engaging in mere wordplay here, if that is your concern. 
If it matters so much that we don’t use the word ‘baby’ in relation to, say, a sentient cat 
(unless it be a young cat, so that we could speak of a ‘baby cat’, which we would then have 
to distinguish from ‘babies in the relevant sense’, i.e. babies of the kind that could 
potentially be murdered and raped and in other ways wronged, who are said to be – for some 
strange reason – all and all members of the human species, a.k.a. ‘human babies’), then I 
can give you the very same point rephrased: animals (sentient non-human animals) are such 
that killing them for fun (or for some other less than morally justifying reason) is exactly as 
murderous as killing sentient human babies for fun. Well, actually this point about some 
acts of murder being no more murderous than other acts of murder actually transcends the 
issue of ‘babyhood’: being ‘more than a baby’ (in the sense of ‘babyhood’ that I am pointing 
to) doesn’t make someone more of an intended beneficiary of morality, and I take it to 
follow from this that it is exactly as murderous to unlawfully kill ‘babies’ as it is to unlawfully 
kill adult human beings (or just ‘human beings’, since it is enough that someone stop being 
a ‘baby’ – in the sense of having an original moral thought – to become a ‘human being’ in 
the technical-philosophical sense of the term).  
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 There are questions surrounding ‘abortion’ (and related issues involving the 
treatment of ‘human organisms’) that seem to be in the minds of many people. Let me just 
state some of the basic elements of my view dogmatically for the sake of formalising my 
claims about the nature of ‘persons’ situating them in some basic ontological and moral 
map. Killing cows for the taste of their flesh belongs in an entirely different category (as an 
act of murder, no less murderous than any other act of murder) from killing, say, an 
unviable human embryo for fun or for any kind of convenience, which could – given the 
details of the case, which is not to say that it is so in ‘normal cases’123 – be wrong and base 
but could never count as ‘murder’, since murder is always the murder of someone, i.e. of 
some subject or person, not a thing. By the way, adding that the ‘human embryo’ being ‘killed 
for convenience’ is a viable (instead of an unviable) one may potentially add some complexity 
to our thinking on the matter, but this consideration will by no means (and for the same 
reason) turn the act into an act of murder. A ‘potential person’ (even in relation to sentience 
as sufficient for personhood, as I mean it to be) is not a person, but always still a thing (in 
Kant’s general sense of a ‘mere something’ or an ‘entity lacking moral standing’) until it be 
born as a person in the original acquisition of personhood-constituting capacities. When a 
sentient subject first becomes present in the world is born the ‘person’, and in the 
acquisition – at some point – of moral freedom on the part of this same subject 
(responsiveness to moral considerations) is born the ‘moral person’ or the ‘moral agent’. I 
was as born as an animal or a sentient being, and so already as a person, the moment I first 
felt a thing, and I was born as a human being (in the technical sense of a ‘moral person’ or a 
‘moral subject’) the day I had my original moral thought.  
 
6.2 Passive Citizens 
 
I am claiming that animals (i.e. non-human animals) are – in terms of their moral status – 
something like ‘babies’, but I also have acknowledged that it would be useful to have a more 
                                               
123 People don’t normally ‘abort’ ‘for fun’ but because they haven’t decided to bring a person into the world. 
Sometimes they abort out of inconvenience, but surely they also detach themselves physically from other 
things (i.e. allowing that we are really dealing with a ‘thing’ in this case) out of inconvenience. None of that is 
murder.  
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technical term to employ in philosophical discourse. Fortunately, we have it. I can suggest 
the term ‘mere intended beneficiary’, which captures the thought of a being having 
‘beneficiary status’ and nothing more, i.e. no further status or role to play in the moral 
community beyond simply being someone with ‘beneficiary status’. But this is not a very 
well-sounding term, I admit, so let me instead suggest another one that is already at use in 
philosophy: passive citizens.  
 This term has acquired a bit of a bad reputation due to misuses of it: due to, for 
instance, people like Kant saying that “domestic servants” and “women in general” are – 
quoting Kant himself – “passive citizens” (MM 6:314). To put it simply and without going 
into the details of Kant’s views here, the point is that their interests are protected by law, 
but they don’t themselves have a right to rule, i.e. to vote and the like, because, says Kant, 
they are unfit (not ‘sufficiently independent’) for that – which of course doesn’t mean they 
have no moral duties whatsoever in Kant’s view since they are still rational beings.124 But 
let me ask: is Kant misapplying a category (or even a thousand philosophers misapplying it) 
reason to reject the category itself? Of course not! Or is it the case that the category is itself 
flawed and we shouldn’t be using it because of that reason? Well, that would be a very good 
reason,125 but what are we going to do with ‘babies’ and ‘animals’? Are we going to posit 
moral duties to them to be able to protect them as our kindred? Of course we have to 
welcome as ‘citizens’ or ‘members of the moral community’ subjects who don’t themselves 
have moral duties, and thus the need for the category that I am now introducing under the 
name passive citizens: beings who fall under the protection of moral laws (with beneficiary 
                                               
124 This is delicate territory, i.e. both the subject matter and our reading of Kant’s views on the particular are 
delicate business, and I will avoid further responsibility here because my argument is meant to convey a very 
basic point in relation to the protection of subjects who – I myself assume – are oblivious to moral 
considerations.  
125 Kant suggests that the concept of ‘passive citizen’ “seems to contradict the concept of a citizen as such” 
because what makes a citizen is exactly that she is “fit to vote” (MM 6:314). In saying this, Kant was (perhaps 
on purpose) setting the ground for the future to call into question his own categorisation on the basis of 
more egalitarian ideas. But surely we can agree that there is no human (morally rational) being that is ever to 
be treated as a ‘passive citizen’ (human moral egalitarianism) without rejecting the category of ‘passive 
citizens’, which we need at our disposal to be able to protect (as citizens with beneficiary status) all beings 
capable of happiness who are nevertheless oblivious to morality. 
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status) without themselves having any moral duties. There are citizens of this kind in the 
moral community: they are called non-human (non-moral) animals = non-human (non-
moral) persons = non-human (non-moral) subjects = non-human (non-moral) individuals, 
all of whom count as persons for moral purposes. All animals fall under the principle of 
respect for persons, since that is what they are: persons.  
 
6.3 Respect for Moral Personality  
 
You can always expect that arguments for the dignity (citizenship) of non-human animals 
– referencing human children for any kind of comparison – will be given the following 
reply: that we (‘advocates of animals’) underestimate how different human beings really are 
from other animals, how soon in a human being’s life a moral personality begins to express 
itself, thus raising the individual above the moral darkness of animality. But I don’t deny 
any of this. I think human beings break free into a moral condition very early in life. And 
if you ask me, all children (all persons who had an original moral thought) have a right to 
participate as equals in the moral government of the world: I summon all of them (so go 
ahead and tell them!) to start by giving us their original thoughts on the moral standing of 
animals. Let us bring ‘philosophers’ and ‘children’ of all ages and backgrounds in the room 
(who want to be there voluntarily, which I bet are many), to talk about the innocent subject 
of animals and morality. I mean, what could be more innocent than that? We always have 
a chance to prove just how seriously we take the moral personality of human beings, i.e. in 
our practical lives we always have this chance. In philosophy (which is what I am directly 
concerned with in this work), we do justice to it by saying: treat all human beings as co-
workers (co-legislators and co-guardians) in the moral community, never as ‘things’ (which 
are rightly to be treated as mere means) OR ‘passive citizens’ / ‘mere intended beneficiaries’ 
/ ‘babies’ / ‘non-human animals’ (who are owed unconditional practical love but nothing 
more, i.e. at least not in a relationally-specific way).126  
                                               
126 The notion of ‘relational-specificity’ is developed and employed (in the context of my technical formulation 
of Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics) in subsection 7.2 below.  
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 Now, since human (morally rational beings) do count as intended beneficiaries on 
account of their capacity for happiness, they are covered by what we might call ‘the formula 
of animality’: Respect the ‘beneficiary status’ of all animals! Act always with practical love for 
all animals!127 And since the two formulas should go together, because all of these things 
can only be realised together, we can just say: respect all persons in their dignity! Now, I 
could extend myself here trying to unpack ‘respect for human beings as such’ and 
describing the way it fits together with the other ‘formula’ that I just introduced, but I will 
only be able to say a few things and come back to this topic in the next section (where I do 
more of an effort to put all the pieces together).  
 The idea that we ought to treat all animals with practical love is a fairly basic idea 
that anyone can understand, and so is the idea that fellow humans should also (i.e. on top 
of that) be treated as moral co-legislators and co-workers in the moral community, as beings 
who are here to participate as equals in the moral government of the world (through the 
government of their own will in its full moral relationality, of course). I also take it that the 
thought of the two relations just mentioned being universally pervasive of morality (i.e. 
featuring as essential aspects of all our moral duties), and the related thought that for each 
of them to be realised both have to be realised together, are not all that difficult to grasp. My 
favourite example should suffice for now: treating human beings as babies doesn’t just 
violate their ‘distinctively human rights’ (if I may put it like this), but also always at the 
same time the ‘beneficiary rights’ of babies, and their own beneficiary rights too (as well as 
oneself as a moral being, etc.). To speak of non-human animals in particular, surely they 
deserve (they have a ‘right’ to) having their guardians never be treated as babies, but as their 
guardians! To speak of human beings in particular, surely they deserve (they have a ‘right’ 
to) never be treated as babies, but always as (among other things) the guardians of animals.  
 This is the end of the basic story that I needed to tell about persons and the respect 
owed them. I will now give you a final reflection on some the central concepts that this 
work as a whole has been trying to elucidate, both in their meaning and moral significance. 
                                               
127 I call it ‘formula of animality’ to indicate that it’s animals (i.e. sentient beings) who are the proper objects 
(direct objects) of the relationally-specific attitude being enjoined by this particular principle. But of course 
this is not to deny that this is a principle of humanity, a principle characterising an essential aspect of the 
human mission.  
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I will devote a separate section to this and then move to my central argument in ethical 
theory (formulating Utilitarianism and clarifying its connection with Kantian ethics, where 
I return to discussing fundamental moral principles).  
 
6.4 Animals equals Persons 
 
If my arguments are correct or at least in the right direction, it follows that there must be a 
very fundamental way in which ‘animality’ is (as a category) much closer to ‘personhood’ 
than ‘humanity’ is. After all, it follows from everything I have said that (i) all and only 
animals count as ‘persons’, and (ii) humanity – as the capacity for morality – is not necessary 
for individuals to count as ‘persons’, even for moral purposes. But how exactly is ‘animality’ 
closer to ‘personhood’ than ‘humanity’ is? I think I am prepared to say that ‘animal’ and 
‘person’ are one and the same philosophical category, and I think this is borne out in 
reflection about our ordinary use of concepts. When we qualify a person as a ‘moral person’ 
(which even ‘orthodox Kantians’ and people traditionally arguing on ‘similar lines’ do, 
seemingly without realising the door they are thereby opening), what we are doing is 
qualifying an animal as a ‘moral animal’, which is of course what we are. Or what is again 
the same thing: we are qualifying a subject as a ‘moral subject’. The categories of ‘person’, 
‘animal’ and ‘subject’ are one and the same category, just different ways of naming the same 
reality. There is no denying that humans beings are in a class of their own in virtue of the 
specific kind of life they are called to lead, the moral life, which raises them above the rest 
of the world as the moral governors of the world, but by no means do they exhaust the 
domain of ‘persons’ because persons equals animals.  
 If someone – pretending to be raising a serious objection – says that ‘animal’ is a 
biological as opposed to a philosophical category, I cannot but remind him of the etymology 
of the sacred word he is employing: is ‘animal’, whose etymology (from the Latin anima 
meaning ‘soul’) gives us ‘animated being’ or ‘being with a soul’, a biological as opposed to 
a philosophical category? If – perhaps more plausibly – he questions my proposal here by 
suggesting that if non-human animals are ‘persons’ or ‘subjects’ it is only in a ‘psychological’ 
sense that has no bearing on morality because they are not (even by my own admission) 
‘moral persons’ and therefore not ‘persons’ or ‘subjects’ of the relevant kind, and that 
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therefore I shouldn’t be concluding that ‘animal’ and ‘person’ are the same category (let 
alone the same moral category) because the fact is that there are animals (subjects) that 
don’t count as ‘persons’ for moral purposes, I can only note that this completely begs the 
invalidity of everything I have said in this work. We know the stories that are meant to give 
support to that kind of position, and I have done my best to undermine those stories.  
 There are two concepts here that cannot be conflated: ‘moral persons’, or ‘moral 
subjects’, on the one hand, and ‘those who count as persons for moral purposes’ on the 
other, those who fall (as proper objects) under the principle of ‘respect for persons’ in 
particular, who I have argued need not be ‘moral persons’ themselves.128 Moral persons 
(human persons) are still special in that it is they who alone are called to act with respect, 
and also because they are themselves to be respected in a special kind of way, but by no 
means do they exhaust the domain of moral respectability; human beings are not 
beneficiaries of the duty that we have not to be cruel to them (and even, I would argue, the 
duties that we have not to murder them and not to steal their property, which in truth are 
grounded in practical love and so contain a special reference to persons as intended 
beneficiaries) because they are capable of morality, for instance.  
 Now, what I have been doing all along is arguing that non-human animals have a 
specific kind of moral standing (grounded in our duties to them) which entails their 
personhood for moral purposes. However, I have never argued that animals are ‘persons’ 
to begin with because they have this moral standing which is grounded in our duties. Again, 
my claim is that there is a certain moral status X that entails personhood S, but all I mean 
by this is that X presupposes S, not that it constitutes it or grounds it. Animals (i.e. non-
human animals) are persons because they are persons. Non-human animals are persons 
because they are subjects, because they have souls or minds, because they are alive in the 
most basic way in which people (regarded as people instead of as biological organisms) can 
be alive, because they are personal presences in the world, each a ‘world’ in their own right. 
These persons have a special kind of moral significance in our eyes, there is an irreducible 
                                               
128 What I am saying is of course very similar in structure to what my ‘adversaries’ may be saying at this point, 
namely: don’t conflate ‘persons’ (in the sense of psychological subjects) with those who count as ‘persons for 
moral purposes’, which of course have to be ‘moral persons’ themselves. 
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moral bond uniting us (moral beings) with them, and so we count them as persons for moral 
purposes. But of course they were persons already, before even being considered in this light: 
in the world as we know it, the presence of persons precedes the presence of morality and 
moral relations in general.129  
 You can – looking at my argument as a whole – see how I decided to first build up 
to the notions of ‘practical love’ and ‘recognition respect’ before emphasising the personhood 
of all animals. I took this to be the correct rout to take insofar as the purpose of moral 
philosophy is to explain the moral relations that obtain between persons as such, i.e. it was my 
main job to explain why sentient beings as such can – and in fact do – participate as objects 
or recipients in irreducible and universally pervasive (and in these ways fundamental) moral 
relations, which takes substantive moral theorising and cannot be solved by, say, pointing 
to the etymology of the word ‘animal’, or to sentience as already making a subject or a 
person (i.e. a ‘someone’ as opposed to a mere ‘something’). But one doesn’t really need to 
build up in that way in order to arrive at the basic conclusion that all animals are persons, 
and that therefore non-human animals are persons in their own right. Thus, if you think 
about it, pathological love (in the sense of kindness or benevolence from sympathy), which 
is not of itself a moral relation, is nevertheless always and by necessity directed at persons. 
One cannot be kind (whatever the grounds) to a ‘thing’. It is always ‘someone’ that is the 
object of kindness, whatever the provenance of the kindness. In fact, we can dissociate 
ascriptions of personhood even more by talking about things like fortune and misfortune 
without connecting them with morality and immorality. A misfortune (calamity, tragedy, 
etc.) is always someone’s misfortune, and the same goes for fortune! And of course: Pleasure 
is always someone’s pleasure! Pain is always someone’s pain! ‘Things’ have no knowledge of 
heaven and hell, only persons do. 
 We have basic and powerful evidence (philosophical evidence) for all animals 
deserving to be called persons. We have arguments that appear incontestable from the 
perspective of our reflective common-sense and our everyday parlance (which of course has 
                                               
129 Similarly in the life of a single individual. An individual’s growing from state of ‘bare animality’ into the 
moral condition of ‘humanity’ is not the same as her growing from a non-person to a person, but from a non-
moral person to a moral person.  
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sometimes been adulterated, although in ways that can easily be spotted and amended). I 
have given some of those arguments already (e.g. those in the preceding paragraph), and I 
won’t miss the opportunity here to say more: (1) We can only be kind to someone, never to 
a mere ‘something’; but it turns out we can be kind to animals (i.e. to non-human animals), 
therefore animals are persons. (2) Happiness is always someone’s happiness; but it turns 
out that animals can be happy, therefore animals are persons. (3) A person is the kind of 
entity that can participate in moral relations; but it turns out that animals (i.e. non-human 
animals), very much like human beings, participate as direct recipients in practical love (a 
fundamental moral relation), therefore animals are persons. (4) And perhaps the most basic 
one from the perspective of our common use of language (English being a somewhat 
complicated case given the frequent – officially enjoined, but in truth completely 
inadequate as demonstrated in common parlance itself – use of the impersonal pronoun it 
in reference to non-human animals, which in reality is only in reference to ‘non-pets’ 
because it is idiomatic to call ‘pets’ by personal pronouns, and hence the problem that we 
face: language being commonly used to de-personify those towards whom human beings 
don’t have a personal, pathological, attachment): persons are the kind of entity that are 
rightly called by personal pronouns, but it turns out that I rightly call my cat (my daughter, 
that is) she, and the chickens and cows and pigs and ducks that human beings have killed 
by the billions they (which I do without ever having met them in person), therefore animals 
are persons. These basic arguments I lay down for the consideration of the reader, and now 
it is time for a separate (though closely related) point.  
 All well and good so far. But surely there is a clear inconsistency or irregularity that 
has arisen in my story. I began equating ‘animality’ with the ‘capacity for happiness’ or 
‘sensibility’ more generally (i.e. the capacity for happiness + self-love as concomitant 
agency); but now, and all of a sudden, I have moved in this section to saying that ‘animality’ 
is to be equated with ‘personhood’ as the very same philosophical category, which seems 
clearly to be changing the rules of the game. If you recall, all my arguments up until the last 
section (and even the ones in this section) have relied on the thought that there is more to 
human beings as persons than just ‘animality’ or (what I have taken so far to be the same 
thing) ‘sensibility’, and this alone entails that ‘animality’ (i.e. if equated with ‘sensibility’) 
cannot equal ‘personhood’. Moral personality is an irreducible aspect of persons as persons, 
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and this alone is enough to show that the two proposed uses of the word ‘animal’ are 
mutually inconsistent. What is it, then? Let me explore the two options that we have. 
Ultimately, there is a third which I will try to motivate.  
 The first option is to undo the association between ‘animality’ and ‘sensibility’ 
(happiness + self-love) and insist on ‘animality’ and ‘personhood’ being one and the same 
philosophical category. This seems right, insofar as the basic etymological meaning of 
‘animality’ is ‘having a soul’ or ‘having a mind’ (i.e. souledness or mindedness), and it is 
eminently plausible to equate ‘persons’ with ‘those who have a soul’ or ‘those whose have 
a mind’. In fact, this might well be the most basic meaning of person as a concept. Then we 
could of course think of ‘persons’ or (what is the same) ‘animals’ as having one or more 
types of souls (one or more types of mindedness if you will): persons / animals may be both 
‘sentient’ and ‘rational’ OR they may be only one of those two things, thinking of those 
who only instantiate ‘sentience’ (who we have encountered) and not so much of those who 
allegedly instantiate ‘reason alone’ (whom we have not). If the latter existed (i.e. assuming 
that they can even exist metaphysically speaking, which is a separate question entirely), we 
could rightly call them ‘purely rational persons’ or ‘purely rational animals’ or ‘purely 
rational subjects’ or ‘carriers of a purely rational soul’. Again, there are those who only have 
sensitive souls and concomitant agency (non-human animals) and those who have both 
rational and sensitive souls (human animals), where both are assumed to be sentient and 
to count as ‘animals’ and therefore also as ‘persons’ merely on that account already: any of 
the two types of ‘souls’ – and of course also the two together – is enough to make an ‘animal’ 
or a ‘person’.  
 The other option starts by insisting on ‘animality’ standing for ‘sensibility’ in 
particular (happiness + self-love as concomitant agency), which initially presents itself as 
problematic from the perspective of equating ‘animality’ and ‘personhood’ (as I came to do 
only very late in the argument) because there seems to be more to ‘personhood as such’ 
than just sensibility plus concomitant agency. Again: surely there are persons with more to 
them as persons than just ‘sensibility’ (capacity for happiness + self-love) and potential 
modifications of it; but since I am now committing myself to ‘animality’ equating 
‘personhood’, then I seem to be suggesting that the addition of a ‘rational soul’ would of 
itself contribute nothing to the ‘personhood’ of those particular persons, which just seems 
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wrong. We do talk about ‘moral personality’ and take it to be an irreducible aspect of the 
person (the human person) as such, certainly irreducible to what I have so far deemed ‘the 
animal condition’ (the capacity for happiness + self-love). Hence, if one wants to insists on 
preserving the identity between ‘animality’ and ‘sensibility’, one seems obliged to undo the 
claim (my late claim) equating ‘animality’ with ‘personhood’ to avoid unduly reducing 
‘personhood’ to ‘sensibility’. Or perhaps it is possible to find a third way. 
 I have to be honest and admit that this analysis is not meant to be final, as I am still 
undecided about whether to undo the claim that ‘animality’ equals ‘sensibility’ (the capacity 
for happiness + concomitant agency), which of course would have to be done elsewhere. 
What I am certainly not undoing is the claim (which I came to make late in the argument) 
that ‘animal’ equals ‘person’ equals ‘subject’ as the same philosophical category. It is one 
of the scandals of the history of philosophy, I think, that it brought us to a place where 
‘animality’ (the original meaning of which is ‘having a soul’) is commonly associated with 
‘corporality’ or ‘belonging in the domain of nature’ and so by implication not in the that 
of ‘Freedom’ or ‘Reason’ as the only one that is inhabited by ‘persons’.130 Freedom and Reason, 
                                               
130 I would like to quote Kant in relation to this point (MM 6:223): “A thing is that to which nothing can be 
imputed. Any object of free choice which itself lacks freedom is therefore called a thing (res corporalis)”. Kant 
is here quite explicitly placing non-human animals (who lack freedom just as much as inanimate entities lack 
freedom, and to whom nothing can therefore be imputed) in the domain of ‘things’ (res corporalis), which 
contrasts with the domain freedom as the only one inhabited by persons (MM 6:223): “A person is a subject 
whose actions can be imputed to him. [...] From this it follows that a person is subject to no other laws than 
those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others).” To be clear, Kant doesn’t think that 
non-human animals are devoid of sensation, experiential subjectivity or even (non-moral) volition, being quite 
emphatic in ascribing them all of those things. He doesn’t equate ‘animal’ with ‘corporeal’ either. But as we 
can see clearly in the lines just quoted (as well as in many other than have been quoted), he does speak in 
ways that entail the lack of personhood (and membership in the merely corporeal world: res corporalis) of non-
human animals in virtue of their lack of freedom, which is problematic in light of the very etymology of the 
word animal (which designates the concept of souledness or mindedness and therefore contrasts with the concept 
of the merely corporeal if anything does). For Kant, then, there is more to the ontological map than just 
freedom and non-freedom, reason and non-reason: there is also sentience (which for him is very close to 
animality, as it has been for me up to this point) and everything that comes with it; however, if we are drawing 
an ontological map for the sake of situating persons, we need only draw the limits between freedom and non-
freedom, between reason and non-reason, and have no need whatsoever to talk about anything else. Now, it 
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I agree, we can reserve for human beings, but personhood (an entity’s being a person, i.e. an 
entity’s being someone as opposed to a mere something) belongs to animals in general, and 
this by definition and therefore obviously and indubitably. The task is in our hands, 
therefore, to rehabilitate ‘animality’ and ‘animal’ as the central philosophical categories 
that they are.  
 
7. Utilitarianism & the Vindication of Kantian Ethics 
 
Even though I have been defending the dignity of all animals / sentient beings (as a good 
Utilitarian would), I have been doing so without ever positing happiness and its bearers so 
regarded as the ground or locus of moral realities (as a good Kantian would). The thought 
has remained intact that the concepts of moral duty and moral goodness are answered only 
by intrinsic features and modes of our own humanity, of our own moral agency, without any 
reference to the felicific properties of our conduct. This is not bad news for animals, of 
course. The existence of humanity itself is meant to be good news for animals in general, 
since it is intrinsic to the task of humanity to exercise practical love for all animals: it is 
beyond us (i.e. beyond our morality) that they actually be happy, but still we are here to 
protect them as our kindred and do our best effort for their happiness. That is of course as 
much as we can promise them. But I have said enough about the moral standing of animals 
already, and need to shift focus towards humanity as such, which is what Utilitarianism (as 
the regular ethical theory that I take it to be) is primarily all about. 
 
7.1 Gathering Historical Pieces 
 
I don’t think I need to repeat the slogans with which the theory known as ‘Utilitarianism’ 
has often been associated. I already talked about them in Part I, where I showed that the 
                                               
is not only Kant who is responsible for this scandal, as many other people (many other classics, e.g. Descartes 
and Locke, and many non-Kantians, e.g. most Christians, including virtually all ‘conservative Christians’) 
have painted the exact same picture.  
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basic formulations of the view following those slogans are fundamentally flawed, in 
particular the ‘Consequentialism’ + ‘Welfarism’ formula that has become dominant in 
philosophy. My purpose here is to restate Utilitarianism.  
 To kick things off, let consider the following line by John Stuart Mill, extracted 
from his Utilitarianism: “the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention – 
that is, upon what the agent wills to do” (Mill 1861/2003, p.196).131 Read it again if you 
need to. Is it so patently clear – I ask – that Utilitarianism is intended as a form of 
‘Consequentialism’ that as such stands in opposition to theories making the morality of 
actions depend on properties of the intentions or volitions of human beings? If so, Mill 
apparently didn’t know about it. And if you think – because that is the rumour – that Mill 
was not in fact a ‘Utilitarian’ but instead Judas among Utilitarians precisely because he says 
things like that, now read the entire line (Mill 1861/2003, p.196):  
 
There is no point which utilitarian thinkers (and Bentham pre-eminently) have taken more 
pains to illustrate than this. The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention 
– that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes 
him will so to do, when it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality: though 
it makes a great difference in our moral estimation of the agent.  
 
Utilitarianism, Mill tells us, makes the ‘morality of actions’ depend on properties of human 
intentions, and therefore not on their felicific consequences. This is supposed to be true for 
both Bentham and Mill, taking it on Mill’s word not to make things unnecessarily 
complicated. Now, we are yet to see what this claim by Mill (to keep focusing on him) really 
amounts to, but there is another element in the picture already: the distinction – which 
Mill is positing in the line just quoted – between the ‘morality of the act’ and the ‘morality 
of the agent’, which is what I am naming the object of “our moral estimation of the agent” 
(Mill 1861/2003, p.196). Now, the reason Mill is positing this distinction is because he is 
trying to convey the point that there are two ‘moral judgements’ that come (or may come) 
apart depending on the features of the situation that we focus on: when we are ‘judging 
actions’, he says, we focus on intentions, but when we judge persons (a.k.a. human beings) 
                                               
131 This is Mill’s own emphasis.  
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we instead focus on their motives. Now, here I don’t care about possible ramifications Mill’s 
distinction or even about its merits, as the point is simply to note that both of the moral 
qualities (both of the ‘moralities’) that Mill thinks we assess in human activity – both of 
them, I repeat – are said to be entirely fixed by properties of human agents, namely their 
intentions and their motives respectively.  
 Now, even though I celebrate that Mill (to keep speaking of him) is making the ‘the 
morality of actions’ depend entirely the intentions of human beings (to start with this 
particular point), one is initially disappointed at realising how thin a conception of human 
intention Mill seems to be working with. In his writing on Bentham he tells us that the 
“morality of an action depends on its foreseeable consequences; its beauty, and its loveableness, 
or the reverse, depend on the qualities which it is evidence of” (Mill 1861/2003, p.84).132 
What Mill is saying here seems again to correspond to the distinction between the ‘morality 
of the act’ (which depends on ‘intentions’) and the ‘morality of the agent’ (which depends 
on ‘motives’), only that now he is telling us what he really takes ‘intentions’ to be: 
foreseeable consequences? So, is Mill now conceding that it’s all about consequences, only 
not in actuality but in some other form? I would say that he is, but he is not thereby 
retracting the basic point about human intention. After all, talk of ‘foreseeable 
consequences’ or ‘expected consequences’ or ‘intended consequences’ is always to be 
construed as talk of human intentions: very thin intensions to be sure, intentions that so far 
seem to be grounded in the air, mere pursuits of outward outcomes if you will, but intentions 
nonetheless. But then of course there are also motives in the picture, as Mill says, and these 
could well ground the initially very thin intentions he was talking about.  
 Now, I would have been neat if at this point Mill had said: from duty, for everyone’s 
happiness, or just from duty in case he wanted to simplify (or just for everyone’s happiness, as 
one could also rightly simplify). It would have been neat of him to point to some 
determinate principle or maxim or motive the influence of which, in human action, would 
entirely fix the morality (positive moral worth) of that action. But no! Instead, he tells us 
that ‘motives’ are immaterial to the ‘morality of actions’, and that it’s only intentions (i.e. 
‘bare intentions’, intentions thought of in isolation from their grounds and even from their 
                                               
132 My emphasis.  
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actual consequences, although still in direct relation to their ‘intended consequences’, 
which of course doesn’t detract from their status as intentions) that count. Again, it is the 
initially very thin intentions that ‘count morally’ in Mill’s view: they are grounded in 
motives, to be sure, but it’s not this connection that makes them ‘moral’. Or wait a second: 
is Mill really talking about morality in the strict sense of the term when he makes these 
claims? Or is he perhaps talking about something else? Let me quote another line that I 
find instructive (Mill 1861/2003, p.195): 
 
He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive 
be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble.133 
 
Mill calls it the ‘morality of actions’, but of course it is ‘moral rightness’ that he is talking 
about, which he distinguishes from ‘the morality of the agent’. Is Mill just giving us Kant’s 
‘legality vs morality’ distinction, only in other words? If he isn’t, or (in any case) if it is really 
his view that helping a fellow ‘for the sake of getting a reward’ counts as a genuinely moral 
action, then of course he is in big trouble. It would be a very silly, almost unbelievable, 
mistake to give us a moral theory calling actions ‘moral’ (genuinely moral) that are not 
motivated or driven by any kind of moral consideration. More than a silly mistake, it would 
look very much like a cheap attempt at denying the concept of morality. If, however, we 
decide to map Mill’s ‘moral rightness’ onto Kant’s ‘legality’ or ‘rightness’, we get a 
completely different story: both philosophers can agree in saying that a human being 
helping a fellow from ‘purely self-interested motives’ can in principle be called ‘right’. If 
you look at the person acting and all looks well from the outside (at least as pertaining to her 
apparent intentions, for ‘actual consequences’ are completely immaterial at this level, and 
this even for Bentham and Mill), i.e. if we look at the situation and the person whose 
conduct we are assessing seems to be ‘doing the right thing’, then we can all agree to call it 
‘morally right’ or ‘legal’ or ‘in external conformity with moral commands’. Certainly we 
have no grounds for calling it ‘wrong’. And this is just the first potential point of agreement, 
of course, since we are yet to say something about what Mill calls the ‘morality of agents’, 
                                               
133 Both emphases are mine. 
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which he tells us depends entirely on motives (‘duty’ being the one that he mentions in the 
context of the example we are discussing) and which we could well be mapped onto Kant’s 
concept of morality. Accordingly, we can read Mill as saying that the action of saving a fellow 
is morally good (genuinely moral) only in case it is committed ‘from duty’ (or in any case 
from a distinctively moral motive or principle or maxim). And voila! Have we put an end 
to the biggest battle in moral philosophy?134  
 As far I am concerned, Utilitarians are perfectly free (i.e. we don’t have to abandon 
our view) to depict morality as irreducibly a matter of attitude on the part of the moral 
agent herself, of this agent voluntarily aligning her conduct with the internal standards 
(commands) of her own humanity (autonomy – human dignity – Kantian ethics). And the 
same with Kantians, who we are perfectly free (i.e. we don’t have to give up our Kantian 
label) to state the above and then add that morality is also at the same time (both essentially 
and irreducibly) a matter of self-givingness, i.e. of the agent voluntarily turning herself into a 
means for the happiness of subjects (Utilitarianism). If obeying reason within can be shown 
to involve reaching out to sentient beings (acting for their happiness) as a fundamental 
moral act of the human being, then the conclusion just follows that there is no real 
fundamental conflict between Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism.  
 To be clear, practical love and the self-givingness (the ‘acting for the happiness of 
subjects’) that it essentially involves are already in place, and I don’t need to be adding any 
arguments to that effect. What I am setting myself to do at this point is elucidate the nature 
of what I take to be the distinctively moral attitude (the attitude whose instantiation alone 
constitutes moral goodness) in its full moral relationality. So far we have the slogan: from duty, 
for everyone’s happiness, but a more elaborate argument can be made putting various ideas 
together in something like a marriage between the following three views (taken as 
theoretical idealisations or specific philosophical theses, not necessarily as ‘traditions in 
philosophy’): First-Personal Kantianism (Kantianism emphasising self-legislation), 
                                               
134 At this point it is being assumed that Utilitarians need not (and in fact should not) be committed to 
‘Welfarism’ as their moral axiology. The story that I have been telling in this Part II (and that I will continue 
to tell in the next subsection, now in more technical fashion) is a story about how to understand 
Utilitarianism as a theory about the nature of moral goodness in the strict Kantian (realisation of the human 
being as a moral being) sense of the term.  
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Contractualism (Kantianism emphasising co-legislation and related human-to-human moral 
relations, the most general one in my view being that of co-guardianship in the moral 
community), and Utilitarianism (practical love for all sentient beings). This corresponds to 
my technical formulation of Utilitarianism, a label that I am claiming for my moral 
philosophy as a whole.  
 
7.2 On Utilitarianism (and Kantian Ethics): The Technical Formulation 
 
In virtue of the relationally-specific duty of practical love which permeates the entirety of 
morality, the motive of duty acquires the sense of self-givingness, of doing things for the benefit 
of subjects. ‘Practical love’ is love (benevolence, kindness) from duty, but it is also always at 
the same time ‘self-giving love’, and thus the possibility to define Utilitarianism (the theory 
making morality a matter of practical love) as the view according to which everything that is 
done truthfully in the name of ‘morality’ or ‘from duty’ is done always at the same time for 
everyone’s happiness. If an action doesn’t come from the exercise of a maxim that is adopted 
for everyone’s happiness (i.e. from practical love), the action consequently lacks moral worth. 
Now, I have made it very clear that none of this is to deny the ‘more basic’ Kantian slogan 
for the morality of actions: only actions that are done from duty – and only because they 
have that feature – can rightly be said to be morally good. Here what we are doing is simply 
further describing what acting from duty amounts to.  
 I take all the work that has been done to speak for the recognition of the double 
relationality expressed in the slogan: from duty, for everyone’s happiness, but there is still more 
to be said to that effect (i.e. to justify the second part of the slogan in particular as the one 
that is telling us something ‘new’ about the nature of the motive of duty). Let me then try 
to give you something closer to a proper argument for morality as a whole (and therefore the 
motive of duty as the distinctively moral motive) essentially involving an element of self-
givingness that justifies our basic slogan and the use of label ‘Utilitarianism’.    
 If Utilitarianism presents itself as the philosophy of ‘practical love’, a philosophy 
devised to emphasise the fact that the whole of morality is done ‘for the happiness of 
subjects’, does that mean that such a philosophy is bound to undo or reduce all the other 
moral relations we have been talking about? Didn’t I affirm the notion of ‘respect for 
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human beings as such’? And is there not an intra-personal dimension of morality (self-
legislation) that has a good claim to being counted as the most fundamental one? And if I 
don’t mean to undo what I have said, and if I am not here saying that we should reduce 
everything to ‘practical love’, and if I am myself portraying practical love as only a part or 
an aspect of morality alongside other fundamental parts or aspects, wouldn’t it be more 
plausible to say that only this one part of morality, and not so the whole, is done for the 
happiness of subjects? And wouldn’t it be more plausible – for the very same reason – to say 
that ‘Utilitarianism’ is trying to account for a particular aspect (as opposed to the whole) of 
morality?  
 Let me introduce more nuance into my argument. Initially, ‘practical love’ is meant 
to be understood as a fundamental, if only relationally-specific, moral relation. By calling this 
moral relation ‘relationally-specific’ what I mean to indicate is that it has a specific direct 
object, which in this case is sentient beings in general as intended beneficiaries. But this is not 
all that there is to say about the nature of this moral relation, of course: ‘practical love’ is 
also to be understood as a moral relation that is universally pervasive of morality, a relation 
that features as an essential aspect of every moral duty that we have. This universal pervasiveness, 
I argue, is enough to ground the claim that the whole of morality (in the sense of every single 
moral duty that we have) essentially involves an act of self-givingness on the part of the human 
being: in virtue of ‘practical love’ as ground, every moral duty that we have is a call to act 
for the happiness of subjects. And this in turn is enough – or so I argue – for me to claim the 
Utilitarian label for my proposed moral philosophy as a whole: morality is, taken in one 
piece and therefore every bit of it, a matter of practical love for all sentient beings.  
 Think about it. A similar story has be told for other essential aspects of morality that 
people also like to emphasise. Why is the whole morality (i.e. every single moral duty that 
we have) a matter of obedience to reason within (Kantian autonomy – self-legislation)? Is it 
because obedience to reason within is the only fundamental moral relation, or is it because 
this relation is universally pervasive of morality? I think it has to be the latter: it has to be 
because every moral duty that we have is self-imposed (and not because the self-imposition of 
moral duties is the only fundamental moral relation) that the whole of morality (the whole 
set of our moral duties and so every step that we take in the name of morality) is a matter 
of obedience to reason within. The universal pervasiveness of obedience to reason within 
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(the fact that every duty is self-imposed) makes it the case that morality is, taken in one piece, 
a matter of obedience to reason within, of voluntarily aligning one’s conduct with the 
internal standards of one’s own reason as the only moral standards one is ethically obliged 
to live up to. And making the picture complete, the same goes for the ‘Contractualist’ 
aspect of morality: the idea of morality being a matter of ‘human collaboration’ (moral co-
operation involving co-legislation and co-guardianship of the moral community of which 
all sentient beings are intended beneficiaries). The universal pervasiveness of this ‘third’ 
aspect of morality, it’s being essential (if merely as an aspect) to every moral duty that we 
have, makes it the case that morality is – taken in one piece – a matter of human 
collaboration: there is not a single duty that we have that is not always at the same time a 
matter of human collaboration, of ‘doing one’s bit’ in the moral community vis-à-vis other 
human beings.135  
 This analysis is meant to speak in favour of claiming the label ‘Utilitarian’ for my 
moral philosophy as a whole, and I really think that is what it gives me. But then again this 
point also speaks for other labels as well, thus bringing me back to the very place I was 
trying to escape. The fact that Utilitarianism has to stand alongside other labels sort of 
speaks against Utilitarianism as ‘the correct moral theory’, doesn’t it? Well, it doesn’t. It 
speaks in favour of our not having to choose one label above another, which in a way is the 
entire point of this philosophical work. Let me however try to elaborate more around the 
same ideas to see if further philosophical progress can be made allowing us to put all the 
pieces of this ‘puzzle’ together. 
                                               
135 This is not the idea that one is to divide the pie of responsibilities (as it were) fairly into slices among all 
human beings and only do ‘only one’s bit’: that if – for instance – there were two children drowning and 
another capable human being around who could help out but (for no apparent good reason) decides not to, 
I would need only save one child and let the other drown. In a case like this, saving both children (and perhaps 
– depending on details of the case – doing something on top of that to address the human being who didn’t 
help out) constitutes ‘doing one’s bit’ (i.e. one’s job) vis-à-vis human beings in general. Is there unfairness in 
the situation in which one acts this way in part because one acts this way? Yes, but in saving the two children 
one is not oneself being unfair, one is in no way putting benevolence above fairness. It’s the other human 
being who (presumably) is being malevolent (to put it like this) and unfair. It is him who is responsible for the 
unfairness (the strictly moral unfairness) of the situation.  
 156 
 I won’t deny that there is a sense (a crucially important sense) in which the whole 
of morality is owed only to reason (the moral law) within: the obedience that morality 
essentially involves is as such owed (ethically speaking) to reason within and to reason within 
alone – we don’t owe obedience (at least not directly) to our fellow humans as such or to 
sentient beings in general. Likewise, it has to be admitted that there is a sense in which the 
whole of morality is owed to sentient beings so regarded and to sentient beings alone: the 
self-givingness that morality essentially involves is as such owed (ethically speaking) to sentient 
beings in general as the intended beneficiaries of the moral enterprise – we don’t owe self-
givingness (at least not directly) to reason within or to human beings so regarded in general. 
And again likewise, and to bring completeness to the picture, human collaboration is as such 
owed (ethically speaking) to other human beings as moral co-workers in the moral 
community, and to them alone – we don’t owe this collaboration (at least not directly) to 
reason within or to sentient beings in general.  
 Now, the key to getting the point that I am trying to make lies in understanding 
what I mean in every case by the ‘at least not directly’ clause. More precisely, it lies in 
understanding why the point should not be made using that clause, but in a slightly 
different way. A lot of theorising in this area makes use of the expression ‘owing things 
directly’ and ‘indirectly’, but I argue that we should avoid it on the grounds that it is not 
very illuminating and even potentially misleading, i.e. supposing that it even makes sense 
to say things like: we owe obedience to our fellow humans and sentient beings in general, but only 
‘indirectly’. It is statements of this kind, statements using the expressions ‘owing things 
directly’ and ‘indirectly’, that tend to reinforce the reductionist thoughts of philosophers 
who are in the business of defending certain labels as against other labels. The ‘reductive 
first-personal Kantian’, for instance, will probably take the chance to once again portray 
people like me (who argue for duties to animals) as confused because clearly morality is 
‘most essentially’ a matter of obedience, and obedience can be ‘owed outwardly’ (e.g. it can 
be directed to human beings or sentient beings) only ‘indirectly’ and therefore not really 
(which would be odd for a ‘Kantian simpliciter’ to say anyway given that it would make 
duties to other human beings ‘indirect duties’, which most likely he doesn’t really want to 
say; although he will probably find a way to include human beings in general that doesn’t 
apply to other animals, who, for instance, are not bound by obedience themselves). You 
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can also imagine the ‘Reductive Contractualist’ taking advantage in a similar way, and the 
very same for the reductive Utilitarian (Agapist) out there: no matter how adequately 
nuanced one’s claims are otherwise, if one makes them in terms of owing things ‘directly’ 
or ‘indirectly’ one immediately gives way for philosophers to bring their own idiosyncrasies 
to the fore in a contest (a very dangerous contest) for who is the one ‘with the right answer’. 
Let me then avoid using the terms ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ and rephrase my argument in 
more adequate terms. Let me use the language of ‘owing duties to X’ (X being the relevant 
party at the ‘receiving end’ of whatever fundamental moral relation we are talking about) 
in a relationally-specific way. If we use this terminology instead (which I have already been 
employing in reference to ‘relationally-specific attitudes’: fundamental moral attitudes with 
their own specific direct object), all confusion begins to disappear and ideas begin to really 
come together.  
 Relationally-specifically, the kind of obedience that morality essentially involves is 
owed only to the Moral Law (reason) within, meaning that it is obedience to reason within 
and to nothing else (no ‘indirectlys’ here). In the relationally-specific sense that is implicated 
here, we don’t live for anyone other than ourselves: we are not here to ‘please’ anyone, only 
to do as our own reason says. Relationally-specifically, the self-givingness that morality 
essentially involves is owed only to sentient beings as such and in general, meaning that it 
is self-givingness directed towards sentient beings. In the relationally-specific sense that is 
implicated here, we very much live for everyone, which is not to deny the above because 
giving oneself to sentient beings in practical love is part and parcel of doing as reason says. 
Again: from duty, for everyone’s happiness. And something similar goes for moral collaboration, 
of course, which (speaking in a relationally-specific way) we owe to our fellow human beings 
as co-workers in the moral community and to them alone under that condition, not to 
reason within or to sentient beings in general (again, no ‘indirectlys’ here, as the point here 
is simply to note that moral collaboration is collaboration with other human beings).  
 Now, this all seems again to be speaking in favour of keeping Utilitarianism 
(practical love and self-givingness) restricted as a particular aspect of morality, instead of 
‘morality as a whole’. In some sense, this is true, but then again I see it as a good thing 
because from the very beginning the whole point has been to depict Utilitarianism as 
consistent with other labels in philosophy.  
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 But there is still one last effort that I can do to make Utilitarianism (or in any case 
Agapism) even more central than I have managed to make it thus far. This last effort may 
involve problematising some of the claims that I myself have made, in particular the claim 
that practical love is just one aspect of the fundamental moral principle as opposed to the 
principle itself, but that is exactly what this last effort of mine consists in. If the principle 
of ‘respect for persons in general’ can as such be called ‘the principle of practical love’, then 
Utilitarianism (Agapism) must have some genuine claim as a label for our moral philosophy 
as a whole (or perhaps the main label as among those that apply to the moral theory as a 
whole). 
 This is how I see things going. Even though we don’t owe ‘obedience to reason within’ 
to sentient beings in general in a relationally-specific way (for they are obviously not the direct 
object of this attitude), we can still talk about owing them (as intended beneficiaries) all acts 
that constitute obedience to reason within. This is of course the very same point I have 
been making all along: all moral acts stand in relation to reason within as moral authority 
(as the only source of their obligatoriness), but this doesn’t prevent those same acts from 
standing in relation to sentient beings in general as intended beneficiaries. But of course this 
double relationality is assumed by the very definition of ‘practical love’ that I have been 
working with all along. If it doesn’t come from morally legislative reason but from some 
other place, if it doesn’t belong in the idea of living up to the internal standards of 
humanity, it just doesn’t count as practical love. Such is exactly what distinguishes 
‘practical’ (rationally-based) from ‘pathological’ (sensibility-based) love, remember. And so 
I ask: how is it that adding other human beings in the picture as co-legislators and co-
workers in the moral community (the Contractualist aspect of morality) can possibly ruin 
the status of the basic moral principle as a ‘principle of practical love’ if we have agreed that 
reference to the intra-personal dimension of morality cannot do that? It can’t, of course, 
and so I say: if it doesn’t put the moral subject in relation with other moral subjects as co-
workers or co-guardians in the moral community, if it relates to human beings as ‘mere 
intended beneficiaries’ or ‘passive citizens’, i.e. if it treats human beings as babies, it ain’t 
practical love. If it doesn’t involve truthfulness of testimony (especially human or moral 
testimony, i.e. calling things by their name) vis-à-vis human beings in general (as well as 
sincerity in promises and other things that may rightly belong in this dimension of 
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morality), it just ain’t practical love. But if – given this basic clarification – morality can in 
fact as a whole be seen as a matter of practical love, i.e. if this ‘practical love’ can rightly be 
deemed uniquely necessary and sufficient for moral goodness to obtain (because it embodies 
direct obedience to the moral law and respect for persons in general, both as capable of 
morality and as capable of happiness), then we really have to entertain the possibility that 
Utilitarianism (Agapism) – the theory depicting morality in this way – is actually true. But 
of course this is also my proposed reconstruction of Kantian philosophy, and I take it to 
follow as a conclusion of all the work done that there is no real conflict between Kantian 

















                                               
136 At the very least, it has been shown how (and by implication also that) it is possible to make meaningful 
and systematic use of both of these labels in the context of accounting for the basic facts about the nature of 
morality (including the basic map that we need to draw of the fundamental moral relations that obtain 
between persons in the moral community).  
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Part III (Conclusion) 
 
 
Let me bring this work to an end by offering further reflection concerning the relation 
between Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, only now more so from the perspective of what 
they share (or can be seen as sharing) as historical movements in moral philosophy. Real 
differences between them notwithstanding, there is one common feature in relation to the 
genesis of these movements that we do well to acknowledge, namely that were developed 
under the maxim of: (i) making good of ancient – especially Hellenistic, i.e. Stoic and 
Epicurean – philosophy, and (ii) secularising – i.e. divorcing from theological foundations – 
the fundamental ethical insights of ‘Christian philosophy’. Let me begin by quoting Mill’s 
Utilitarianism again (Mill, 1861/2003, p.187): 
 
I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out 
their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient 
manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included.  
 
Before developing my claim, I need to note that Mill writes these lines in the context of his 
famous (or should I say infamous) argument to the effect that ‘Utilitarianism’ (as allegedly 
a ‘hedonistic’ theory that because of that relates very closely to Epicurean philosophy, which 
I argue is a mistake if taken to mean there is no ‘moral goodness’ irreducible to the felicific 
or the hedonic – which I doubt is what Mill really means to say anyway, but in any case) is 
not a ‘philosophy for swine’ because it acknowledges – as he takes ancient epicureans to 
have acknowledged – that human beings have access to ‘higher pleasures’ (pleasures of the 
intellect and social interaction) which far surpass in ‘value’ – as components of happiness, 
i.e. in felicific value – that of the lower pleasures also available to non-human animals, and 
that therefore human happiness is almost incomparably better (again, in the strict felicific 
sense) than ‘merely animal’ happiness, and that therefore our human ‘sense of dignity’ 
comes out vindicated in ‘Utilitarianism’. This is the weakest argument in the entire book, 
I think. Not only is Mill’s claim false that ‘higher pleasures’ are as such more valuable 
(felicifically speaking) than ‘lower pleasures’ (as not only Bentham but also Kant rightly 
 161 
pointed out) ,137 he is also completely mis-locating the ground of our special ‘sense of human 
dignity’. As Kant emphasised with the Stoics and Christian philosophy in mind, what 
makes human beings special is our moral vocation as such, the fact that we are called for 
morality, which we are in such a way that self-love (i.e. our natural concern for our own 
happiness, or our own ‘pleasure’ as Stoics who think ‘happiness’ lies elsewhere would 
always have to call it) has to take second place in our practical life. In a certain sense, 
morality is very much all about subordinating the call of self-love to the call of moral duty, 
to constraint the pursuit of our own happiness by the moral pursuit (which – as Kant 
himself makes it very clear – essentially involves the pursuit of the happiness of subjects in 
general). This is of course the essence of the Kantian story, which Mill obscures by trying 
to place the ground of human dignity elsewhere, in a place that in truth we are the equals 
of other animals (as in a certain sense even Kant acknowledges).  
 But are we supposed to conclude from this analysis (of the argument in the context 
of which Mill invokes ‘Epicurean’ and ‘Stoic’ and ‘Christian’ philosophy as having to come 
together in making sense of ‘Utilitarianism’) that therefore Mill – or Utilitarianism itself – 
lacks the resources to be able to follow the Kantian story? If I understand Mill’s intention 
here, he is invoking the two schools more associated with virtue than they are with pleasure 
(the ‘Christian’ and ‘Stoic’ schools) because he wants to point out that ‘Utilitarianism’ is 
not out to portray human beings as having no more mental powers than pigs do; but of 
course that is a point that all moral philosophy has to assume in the idea that human beings 
– and not so others animals, i.e. to the extent that they are really non-human – are moral 
beings capable of bearing duties and being morally good, etc. If Utilitarianism is to be 
presented in a fair-minded way as an ethical theory, there is absolutely no need to appeal 
to felicific distinctions to defend human dignity in the (also fair-minded) Kantian sense. 
Now, I am of course focusing on the negatives of Mill’s efforts (seizing the opportunity to 
make a general point about ‘dignity’ that once again captures the essence of this work); but 
actually this is not the only place where reference to ‘Stoic’ and ‘Christian’ philosophy 
comes up in Mill’s Utilitarianism, and I think we do well to examine those other references 
because they speak to something good and deep. 
                                               
137 I will come back to this point.  
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 We can safely assume that the ‘Christian’ component (or perhaps the most 
important ‘Christian’ component) in Mill’s narrative has to do with the fundamental moral 
principle itself, for he quite explicitly tells us to make this connection: “In the golden rule 
of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would 
be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of 
utilitarian morality.”138 (Mill, 1861/2003, p.194). This is perfectly consistent with the story 
that I have told in this work, construing Utilitarianism as an agapist doctrine that therefore 
belongs in the domain of ‘human dignity’ in the Kantian sense, thus making it the case 
that Utilitarians have at their disposal the same answer that everyone else (e.g. ‘Stoics’ and 
‘Kantians’ and ‘Christians’) gives when asked if human beings are capable of something 
‘higher’ than pleasure: yes, they are capable of self-legislation, co-legislation, co-loving of 
creation, speaking for the ‘voiceless’, impartial self-givingness for the happiness of subjects, 
etc., i.e. human beings are capable of morality. More recently, Peter Singer made a similar 
association (Singer, 2017, p.31):  
 
All of these philosophers139 can be seen as presenting utilitarianism as the best understanding 
and application of the insight that underlies the Golden Rule. Nor is it an accident, we 
believe, that something akin to the Golden Rule lies at the core of the ethics of many 
different cultures and civilizations, from the Jewish and Christian traditions to those of India 
and China. That utilitarianism can plausibly be seen as an implication of the same insight is 
a further argument in its favour.  
 
Let me stop to consider this claim by Singer, which I find instructive. The fact that in the 
last line Singer speaks of Utilitarianism as an application of the moral insight embodied in 
the ‘Golden Rule’ suggests that he is talking about ‘Utilitarianism’ as something – a 
                                               
138 My emphasis. 
139 Singer mentions Bentham and Mill in relation to their “everybody is to count for one and nobody for 
more than one” slogan; Sidgwick and the “requirement that we regard the good of any one individual as 
equivalent to the good of any other”; Harsanyi’s and his idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’ which “forces us to be 
impartial between all members of the group for which we are choosing”; Smart and his appeal to the 
sentiment of ‘generalized benevolence’; and lastly Hare and his “analysis of moral language as requiring us to 
put ourselves in the position of all of those affected by our actions”. (Singer, 2017, p. 31) 
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procedure such as the ‘felicific calculus’ perhaps – that is called for given the aforesaid 
insight as opposed to something (a moral theory?) giving us the insight itself, which doesn’t 
exactly speak in favour of my point. But that is only the last line in the passage, and right 
before that Singer also speaks of Utilitarianism as providing an “understanding” of the 
Golden Rule (Singer, 2017, p.31), which does speak in favour of my point because a theory 
putatively giving us an understanding of a certain insight (and portraying that insight as the 
fundamental moral insight available to humanity) is a theory that claims that insight for 
itself as its very essence, which is exactly what Mill does in relation to ‘the Golden Rule of 
Jesus of Nazareth’ as one that captures the “complete spirit” of Utilitarianism (Mill, 
1861/2003, p.194). 
 The name ‘Utilitarianism’ may be a new thing, but the ones who first identified 
themselves by it (and even those who still identify) didn’t see the referent as a new thing at 
all. If anything, they saw it as one of the ancient belongings of the ‘human species’. 
Utilitarianism is meant to be a philosophy based on human reason vindicating ‘practical 
love’ as the fundamental duty of the human being. Insofar as Kant can be regarded in the 
same (or similar) light, this is an important point of encounter between the two projects in 
moral philosophy. Now, let me admit that this particular point (the fact that both are 
attempts to secularise the fundamental ethical insights of ‘Christian philosophy’, and 
especially – for my purposes – the notion of ‘agape’) is to a large extent philosophical cliché. 
After all, the only thing I have pointed to here (the ‘Golden Rule’ as registered in a 
particular expression of it) is something that speaks to everyone but which at the same time 
admits of many possible interpretations, and nothing can be assumed on this basis about 
how much the two projects in moral philosophy actually have in common. Now, you can 
of course fill in this gap with the content of this work, or you can try to fill it in yourself, 
of course.  
 I am not trying to diminish the importance of the fact that both projects in moral 
philosophy try to associate themselves with Christian philosophy. But I don’t think this is 
the most theoretically interesting association that they have in common. If I am allowed, I 
would like to give this particular honour to Hellenistic philosophy. We already saw Mill 
invoking both ‘Stoic’ and ‘Epicurean’ philosophy as necessary to understand ‘Utilitarian’ 
philosophy. Now, his own way of arbitrating between the two ancient schools and putting 
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them together is problematic in ways that I have explained already: for instance, I don’t 
think Mill is the best representative of ‘hedonism about well-being’, nor do I think he 
manages to do justice to human dignity in something like the Kantian sense. But the fact 
is that Mill partially redeems himself with his reference to the ‘Golden Rule’, and there is 
another reference to the Stoics (and in fact to Kant himself under the name ‘the 
Transcendentalist’) that I think we need to consider to get the full picture of what he has 
in mind for Utilitarianism (Mill, 1861/2003, p.194): 
 
Meanwhile, let utilitarians never cease to claim the morality of self-devotion as a possession 
which belongs by as good a right to them, as either to the Stoic or to the Transcendentalist. 
The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own 
greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. 
A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it 
considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds, is devotion to the 
happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of others; either of mankind collectively, 
or of individuals within the limits imposed by the collective interests of mankind.  
 
Utilitarians, Mill claims, are committed to sacrificing their ‘greatest good’ if morality so 
requires. You can take this as the resolution to put one’s life in line in some ‘extreme 
situation’, but I suggest we read it in the more general (Kantian) sense of morality not being 
grounded in self-love and indeed as involving the subordination of self-love to moral duty, 
death and misfortune come as they may. In fact, I suspect that such is what Mill actually 
had in mind here. Initially, however, the story that Mill gives us may seem to contradict 
Kant’s at some level: while Kant tells us that self-love is always to be subordinated to moral 
duty out of reverence for the moral law (and in this sense ‘directly for the sake of the law’), Mill 
tells us that ‘moral sacrifice’ is a waste if it “does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum 
total of happiness” (Mill, 1861/2003, p.194). Apparently making things worse, Mill tells us 
that the sacrifice itself Utilitarianism doesn’t consider ‘good’ (Mill, 1861/2003, p.194). Let 
me help Mill a little: the act which constitutes ‘moral sacrifice’ (which it does only because 
it counts as a morally good act which incidentally involves ‘self-sacrifice’ as a by-product of 
subordination, i.e. of putting self-love second with respect to moral duty in terms of one’s 
practical priorities) is of itself morally good, i.e. it’s moral goodness (i.e. its morality or moral 
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worth and therefore the person’s being worthy of gratitude for her act) does not depend 
on felicific consequences or tendencies in any form. Now, of course self-sacrifice if not of 
itself a benefit for anyone, and of course the person that ‘sacrifices her good’ does not see 
the sacrifice itself (the act regarded as an ‘act of sacrifice’) as something worth pursuing. 
Kant is right in thinking that she does so from duty (simply because she morally ought to): 
Mill is right in thinking that this same act (acting from duty) essentially involves acting for 
the happiness of subjects, such that there is nothing that one does from duty, and therefore 
no ‘moral sacrifice’, that is not done for the happiness of subjects. Hence my (admittedly 
reconstructed) interpretation of the claim that Mill is advancing here. Again: he has 
reclaimed for Utilitarianism the right to demand ‘self-sacrifice’ no less than the Stoic or the 
Transcendentalist (a.k.a. Kant) are capable of demanding, he is only adding that none of 
this would make any sense (i.e. we would not really identify it as part of morality) if it didn’t 
relate – at least at some level, and of course always in the right way – to sentient beings in 
general as intended beneficiaries. In my (admittedly reconstructed) reading of Kant’s moral 
philosophy as a whole, he agrees. In virtue of Kant’s ‘doctrine of morally obligatory ends’ 
(MM 6:379–395) and other elements of his morally philosophy, he already seems to agree 
on the fundamental point. Once again, therefore, I conclude that there is no real conflict 
between Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Neither has a claim to being more (duly) ‘Stoic’ 
than the other.  
 As to Kant’s arbitration between Stoic and Epicurean philosophy (with which I 
end), there are two important points to note. (1) It is a notorious fact that Kant rejects Stoic 
philosophy on the basis of what he sees as the truth in Epicurean philosophy. We have 
gone over this more than once, but I really need to recapitulate. The Stoics are right to 
emphasise moral virtue as the paramount ‘good’ (the ‘supreme practical good’ as Kant 
would have it) in human life, but they are wrong in thinking that happiness (well-being) is 
thereby secured, or that everything is therefore fine in a human life; they are right in 
claiming that human beings are capable of something ‘higher’ than pleasure, but they are 
wrong in denying pleasure as such the claim that it has as an essential component of ‘the 
human good’: there is an irreducibly felicific component to the ‘human good’, and it 
depends completely on the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, enjoyment and 
suffering (in the literal, experiential sense of these terms). “Well-being or ill-being”, Kant 
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tells us, “always signifies only a reference to our state of agreeableness or disagreeableness, 
of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object on this account we do so only 
insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure it 
causes.” (CPrR 5:60). If it is happiness or well-being that we are talking about, Kant is as 
much an unqualified hedonist as Bentham was, as we can appreciate in his larger treatment 
of the issue in the Second Critique (his account of non-moral psychology in particular, which 
we find condensed in 5:23–25). And so the conclusion follows once again – now from 
another perspective – that there is no real conflict between Kantian ethics and 
Utilitarianism: neither has a claim to being more (duly) ‘Epicurean’ than the other.  
 Now, the second (more interesting point) is what Kant gives to the Stoics and how 
he tries to put it together with the ‘Epicurean’ component of his view. We have visited this 
place already, but (again) I need it to recapitulate and offer my final reflections. The most 
essential way in which Kant puts Stoic and Epicurean philosophy together is one that 
transcends the limits of moral or ethical theory: the most general way in which Kant does 
this (through his notion of the ‘highest good’ in the person) is one that pertains first and 
foremost to his theory of ‘the human good’, and second (and more importantly for him in 
terms of the general emphasis that he gives to everything he touches) in his ‘practical 
philosophy’, which is based on the dualistic psychology of the human being: the idea that 
the human being is essentially driven by both duty and self-love. Now, there is a basic thesis 
in relation to Kant’s dualism that does pertain in ethical theory, namely the part that says 
that moral goodness (the morally good maxim) consists in the subordination of the influence 
– in the human will – of self-love to the influence of moral duty. However, as you can see, 
this is Kant’s distinctive (ubiquitous to his practical philosophy) take on the priorities that 
reason attaches to the two basic principles of the human will (through his conception of 
the kind of principle that the moral principle is, of course: a categorical principle), which 
together comprise ‘practical’ as opposed to just ‘moral’ philosophy. ‘Practical philosophy’ 
includes both ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’ practical philosophy, a theory of ‘pure practical 
reason’ that Kant associates with the Stoics and a theory of ‘empirical practical reason’ that 
he associates with Epicureans: he sees each school as giving us (with their own emphasis) 
an irreducible aspect of our ‘human – including agential – nature’, and we are supposed to 
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put them together in the idea of the ‘highest good in the person’, which Kant then 
associates with ‘Christian philosophy’.  
 Now, it is here that a certain issue arises on which I haven’t dared to pronounce, 
namely Kant’s idea of ‘retributive’ or ‘punitive’ (and also of course ‘remunerative’) justice: 
the idea that the virtuous should be happy and the vicious suffer. Perhaps to your 
disappointment, I will continue in silence with respect to my take on this particular notion,  
and instead make a basic point that I think needs to be made concerning discussion of it 
in moral philosophy. The issue of ‘punitive’ / ‘remunerative’ justice comes up very 
frequently in discussions surrounding the relation between Kantian ethics and 
Utilitarianism, much more so than self-givingness does (which in fact hardly ever does 
because Kantians are generally happy to avoid it and Utilitarians tend to treat facts about 
the nature of moral motivation as less than morally fundamental, most of the time not even 
caring what it is that moves human beings in action so long as they ‘do the right –  
felicifically optimific – thing’), and I want to take the chance to explain why this tendency 
should be regarded as seriously problematic. This tendency has to change because self-
givingness is part of morality in a way that ‘punitive’ / ‘remunerative’ justice can never hope 
to be (even if we agree on calling morality itself by the name – as one among its various 
names – of ‘worthiness of happiness’). What I mean here is that the latter idea (whatever 
we make of it) presupposes the former as itself part of morality in a more essential manner, 
being exactly the kind of thing one can point to as rendering human beings ‘worthy of 
happiness’. Accordingly, we can imagine God’s judgement proceeding as follows: did she 
exercise adequate self-givingness? She is worthy of happiness, then.    
 What I just said is by no means taking sides for Utilitarianism as against Kantian 
ethics, for I think that a careful reading of Kant himself reveals that we are in agreement 
here. Kant’s own doctrine of morally obligatory ends (which puts the human being in 
relation to the happiness of subjects as intended beneficiaries), for instance, belongs in his 
moral philosophy in a way that his doctrine of ‘retributive’ / ‘remunerative’ justice can 
never hope to. The latter doctrine transcends ethical theory as such even for Kant, having 
more to do with the related question of hope taking us to what Kant and other people would 
call ‘religion’ (something which I haven’t touched directly in this work). The pursuit of 
everyone’s happiness in practical love, on the contrary, which essentially involves acting for 
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the benefit of subjects, is essentially constitutive of moral activity itself, and as such it should 
figure in moral philosophy well before we get to the point (if we even need to go there) of 
talking about punishment and reward. In this way, everyone’s happiness – including the 
happiness of non-human animals – is more central (radically more pressing talking about) 
than one’s morally deserved happiness in Kantian ethical theory.  
 Kant’s account of the relations between moral virtue and happiness is far more 
complex and exhaustive – and to a large extent more ‘Utilitarian’, and in any case more 
useful for Utilitarians in their own theorising and for everyone else defending the moral 
standing of non-human animals – than popular slogans and narratives have ever managed 
to convey. Kant’s most basic point in his moral philosophy (a point emphasis on which I 
think deserves him the label of ‘the philosopher of practical priorities’) is of course that 
morality (holding our moral principles sacred and religiously observing them) is radically 
more important than – in the sense of practically unconditional with respect to – the pursuit 
of our own happiness in self-love: morality is always to be given ‘first place’, never to be 
compromised. But of course this point (which should on its own be appealing for 
Utilitarians as philosophers who claim to give morality a prominent place in human life) 
cuts across other themes in Kant’s philosophy where happiness figures in a more prominent 
manner: there is also Kant’s ‘doctrine of morally obligatory ends’ (MM 6:379–395), his 
derivation of the duty of generalised benevolence entailing the notion of ‘self-givingness’ 
or ‘acting for the happiness of subjects’ (MM 6:393), and more.  
 I hope my use of these resources, and this work as a whole, have shed some light 
on the nature of or our existing ethical theories. More importantly, I hope light has been 
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